Intergroup Relations and Intercultural Policies in European Cities

Draft Overview Report of CLIP’s third module

Draft version (10.09.2009), not to be quoted

Doris Lüken-Klaßen & Friedrich Heckmann

European Forum for Migration Studies (EFMS)

© 2008 European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions
Wyattville Road, Loughlinstown, Dublin 18, Ireland
Telephone: + 353 1 2043100, Fax: + 353 1 2826456
Table of Contents

Foreword....................................................................................................................................8

1. Introduction.........................................................................................................................10

2. Intergroup relations and major issues in CLIP cities......................................................19

3. Patterns of intercultural policies in CLIP cities..............................................................42

4. Meeting religious needs and fostering inter-religious dialogue........................................87

5. Tendencies of radicalisation and de-radicalisation policies.............................................107

6. Conclusions and Recommendations................................................................................122

Bibliography ..........................................................................................................................123

Annex: CLIP European Research Group................................................................................126
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreword</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals of the report</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The CLIP network</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European policy background</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conceptual approach</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research method</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research questions and structure of the report</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Intergroup relations and major issues in CLIP cities</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1. Overview on cities’ populations</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2. Recognition and resources for migrants’ heritage</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3. Religious practices, identities and needs</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4. Prejudice and discrimination</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5. Representation of migrants in the media</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6. Language</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7. The use of public space and safety issues</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8. Imported ethnic and political conflict</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9. Issues in relation to national minorities</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.10. Gender roles and relations</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Patterns of intercultural policies in CLIP cities</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1. General approaches</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2. Structure of relations between city and migrant and minority groups</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3. Intercultural policies towards ethnic organisations</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3.1. Funding of migrant organisations ............................................................. 48
3.3.2. Empowering and connecting migrant organisations ................................. 51
3.3.3. Policies of recognition ............................................................................... 55
3.3.4. Promoting a shared vision ......................................................................... 56
3.4. Policies improving attitudes and relations between groups ............................. 58
  3.4.1. Institutionalised intercultural dialogue ...................................................... 58
  3.4.2. Humanising the ‘other’ by creating informal contact ............................... 59
  3.4.3. (Inter)Cultural events ................................................................................ 62
  3.4.4. Intercultural competence building ............................................................. 66
  3.4.5. Anti-racism/anti-discrimination work ....................................................... 70
  3.4.6. Inclusive identity strategy ......................................................................... 72
  3.4.7. Cities’ communication strategies .............................................................. 74
  3.4.8. Public space management ......................................................................... 77
3.5. Policies improving the relations between police and migrant groups ................. 80
  3.5.1. Intercultural education of police officers .................................................. 80
  3.5.2. Information on the police for migrants ..................................................... 83
  3.5.3. Institutionalised dialogue between police and migrant organisations ....... 84
4. Meeting religious needs and fostering inter-religious dialogue ........................... 87
  4.1. Policies for meeting religious needs .............................................................. 87
    4.1.1. Construction of religious buildings ........................................................... 87
    4.1.2. Burials and cemeteries .............................................................................. 89
    4.1.3. Dress codes .............................................................................................. 91
    4.1.4. Education ................................................................................................ 92
    4.1.5. Food ......................................................................................................... 92
  4.2. Inter-religious dialogue ................................................................................. 93
    4.2.1. Inter-religious dialogue about faith topics ................................................ 94
    4.2.2. Inter-religious dialogue about secular topics ............................................ 96
  4.3. Improving relations with Muslim communities ............................................. 98
    4.3.1. Recognising Muslim communities and establishing relationships .......... 99
    4.3.2. Empowerment and (political) involvement of Muslim representatives .. 102
    4.3.3. Information about and contact with Islam ............................................... 104
5. Tendencies of radicalisation and de-radicalisation policies .............................................107

5.1. What is radicalisation? ........................................................................................................107

5.2. Radicalisation in the majority population ......................................................................111
   5.2.1. Patterns of radicalisation .............................................................................................111
   5.2.2. Policies and measures against radicalisation tendencies within the majority ...............113

5.3. Radicalisation in the minority population .......................................................................115
   5.3.1. Patterns of radicalisation .............................................................................................115
   5.3.2. Policies and measures against radicalisation tendencies in the minority ......................116

6. Conclusions and Recommendations .....................................................................................122

Bibliography ................................................................................................................................123

Annex: CLIP European Research Group .....................................................................................126
**List of Figures**

Figure 1: CLIP cities covered in this report ................................................................. 12
Figure 2: Groups represented in the interviews during the CLIP field research .......... 17
Figure 3: The Council and intercultural policies ............................................................ 45
Figure 4: The mayor’s role in intercultural policies ....................................................... 47

**List of Tables**

Table 1: CLIP cities’ populations and migrant proportion ............................................. 20
Table 2: Religious composition of CLIP cities’ population ............................................. 22
Table 3: Radicalisation tendencies in segments of city population ............................... 110

**List of Good Practice Examples**

Box 1: Breda: funding for migrant organisations’ projects ............................................. 49
Box 2: Turin: public-private partnership ....................................................................... 50
Box 3: Prague: ‘House of National Minorities’ .............................................................. 51
Box 4: Newport, Stuttgart, Sundsvall and Turku: courses in association management ....... 51
Box 5: Dublin: ‘Migrant Voters Campaign’ ................................................................... 52
Box 6: Stuttgart: ‘Forum of Cultures’ ......................................................................... 53
Box 7: Zagreb: institutionalised and informal contacts between city and minorities ....... 55
Box 8: Tallinn: Kodurahu – Peace in the Community..................................................... 57
Box 9: Arnsberg: ‘International Cooking Night’ ............................................................... 59
Box 10: Athens: ‘Responsible Little Citizens’ ................................................................. 61
Box 11: Sundsvall: contact and integration through sport – the project ‘Fotboll Plus’ ....... 62
Box 12: Newport: encouragement to celebrate ethnic heritage festivals ...................... 63
Box 13: Lisbon: intercultural festival ‘ImigrArte’ ............................................................ 64
Box 14: Luxembourg: ‘Festival des Migrations’ ......................................................... 64
Box 15: Wrocław: ‘Kaleidoscope of Cultures’ ............................................................... 65
Box 16: Kirklees: ‘Interfaith Kirklees’ ......................................................................... 67
Box 17: Sundsvall and Malmö: ‘Swedish for Immigrants’ (SFI) ..................................... 69
Box 18: Sundsvall: ‘Centre for Mother Tongue Education’ .......................................... 70
Box 19: Newport: ‘Newport Hate Crime Forum’ ................................................................. 71
Box 20: Copenhagen: ‘We Copenhageners’ ....................................................................... 73
Box 21: Turku: ‘New Citizen of Turku’ and ‘Multicultural Actor’ awards ......................... 74
Box 22: Wolverhampton: ‘One City News’ ........................................................................ 76
Box 23: Athens: ‘Athens International Radio’ ..................................................................... 76
Box 24: Frankfurt: public communication of the AmkA ..................................................... 77
Box 25: Turin: regulating the use of public parks together with local associations ............. 77
Box 26: Amsterdam: ‘Young in Westerpark’ ..................................................................... 79
Box 27: Malmö: chess rooms in the Rosengård city district library ................................... 79
Box 28: Dublin: ‘Ethnic Liaison Unit’ ................................................................................ 81
Box 29: Stuttgart: ‘Cooperation between the Police and Mosque Associations’ .............. 85
Box 30: Terrassa: supporting the acceptance of mosques ............................................... 89
Box 31: Stuttgart: Islamic classes in public schools ............................................................ 92
Box 32: Frankfurt: ‘Council of Religions’ ......................................................................... 96
Box 33: Amsterdam: ‘Jewish Moroccan Network Amsterdam’ ........................................ 97
Box 34: Zurich: Hosting of iftar dinners in the town hall .................................................. 100
Box 35: Stuttgart: qualification of young Muslim leaders .................................................. 102
Box 36: Newport: The child protection project in madressahs .......................................... 103
Box 37: Arnsberg: ‘Quran Project’ .................................................................................... 105
Box 38: Vienna: ‘Ramadan Information Bulletin’ .............................................................. 105
Box 39: Valencia: ‘Open Mosque Days’ .......................................................................... 105
Box 40: Lisbon: ‘Islamic Community of Lisbon’ (CIL) ..................................................... 106
Box 41: Arnsberg: ‘Open to the World Festival’ .............................................................. 113
Box 42: Kirklees: ‘Safe Tenant Initiative’ ......................................................................... 114
Box 43: Terrassa: careful choice and education of imams ................................................. 117
Box 44: Dublin: Young Muslims Club .............................................................................. 117
Box 45: Amsterdam: Poldermoskee .................................................................................. 118
Box 46: Vienna: sustained intercultural dialogue ............................................................... 119
Box 47: Amsterdam: A comprehensive anti-radicalisation strategy ................................ 121
Foreword

In 2006, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe (CoE), the city of Stuttgart and the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (‘Eurofound’) came together to form the European network of ‘Cities for Local Integration Policies’ for Migrants (CLIP).

The CLIP network, which was officially launched in Dublin in September 2006, brings together more than 30 large and medium-sized cities from all regions of Europe in a joint learning process over several years. The network seeks to support effective and sustainable social, economic and societal integration of migrants, combat inequalities and discrimination, and help migrants preserve their cultural identity. Through this joint initiative, the partners are continuing their longstanding commitment and activities in the field of social inclusion and improved social cohesion within local authorities in Europe.

The network is supported by the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) and the Committee of the Regions (CoR) of the European Union. In 2007 and 2008, the cities of Vienna and Amsterdam joined the network’s steering committee. Besides, the CLIP network has formed a partnership with the European Network Against Racism (ENAR).

The first module of work undertaken by CLIP focused on housing, a key issue in the integration of migrants into host societies. It led to an overview report that examines segregation as well as access to affordable housing for migrants and presents innovative policies and their successful implementation at the local level. The second module addressed equality and diversity in municipal employment and services provision. The network analysed policies enhancing migrants’ access to municipal jobs and progress in employment as well as cities’ efforts to provide adequate services for migrants.

This current, third report focuses on intergroup relations and intercultural dialogue in European cities. Since the multicultural, multi-ethnic and multi-religious structures of urban populations challenge the ability of cities to secure social cohesion, cities have a genuine interest to establish effective intercultural policies and promote peaceful intergroup relations on the local level.

Thus, this report presents and analyses intergroup relations and intercultural policies in the CLIP cities, allowing for an exchange of experiences that encourages a learning process within the network. The report is based on CLIP city case studies that comprise information provided by the individual cities, but also include assessments made by representatives of ethnic associations, religious communities, and non-governmental organisations as well as social partners, politicians and other local experts.

As intergroup relations, intercultural and inter-religious dialogue represent a central issue in the ongoing European, national and local debates, we hope that this CLIP report will
communicate policy-relevant experiences and outputs to local, national and European administrative staff and policymakers.

Jorma Karppinen, Director, Eurofound
Ulrich Bohner, Secretary General of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe
Wolfgang Schuster, Lord Mayor of Stuttgart
Sandra Frauenberger, Executive City Councillor for Integration, Women’s Issues, Consumer Protection and Personnel, Vienna
Job Cohen, Lord Mayor of Amsterdam
1. Introduction

Goals of the report

European cities, in particular major cities with strong economies, attract immigrants from all over the world. As a result, urban populations have become increasingly heterogeneous in ethnic, cultural and religious terms. The multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious structures of urban society are, on the one hand, an opportunity for cities, for instance in terms of cultural innovativeness and international competitiveness. At the same time, however, heterogeneity challenges the ability of cities to establish or maintain peaceful and productive relations among the different segments of the population.

This report looks at interrelations between different groups: between local authorities, ethnic and religious migrant associations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other civil society organisations. Our analysis is based on an intergroup approach and grounded in an empirical analysis. The goal is to identify and analyse those relations and intercultural policies which work rather successfully and hence bridge ‘gaps’ between the different ethnic and religious groups, contribute to enhance intergroup relations and foster the integration process of migrants and ethnic and national minorities.¹

Although this report explores relations between all groups living in the cities that make up the CLIP network, there is a particular focus on the experiences of Muslim communities. This reflects the fact that Islam is the largest ‘new’ religion in European countries of immigration, and because, in some contexts, Muslims are perceived as disconnected from ‘European life’. Compared with other migrant groups, there are higher rates of discrimination and prejudice against Muslims and often underlying anxieties about Islam as a threat both to the culture and way of life of European cities and to security.

The CLIP network

Cities have a genuine interest in successful local integration practices. In response to this, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe (CoE), the city of Stuttgart and the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (‘Eurofound’) launched the European network of ‘Cities for Local Integration Policies’ (CLIP) in 2006.

¹ With ‘migrants’ we mean persons who have immigrated themselves and their descendants in the second generation. In some countries, such as the UK, these groups are referred to as ‘ethnic minorities’; in other countries, such as Germany, as ‘people with a migration background’. National minorities are historically and legally established groups in multi-ethnic states, whose belonging to the state is, in most cases, not due to migration, but the result of drawing borders between states.
The city network is supported politically by the Committee of the Regions (CoR) and the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) and has formed a partnership with the European Network Against Racism (ENAR).

The CLIP network seeks to:

- support the social and economic integration and full participation of migrants,
- combat social inequalities and discrimination against migrants,
- improve the peaceful co-existence between migrants and natives and
- promote respect for the cultural identity of migrants.

The CLIP network aims to achieve these goals by bringing together European cities and fostering a joint learning process about successful integration practices over several years. By encouraging the structured sharing of experiences through the medium of city reports and workshops, the network enables local authorities to learn from each other and, thus, pursue a more effective integration policy for migrants. The analysis of innovative policies, carried out under the auspices of CLIP, not only enhances the emerging policy debate at the local, but at the European level as well.

The CLIP network is composed of thirty-five European cities. Of these, thirty-one participated in this third module: Amsterdam (the Netherlands), Antwerp (Belgium), Arnsberg (Germany), Athens (Greece), Bologna (Italy), Breda (the Netherlands), Budapest (Hungary), Copenhagen (Denmark), Dublin (Ireland), Frankfurt am Main (Germany), Hospitalet (Spain), Istanbul (Turkey), Kirklees (United Kingdom), Lisbon (Portugal), Luxembourg (Grand Duchy of Luxembourg), Malmö (Sweden), Newport (United Kingdom), Prague (Czech Republic), Stuttgart (Germany), Sundsvall (Sweden), Tallinn (Estonia), Terrassa (Spain), Turin (Italy), Turku (Finland), Valencia (Spain), Vienna (Austria), Wolverhampton (United Kingdom), Wroclaw (Poland), Zagreb (Croatia), Zeytinburnu (Turkey) and Zurich (Switzerland) (see figure 1).²

It is worth noting that there is considerable variation in the CLIP cities. Their political structure and organisation, economic performance and migration histories vary both between and within the countries. In addition the size of CLIP cities varies considerably. The smallest city is the German city of Arnsberg with approximately 80,000 residents whilst the largest cities host more than a million residents, such as Prague, Vienna, Budapest and Istanbul (see table 1 below). This diversity is one of the strengths of the CLIP network because it provides an opportunity to better understand the implications of the diversity in size and political organisation for the nature of intergroup relations and of the opportunities for, and barriers to, the introduction of policies that promote intergroup and intercultural dialogue.

² The cities of Helsinki (Finland), İzmir (Turkey), Liège (Belgium) and Strasbourg (France) are members of the CLIP network as well. These cities have not participated in this module, but maintain an interest in the findings of the research.
The CLIP network is managed by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (‘Eurofound’), which also chairs the CLIP Steering Committee. The steering committee consists of representatives of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe (CoE), the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) and the cities of Amsterdam, Stuttgart and Vienna. The third sector is represented by the European Network Against Racism (ENAR); the CLIP Research Group is represented by its coordinator. The work of the steering committee is politically supported by the Committee of the Regions (CoR) of the European Union.

The cities’ shared learning process within the network is supported by the CLIP Research Group, a group of six scientific centres that implement the research. The centres are the Institute for Urban and Regional Research (ISR) in Vienna, the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES) in Amsterdam, the Forum of International and European Research on Immigration (FIERI) in Turin, the Institute of International Studies (IIS) in Wroclaw, the
Centre for Migration Policy Research (CMPR) in Swansea and the european forum for migration studies (efms) in Bamberg which coordinates the research group.3

**European policy background**

On a political level, relations between different groups in cities are the topic of ‘intercultural dialogue’. Intercultural dialogue is an important issue at the European policy level. The European Union, the Council of Europe as well as other European actors play a vital role in promoting intercultural dialogue and intercultural relations.

The **European Union** – and particularly the European Commission – is an influential policy driver in the field of intercultural dialogue. On the one hand, European legislation is an important foundation for intercultural dialogue: the ‘EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ – as well as several directives and agendas – addresses equality, freedom and citizens’ rights. On the other hand, the European Commission issued several statements about the topic. In its ‘Common Agenda for Integration: Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union’ of 2005, the Commission recognises the importance of intercultural as well as inter-religious dialogue and emphasises its impact on the local context (European Commission 2005).

Similarly, the ‘Common Basic Principles’, issued by the Council of the European Union in order to form the basis of a common European framework on migrant integration, emphasise that “Frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens is a fundamental mechanism for integration. Shared forums, inter-cultural dialogue, education about immigrants and immigrant cultures, and stimulating living conditions in urban environments enhance the interactions between immigrants and Member State citizens” (Council of the European Union 2004: 22).

To put the issue of intercultural dialogue firmly on the table of national debates and to create a more open and diverse environment by promoting the basic values of mutual respect and participatory European citizenship, the European Union declared 2008 the ‘European Year of Intercultural Dialogue’ (cf. Eurofound 2009: 38). In the course of that year, the EU initiated and supported several projects on European and national levels involving and mobilising civil society. The aim was to raise awareness of the existing cultural diversity and its advantages by promoting more frequent interactions and dialogue between different cultural, ethnic and religious groups.

The **Council of Europe** actively promotes intercultural dialogue at the European level as well. During the Third Meeting of Heads of States in 2005, the Council of Europe emphasised the importance of intercultural dialogue for integration and cohesion of society. It

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3 A total of eighteen academic researchers from these institutions completed the research activities for this module (see Annex); most of them are members of the EU-funded Network on Excellence on International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion IMISCOE.
issued the ‘Faro Declaration’ stating that there are three main goals for the development of intercultural dialogue: maintaining a shared political vision, defining lines of action and setting up instruments to implement the strategy (Council of Europe 2005). Another part of the declaration was the decision to issue a ‘White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue’, which finally was published in 2008. The paper includes aims and conditions of intercultural dialogue, made five general suggestions for policy approaches as well as a definition of intercultural dialogue, which is understood as “an open and respectful exchange of views between individuals and groups with different ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds and heritage on the basis of mutual understanding and respect” (Council of Europe 2008: 17). In order to support the White Paper and to stress the importance of local actors for dialogue, the Council of Europe’s Congress of Local and Regional Authorities brought out the recommendation ‘Intercultural and Inter-religious Dialogue: an Opportunity for Local Democracy’ (Council of Europe 2009).

In addition, the Council of Europe issued the ‘Intercultural Cities’ project in cooperation with the European Commission. It is based on the idea that the local level is crucial in implementing intercultural dialogue and aims at assisting cities to become places for this. The project strives for identifying conditions and strategies in the participating cities and developing future strategies (Council of Europe/European Commission 2008).

Intercultural dialogue is also in the focus of intergovernmental organisations. The United Nations – particularly UNESCO – have promoted the importance of intercultural dialogue for decades and consider it even more relevant with regard to a globalising world. In 2005, UNESCO adopted the ‘Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions’ which aims at encouraging dialogue and exchange among cultures (UNESCO 2005). NGOs and civil society platforms on the European and international level are also vital partners for European institutions to develop intercultural policies. The ‘Platform for Intercultural Europe’, for instance, published a paper providing recommendations to improve intercultural dialogue, such as through education, capacity building and mobilising (Platform for Intercultural Europe 2008).

**Conceptual approach**

This report is based on the concept of intergroup relations as an analytical framework for understanding intercultural and inter-religious dialogue. The concept has been outlined in the initial paper prepared by the CLIP Research Group (Heckmann 2008) as well as in an expanded version prepared by Eurofound in 2009.

The intergroup relations concept is well established in the social sciences, particularly in sociology and social psychology. In general, ‘intergroup relations’ refers to the state and process of interactions between groups, which could, for example, consist of friendship or hostility, cooperation or competition, dominance or subordination, alliance or enmity or even
peace or war (Sherif/Sherif 1969: 222). The broad concept includes different kinds of ‘groups’ at the local level as well.

The term ‘group’ has two different basic meanings: on the one hand it stands for stable structures of interaction between persons, for positions and roles and a concept of membership (‘real groups’). On the other hand ‘group’ is understood as a social category that does not necessarily imply relations between the persons who are included in the category. In this sense, national, ethnic or religious ‘groups’ are people with some common characteristics that are seen by others as belonging to a ‘group’, but these people do not necessarily interact with one another and/or form a system of relations. The perception of ethnic and religious group-categories by ‘others’ – i.e. by persons not belonging to one of these groups – is often shaped by historically grown stereotypes.

This differentiation applies to local politics as well. For example, relations between a local religious community and a city administration department are relations between ‘real groups’, as well as relations between a local migrant association and a local branch of a political party. When, however, a mayor wants to improve relations between Christians and Muslims or between natives and ethnic minorities by using a certain public communications strategy, the mayor is referring to categories and images of ‘groups’ and often to stereotypes that exist in the communication of the urban public. In this latter sense the term intergroup relations refers to relations between categories. The images and stereotypes of the categories typically hide the socio-structural and cultural heterogeneity that exists in these ‘groups’.

When considering ‘intergroup relations’, it is necessary to address both meanings of ‘groups’, i.e. real groups as well as social categories and images of groups. Both groups are considered in the CLIP project.

For policies influencing intergroup relations, the term ‘intercultural policies’ has been established in present day political discourse. CLIP defines intercultural local policies as the specific policies, programmes and activities of local authorities and organisations to influence the social interaction, communication and mutual understanding of ‘old’ and ‘new’ citizens and their organisations and bridging differences between ethnic and religious groups in a city (cf. Eurofound 2009: 74).

The concrete aim of intercultural policies is to manage and to improve relationships between groups of different cultural background, i.e. to influence the relationships of groups with different behaviours based on different values, norms, interests and ideas. The management and improvement of ‘intergroup relations’ includes the management and enhancement of:

- the relationships between native and migrant groups,
- the relationships between migrant groups of different ethnicity, culture and religion and
- the relationships between local authorities (‘city’) and native as well as migrant and minority groups.
CLIP does not see intercultural policies as a new paradigm to manage diversity or integration of migrants, but as part of a comprehensive integration policy, considered as a two-way strategy, aiming at improving social cohesion in cities. We understand intercultural policies as an overarching concept that includes intercultural and inter-religious dialogue. Intercultural and inter-religious dialogue are seen as a specific form of communication and exchange between groups, taking place within a structured or even institutionalised setting between different migrant organisations, between migrant and native organisations or between local authorities and migrant/native organisations.

Not only the objectives, which are related to the immediate outcome, but also the purpose of intercultural policies can vary between cities. Cities try to achieve a wide variety of purposes within the remit of their intercultural policies:

- Cities may pursue intercultural policies to ensure that migrants have equal human and social rights compared to nationals.
- Other cities may stress the need to improve social cohesion and avoid conflicts and radicalisation tendencies.
- An intercultural approach may follow a more economic rationale and is applied especially in consideration of their short term and long term labour demands. The goal of such a strategy is increasing the city’s creative and innovative potential through diversity and by competing for the most productive parts of the world wide labour force.

**Research method**

The aim of the CLIP network is to facilitate a common, research based learning process between European cities. The research process was organised in a series of steps. First, experts from the research group compiled a *concept paper* suggesting an analytical framework for the module. This paper was discussed with the steering committee and city representatives. On the basis of these discussions, the research group refined the conceptual approach, which was then used by the research group to develop a *standardised Common Reporting Scheme (CRS) for research in each city*. This reporting scheme included a variety of (mainly open) questions concerning statistical information on the city and its populations, general approaches towards ethnic and religious minorities, objectives and city policies and interesting activities to enhance intergroup relations. The last section of the CRS concerned radicalisation processes both in the majority and minority population. The reporting schemes were to be filled in by city officials in order to provide researchers with comparable data for each participating city.

Once the completed CRS document had been received and analysed, the research team organised four to five day *field visits in each participating city*, which were completed by the researchers in the spring of 2009. The purpose of the field visits was to elaborate on the responses provided by the city through the CRS document. Therefore, these visits consisted
of interviews and group discussions with a variety of local actors. The researchers discussed with city officials (both administrative and political), ethnic and religious migrant organisations’ representatives, representatives of the Catholic and Protestant churches as well as of NGOs, welfare organisations and social partners. Further, journalists, academics, police officers as well as teachers and participants of integration projects were interviewed. **In total the researchers met with roughly 700 people in the course of the city visits.** More than one third of the respondents are migrants or belong to migrant or ethnic minority organisations. Figure 2 illustrates the proportion of organisations represented in the interviews.

![Figure 2: Groups represented in the interviews during the CLIP field research](image)

Based on the information reported by cities via the Common Reporting Schemes and additional information collected, the research teams produced a case study on each of the thirty-one cities participating in this CLIP module.

The systematic analysis of the case study texts has been carried out with the help of professional **Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS)**; the programme used is MAXqda2.\(^5\)

To conclude, the research group linked different quantitative and qualitative research methods – a standardised common reporting scheme for each city, statistical data, observations, qualitative semi-standardised expert interviews with local actors – and hence conducted a ‘mixed-methods research’. In doing so, the project actively involve local experts in the research and throughout the entire joint learning process. This method has its merits

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\(^4\) Most of the latter were representatives of local mosque associations of different denominations and ethnicities as well as of larger Muslim organisations such as the Turkish-Islamic Union DİTİB or the Islamic Community Millî Görüş. Moreover, Christians, Sikhs, Jews, Hindus and Buddhists were interviewed.

\(^5\) This software facilitates the analysis of qualitative research such as text interpretation, recursive abstraction and content analysis by supporting the systematisation of texts, the construction of a hierarchically structured code system, the assignment of text segments to codes (‘coding’) and text retrieval. For more information see the website ‘http://www.maxqda.com’ or respective literature, e.g. Flick 2006, Kuckartz 2005.
and represents the most promising methodological approach for the project in the eyes of the CIIP team. Yet there are some limitations which include:

- problems of reliability, since a question in the CRS may have been understood differently,
- different quality of case studies due to differing access to information,
- case studies are mainly based on expert assessments, while evaluations of policies and programmes are extremely rare and
- assessments by experts greatly vary, for instance, whether or not a mosque may be considered as ‘radical’.

Despite these limitations the ‘triangulation method’ of CLIP research allows for the gathering and cross-checking of a large amount and broad variety of information to increase reliability and validity of the data.

The systematic analysis of the case studies, which was followed by discussions within the research group, with city representatives and external experts, led to this final report.

Research questions and structure of the report

The report sets out to explore the relations between cities and migrant and minority populations. We ask: what are major needs and issues in intergroup relations between cities and migrant and minority groups? What are the responses of cities and migrant organisations to meet these needs? Which measures cities take to improve attitudes and relations between majority and minorities? Since radicalisation in both majority and minority populations poses a major problem for the cohesion of cities, we explore how cities assess these processes and how they go about it.

The report is structured in the following way. Chapter 2 starts with an overview of migration experiences of CLIP cities and provides information on the ethnic and religious diversity in the cities. It continues to describe and analyse major needs and issues in intergroup relations. Chapter 3 discusses general approaches of cities towards intergroup relations and the structure of relations between cities and migrant and minority organisations. Following that, the chapter analyses patterns of intercultural policies and illustrates these with good practice examples. Approaches towards religious communities as well as approaches fostering inter-religious dialogue are discussed in a separate chapter 4. Policies preventing and guarding against radicalisation and extremist political and religious positions, which could occur among both majority and minority populations, are the focus of chapter 5. The report ends with conclusions and recommendations.
2. Intergroup relations and major issues in CLIP cities

Population structures of European cities have been significantly shaped by recent migration processes. The resulting plurality challenges social cohesion and relations between groups. We start with an overview on the diverse population structures of CLIP cities and then discuss major issues of intergroup relations that are of concern for both city representatives and migrant and minority groups. Among others, these include recognition for migrants’ heritage, religion and discrimination.

2.1. Overview on cities’ populations

The CLIP cities are located in twenty-one different European countries with different histories of migration. Some common themes found among these countries are that most of them have experienced the immigration of labour migrants, asylum seekers, family members of former migrants, of students as well as of irregular migrants – albeit at different levels and times. While some countries, such as the UK and the Netherlands, have a long tradition of immigration as a result of their history as colonial powers, major migration processes to other European countries started ‘only’ in the late 1950s: the combination of high economic growth and internal labour shortages led to a recruitment of foreign ‘guest workers’ in several Northern and Central European countries. In other countries, mainly in Southern Europe, immigration is a relatively recent phenomenon. For example, the city of Valencia, like the other Spanish cities in the CLIP network, was a city of emigration until the early 1990s and changed from an emigration to an immigration region only in recent years. Eastern European countries, by contrast, had a very restrictive regime in regard to migration, both to and from the country. Hence, the migration experiences of these countries are rather recent.

Differences in migration history are not only found across national borders. Even within one country, one can observe significant differences, as different regions or cities have not necessarily shared the same experiences. While the German cities of Frankfurt and Stuttgart have experienced considerable immigration, relatively few migrants live in the smaller city of Arnsberg. The same can be said of UK cities: the percentage of migrants in Wolverhampton is considerably higher than it is, for instance, in Newport.

One of the consequences of these different migration histories, both inside and outside of national borders, is that the CLIP cities differ significantly in the composition of their current populations.

CLIP cities produce very different kinds of data on their migrant and minority populations. While some cities only have data on foreigners, others have official data or estimates on the number of people born outside the country of immigration (‘foreign born’), ethnic minorities and or second-generation migrants. The data for some countries, for example the UK, is
recognised as being outdated because a national census is held only every ten years. In other cities, it is recognised that the official data under-represents the migrant population for other reasons, for example because these populations are difficult to capture in existing data-collection methods. Some general information, however, can be given (see table 1 below).

Table 1: CLIP cities’ populations and migrant proportion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Foreign citizens</th>
<th>Population with migration background or minority status (as defined in each case)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>758,198</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>49% with migration background (foreigners, immigrants with Dutch or dual citizenship and second-generation migrants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antwerp</td>
<td>482,456</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>30% citizens with ‘foreign background’ <em>(allochtonen)</em> (foreigners and naturalised migrants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arnsberg</td>
<td>80,341</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>15% with migration background (foreigners, naturalised Germans and estimated number of ethnic German immigrants and their descendants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athens</td>
<td>745,514</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>n/a (not available)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bologna</td>
<td>372,000</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breda</td>
<td>172,085</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>20% with migration background (foreigners, immigrants with Dutch or dual citizenship and second-generation migrants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>1,777,921</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copenhagen</td>
<td>503,752</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>20.4% with migration background (immigrants and their descendants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dublin</td>
<td>506,211</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurt</td>
<td>676,197</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td>37.7% with migration background (foreigners, people with dual citizenship, naturalised Germans and people born abroad)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitalet</td>
<td>266,973</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>12,569,041</td>
<td>0.34%</td>
<td>47% internal migrants; many of Kurdish origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirklees</td>
<td>388,567</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>ethnic groups: 85.6% White, 14.4% ethnic minority groups (Indian, Pakistani, Other Asian, Caribbean, Others)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisbon</td>
<td>565,000</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>86,977</td>
<td>62.6%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malmö</td>
<td>286,440</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>37% with ‘migration background’, (people born outside Sweden or in Sweden but with both parents being born outside Sweden)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newport</td>
<td>236,573</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>ethnic groups: 95.2% ‘White’, 4.8% ‘ethnic minority groups’ (Black, Asian, Chinese and Other)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prague</td>
<td>1,258,062</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>93.4% are ‘ethnic Czechs’, 6.6% ‘ethnic minorities’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

6 This data includes foreign citizens with foreign citizenship only.
7 The city of Athens has about 750,000 inhabitants. If one takes into account Athens’ urban or even metropolitan area, the numbers rise to about 3.1 and 3.7 million respectively.
8 The city of Lisbon has 565,000 residents. The Lisbon Metropolitan Area, however, has about 2.8 million inhabitants and approximately 3.3 million people live in its broader agglomeration.
### Table 1: Population and Percentage of Migrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Percentage of Migrants</th>
<th>Migration Background Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stuttgart</td>
<td>593,070</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>38.6% with migration background (foreigners, ethnic German Spätaussiedler, naturalised Germans and their descendants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundsvall</td>
<td>94,955</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>5.3% with migration background (foreigners, people born abroad and people born in Sweden having parents who were both born abroad)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tallinn</td>
<td>399,096</td>
<td>28.9%*</td>
<td>45.1% with ethnic nationality other than Estonian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrassa</td>
<td>207,663</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turin</td>
<td>908,902</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turku</td>
<td>175,286</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>6.7% born outside Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valencia</td>
<td>807,396</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>1,651,437</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>30.9% with migration background (foreigners, people born abroad and people having parents born abroad)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolverhampton</td>
<td>236,573</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>22.2% ethnic minority groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wroclaw</td>
<td>634,000</td>
<td>&lt; 1%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zagreb</td>
<td>786,200</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5.1% belong to a ’national minority’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeytinburnu</td>
<td>288,058</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zurich</td>
<td>380,499</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: CLIP case studies

In Central and Eastern European cities, the percentage of migrants and ethnic minorities is comparatively low. In the Polish city of Wroclaw, for instance, the number of foreigners is below one percent; and although the percentage of ethnic minorities is not exactly known, it is not estimated to be much higher. In Zagreb, 5.1% of the population belong to a national minority. Some Western and Northern CLIP cities also have a population with significantly less than 10% from ethnic minorities. For example, 5.3% of Sundsvall’s population has a migration background.

In most European cities, however, the percentage of migrants and their descendents is higher: the population with migration background represents 15% of the total population in Arnsberg and 20% of the population in Breda; 22.2% of Wolverhampton’s population belongs to an ethnic minority group. One can assume that the migrant population in some Southern European cities is similarly large, even though official statistics show a different picture, since they record only the number of legally registered foreigners. Four cities – Vienna, Malmö, Frankfurt and Stuttgart – have a population with a migration background representing from thirty to just under forty percent of the population and in three cities, the proportion of persons with a migration or other ethnic background is clearly over forty percent: 45.1% of Tallinn’s population has an ethnic national background other than Estonian (mainly Russian) and 49% of Amsterdam’s population has a migration background; in Luxembourg, with 63%, a striking percentage of the population are foreigners.

The range of countries from which migrants originate is truly diverse, notwithstanding that they may be predominantly of a particular nationality. In Frankfurt, Malmö and Stuttgart, for example, migrants originate from some 170 countries.
In terms of gender, a significant number of cities reported that a slightly higher proportion of migrants are male, but there is some evidence that these proportions are equalising over time partly due to family reunification, but also due to the feminization of labour migration. In relation to age, a number of cities reported that migrants are younger than the national population as a whole.

**Migration towards CLIP cities is not only reflected in increased ethnic diversity, but also in increased religious diversity.** The information on religious composition is rather scant, as can be seen in table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Other/no religion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>74.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antwerp</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arnsberg</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>2.49%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athens</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>5.4% – 13.4%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bologna</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breda</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>47.1%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.1% – 0.3% 34.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copenhagen</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dublin</td>
<td>~ 80%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurt</td>
<td>24.9%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitalet</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirklees</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisbon</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>over 80%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malmö</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1.71%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newport</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prague</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stuttgart</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundsvall</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tallinn</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrassa</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turin</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turku</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valencia</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>49.2%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>38.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolverhampton</td>
<td>66.5%</td>
<td>1.72%</td>
<td>31.78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrocław</td>
<td></td>
<td>~ 0.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zagreb</td>
<td>87.1%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeytinburnu</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zurich</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: CLIP case studies; most figures are estimates

Official national statistics on religious affiliations were only available for the cities of Vienna, Zagreb and Zurich as well as for the British cities of Kirklees, Newport and
Wolverhampton. In other countries, for example in Germany, official data are only available for the members of the Catholic and Protestant churches while data for the members of other religious communities can only be estimated. Since German cities, like Spanish and Italian cities, have data about the number of people coming from Muslim countries, estimates of the Muslim population in these cities are based on these figures. Others cities, for example Amsterdam and Wroclaw, base their data on surveys and interviews. In still other countries, such as Sweden, the collection of data relating to religious affiliation or beliefs is prohibited, resulting in a lack of data for these countries and their cities.

Nonetheless a general trend is observable: nearly all European cities experience an ongoing increase of both ethnic and religious diversity in general, and of Muslim populations in particular, while the percentage of residents belonging to Christian Churches is decreasing.

This increasing diversity challenges intergroup relations in CLIP cities. In the following analysis, we are dealing with issues, expectations and demands that have a high priority in intergroup relations and are of concern for both city representatives and migrant and minority groups. They relate to recognition for migrants’ cultural heritage, religion, discrimination, media representation, language, the use of public space and safety, imported ethnic and political conflict, the status of national minorities as well as gender issues.

It has to be emphasised that during the city visits, socio-economic issues were considered as crucial for social cohesion in the city as well. First, both city officials and migrant representatives of many CLIP cities emphasised that segregated, disadvantaged neighbourhoods can negatively affect intergroup relations. We will not elaborate on this topic, because it was addressed by CLIP in the first module.9 Second, employment issues were of concern of many interviewed experts.10 On average, the level of unemployment is higher among migrant groups than among natives and many employed migrants are in low paid employment.11 This is true for most migrant groups, but seems to be a particular concern of Muslims. The main reasons for the employment challenge reported in the CLIP case studies include migrants’ education level and a lack of language performance, but also non-recognition of education or training obtained in their countries of origin as well as discrimination in both the employment and education sector. As a result of employment problems, poverty among some migrant groups is high, which makes it difficult for them to participate in society in a broader sense.12 It is probable that the current economic recession will have a particularly adverse impact on these (already vulnerable) migrant groups. These

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10 They were mentioned in the case studies of Amsterdam, Antwerp, Arnsberg, Dublin, Frankfurt, Malmö, Stuttgart, Sundsvall and Vienna.
11 This is true for most, but not for all CLIP countries. In the UK, for instance, the evidence is very mixed.
12 For example, nearly half of youth in Amsterdam with a Moroccan background grow up in families that live ‘below-the-minimum’ as it is termed. Likewise, in Stuttgart, the ‘child poverty rate’ of German children was 12%, while the child poverty rate among foreign children from Muslim countries amounted to 49%.
challenges, however, are issues of general integration policies which will not be in the focus of this CLIP report.

Since issues related to recognition and funds for migrants’ and minorities’ heritage seem to be most crucial regarding intergroup relations and local intercultural policies in the eyes of most experts, we start with this topic.

### 2.2. Recognition and resources for migrants’ heritage

The preservation of cultural heritage, but in particular demands for recognition of and resources for this heritage are major issues related to intergroup relations in most CLIP cities.

Migrants and national minorities have cultural preferences and adhere to cultural practices that are often not shared by the majority population. They want ‘their’ cultures to be preserved and also to be represented and recognised in the urban public and cultural life of the cities in which they now live.

In many CLIP cities, migrants have come together to form **ethnic, cultural and/or faith-based organisations**. In the smaller cities of Sundsvall and Arnsberg, there are, respectively, twelve and thirteen migrant organisations, and in bigger cities with a more recent migration history such as Terrassa, there are thirty-five official migrant organisations. In cities with a longer history of immigration and a higher percentage of migrants, the numbers are much higher: in Frankfurt there are about 300, in Stuttgart about 350 and in Vienna about 730 registered migrant organisations. The number of migrant organisations is even higher in Amsterdam, where there are 3,941.

Although the composition, background and activities of migrant organisations are quite diverse, major demands and interests of these organisations are rather similar. They refer to recognition and resources (funding and space), as illustrated below.

**Recognition: acceptance and involvement of migrant organisations**

Migrant organisations desire official recognition of their existence and activities. Numerous interview partners of local migrant organisations stressed the **importance of general recognition** by the mayor and the local administration and praised, for instance, invitations of city officials to municipal events – or regret, respectively, not to be invited. Most of the CLIP cities seem to be aware of this need. The case study of Kirklees, for instance, states that the “city council considers that the major demands and interests of ethnic and religious groups … to be similar to those of other voluntary and community organisations, including the need to be heard and their views represented”.

In Zurich migrant organisations emphasised “the significance of individual contact among municipal officers and migrant representatives (‘not a letter, but a face’); the informal network of good relations has been considered as being of utmost importance for the good relations between migrant groups and the Zürich public authorities.” In other cities as well,
representatives of migrant organisations applauded ‘their’ city officials for the excellent relationship between administration and migrant organisations. The municipal Office for Multicultural Affairs (AmkA) in Frankfurt, for instance, “is appreciated as a crucial partner by the ethnic associations and religious migrant communities” as stated in the case study. In Terrassa, a representative of a Muslim association expresses his respect by calling the mayor ‘a friend and brother’, as described in the respective case study.

In several cities, migrant representatives are generally pleased with their current contact with the city, e.g. in Arnsberg, Stuttgart and Malmö, but expressed a wish to intensify the contact to the city and conduct common projects; on the one hand, in order to get more information on local policies and activities and, on the other hand, in order to ensure that the city knows the migrants’ demands and issues. Recognition and contact is also an issue in Turin, where “all organisations are interested in becoming a reference point for the city on the various issues concerning migrants’ integration processes.” The city, though, does not know many of the migrant organisations.

In some cities, however, migrant representatives stressed that the contact between the city and the migrant organisations should be improved, as reported, for instance, in the case study of Dublin.

Even though most migrant organisations seem to desire more contact or even cooperation with city officials, they make different attempts. While some migrant organisations invite city officials to their (cultural) events and actively try to increase cooperation, others never expressed their wishes to the city officials.

Resources: funding and space for migrant organisations

Most migrant organisations have very limited financial resources and require support from outside. They apply for grants and subsidies to get support for cultural and folkloric events and activities such as language courses. The cities’ abilities to meet demands for funding are, however, limited. In Amsterdam, for instance, it is considered impossible to fund all ethnic organisations. In cities such as Dublin, Kirklees or Bologna, there are complaints about an unfair distribution of resources. Particularly in Bologna, representatives of relatively ‘new’ migrant organisations complained that the scarce financial resources are mainly given to the established organisations. A general lack of sufficient funding for ethnic migrant organisations was raised as an explicit issue by migrant organisations’ representatives and city officials in seventeen of the CLIP cities. In Malmö, though, migrant associations complimented the city for its provision of funding and financial support.

13 This desire was explicitly expressed in the case studies of Antwerp, Bologna, Budapest, Dublin, Kirklees, Lisbon, Newport, Prague, Tallinn, Wolverhampton, Wroclaw and Zurich.

14 Antwerp, Athens, Bologna, Budapest, Dublin, Kirklees, Luxembourg, Newport, Sundsvall, Stuttgart, Terrassa, Turin, Turku, Vienna, Wolverhampton and Zagreb and Zurich
The problem which was most often raised by both migrant representatives and city officials, however, was the difficulty that many ethnic organisations experience in trying to find **available and sufficiently large space** for their activities. This concerns all migrant groups – both religious communities and cultural associations in the large majority of CLIP cities. Notably, however, this is true for Muslim organisations. The ‘space challenge’ is twofold: on the one hand, migrant organisations need rooms for regular activities, and on the other hand they require large rooms or public space for particular activities such as festivities celebrating national or religious holidays. The main reasons for the lack of meeting places are scarce financial resources of the associations and high rental fees, but also, as written in the Hospitalet case, “bad knowledge of the legal possibilities for organisations, of sound and safety rules and of possibilities to acquire financial assistance, combined with limited organisational capacity within the communities”.

To tackle both, the general funding question and the challenge of finding available space, many migrant organisation representatives would like to be provided with, first, more direct financial support by the city, and, second, with more indirect financial support, such as municipal rooms given for a symbolic rent, and, third, with non-material, organisational assistance (‘man power’) for finding and financing their own premises. The cities’ resources, however, are scant. Furthermore, many cities do not consider such kind of support as a municipal task. The cities’ approaches towards the issue of recognition and funding differ, as we shall see in section 3.1.

### 2.3. Religious practices, identities and needs

Religion is of importance for many migrant as well as native groups in the CLIP cities. According to Hirschman, little support can be found for the general secularisation hypothesis that religion will disappear with modernity. “It is only through religion, or other spiritual beliefs, that many people are able to find solace for the inevitable human experiences of death, suffering and loss” (Hirschman 2004: 1207).

In the context of the migration experience religion can be of help against the traumatic effects of leaving one’s home country and religious organisations can play an important role in the creation of community and as a source of social as well as economic assistance. “Immigrants, as with native born, have spiritual needs, which are most meaningful when packaged in a familiar linguistic and cultural context. In particular, immigrants are drawn to the fellowship of ethnic churches and temples, where primary relationships among congregants are reinforced with traditional foods and traditions. Immigrants also have many economic and social needs, and American churches, temples and synagogues have a long tradition of community service, particularly directed at those most in need of assistance” (ibidem: 1207-15

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15 The migrant organisations’ demand for more space was mentioned in twenty-three cities. The five CLIP case studies, in which the lack of meeting rooms was not mentioned as an important topic, are the case studies of Kirklees, Prague, Tallinn, Wolverhampton and Wroclaw.
The combination of culturally attuned spiritual guidance and material assistance increases the appeal of religious organisations for immigrants after their migration: “Although religious faith provides continuity with experiences prior to immigration, the commitment, observance, and participation are generally higher in the American setting after immigration than in the origin country” (ibidem: 1208). This observation seems to be valid for many migrants in the CLIP cities as well.

Migrants’ religions, however, often differ from those prevalent in the immigration country. Hence, migrants bring along new practices as well as new needs – which can enrich the local society, but also affect intergroup relations in a possibly conflicting way.

The following issues relating to religious practices, identities and needs have been identified during the course of this research: religious buildings, burials, education, religious dress codes and food. These sections describe the issues in more detail while the policy approaches taken by cities in dealing with these issues are discussed later in this report. Since Muslim communities represent the largest of the ‘new’ religions in CLIP cities, many of the following examples refer to this group.

**Religious buildings**

The planning and building of representative migrant religious buildings challenge intergroup relations in most CLIP cities – in particular when the building is a mosque. Islamic groups want to erect new mosques as a visible and representative building equal to the Christian churches. They see the permission to build a mosque as a sign of recognition of their religion that could help improve their present status. The significance of the new building thus goes beyond its pure religious use.

A classical sociological study in the United States found that there is a general sequence of steps in the institutionalisation of migrants’ religious practice, beginning with the holding of religious gatherings in private homes, followed by the rental of temporary quarters and finally the construction of permanent, representative and visible churches, mosques, temples or synagogues (Warner and Srole: 1945).

Even though the study was published more than half a century ago, these experiences seem to be mirrored in today’s Europe. Some CLIP cities are experiencing the second phase of this sequence in which migrants search for rooms for religious gatherings, while others have already reached the third phase in which they plan to build and then build new, large and representative religious buildings – mostly mosques.

As long as the issue remains rather general and ‘far away’, representative mosques are not seen as a problem by the native population.\(^{16}\) The picture looks different, however, when

\(^{16}\) For instance, according to a survey conducted in 2001 in Luxembourg, 70% of the respondents were in favour of building a mosque in the city. In Bologna and the surrounding area as well, about two thirds of a survey had a positive attitude towards the construction of a large mosque.
plans for a new representative mosque become concrete in a certain area and neighbourhood. Very often then native groups and organisations in the respective neighbourhood protest and try to obstruct the plans.

The demand for more space – either in the form of prayer rooms or representative religious buildings – was expressed in many CLIP cities. We can categorise the CLIP cities in four categories:

- In four CLIP cities, the religious migrant communities are so small and/or rather new, that the issue of representative religious buildings is not of high importance. These cities are Turku, Tallinn, Prague and Wrocław.

- In several CLIP cities, religious migrant communities already have some places to worship; due to financial restrictions most of these are located in cellars or in backyard buildings. Since religious migrant communities, in particular Muslim communities, increase in size over time these rooms become too small. In Terrassa, for instance, Pentecostal communities lack enough space and Muslims had to pray in the streets in front of the mosque due to the lack of space during the Eid festivals. Hence, most of these communities express their wish for better prayer rooms. These communities would also like to have a representative building, but because they are either too small or lack the financial resources, they do not seriously attempt to make this a reality. Instead, they attempt to find centrally located spaces that are larger and of better quality than where they are currently located. This observation was made in eight cities, notably in Arnsberg, Athens, Budapest, Luxembourg, Sundsvall, Terrassa, Turin and Valencia17.

- In nine other cities, religious migrant communities already have some places to worship (in some cities including mosques) and are currently building (additional) representative buildings or making serious efforts to reach this aim: Amsterdam, Antwerp, Bologna, Copenhagen, Frankfurt, Hospitalet, Stuttgart, Vienna and Zurich. In all of these cities, this is mainly an issue for Muslims who want to build a representative mosque with a minaret that can be clearly recognised as a mosque and want the support of the city for their plans.

- In the ten cities of Breda, Dublin, Istanbul, Kirklees, Lisbon, Malmö, Newport, Wolverhampton, Zagreb and Zeytinburnu, the building of representative religious buildings is not an important issue for migrant organisations and the city (any more), since they already have representative mosques or Sikh temples and are currently not planning to enlarge or to move.

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17 The city of Valencia is a sort of ‘intermediate case’ between this group and the next one. While one Muslim organisation has already built a representative mosque with a minaret on a piece of land granted by the city, other Muslim associations rent private premises in backyard buildings and look for better accommodation.
Conflicts about religious buildings are common in quite a few CLIP cities. In Bologna, Breda, Frankfurt and Vienna, for instance, groups and organisations from the majority population opposed the construction of a mosque in their neighbourhood and launched campaigns against it. This led to vivid public discussions about mosques – in the case of Vienna even to a nationwide debate on Islamic values. In Frankfurt and Vienna, right-wing political parties tried to use these conflicts for political mobilisation and communication of their extremist, racist and Islamophobic ideas. In the city of Vienna, an incident once ended in physical violence between supporters and opponents of the mosque. In contrast to this example, the conflict in Breda and Frankfurt were solved peacefully. The mosque associations arranged meetings for the neighbours to present themselves. This open approach led to a friendly and positive atmosphere in the neighbourhoods.

Unwanted external influences – real or assumed – can also affect intergroup relations. One example can be found in Turin: the information that the Moroccan state would finance a new mosque in the city caused criticism from certain political parties that feared the influence of the Moroccan king on the choice of imams. Another example is the building of the Wester Mosque in Amsterdam which caused conflict between the mosque association and the city (district) administration because of assumptions of financial mismanagement and mistrust due to the interference of the German headquarters of the conservative Muslim association Millî Görüş which was accused of having replaced the mosque’s modern leader.

Besides Islamophobia and the fear of external influences, challenges related to the construction of religious buildings also include practical issues such as parking facilities, traffic and noise. The latter issue was a problem in Terrassa, where neighbours complained about the steady noise of a Baptist Evangelic migrant church. In Dublin, “there have been some concerns from local residents relating to Muslims parking in the surrounding areas of the South Circular mosque. These concerns have been active for the past seven years. Local residents have consistently complained concerning the high volume of parked cars in the area during prayer times and festivals.” Similar complaints were also made in Zurich.

As illustrated in these examples, such issues remain after the construction has been completed. It is important to mention that the minority religious groups as well have concerns about these issues. In Lisbon, for example, the Hindu community pointed out the need for better public transportations connecting the Temple to the rest of the city and thus preventing parking problems.

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18 As far as we know, conflicts surrounding the building of religious buildings (both mosques and churches) occurred in the cities of Amsterdam, Antwerp, Bologna, Breda, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Terrassa, Turin and Vienna.
**Burials and cemeteries**

Although there has been considerable progress in the process of migrant integration in Europe, many migrants – in particular Muslims – are still buried in their countries of origin. This trend, however, is starting to change; there is evidence that an increasing number of migrants, including Muslims, are being buried in their countries of immigration.

The issue of burials is mainly discussed in cities in relation to Islam, since there are central differences in burial rules between the Christian and Muslim traditions. The issue of Islamic burials has been mentioned as relevant in the case studies of twenty-two CLIP cities.19

The challenge is manifold: a central difference in Muslim and Christian burials is that according to Islam, the body is placed directly into the ground, without a casket and wrapped in simple plain cloth. This burial rule, however, was or is not in accordance with many national or local laws in Europe, traditionally requiring a wooden coffin. Second, according to Islam, the grave itself should be aligned towards Mecca – what is often not in accordance with local traditions and with the arrangements of local cemeteries. Third, there is the tradition – both in Christianity and Islam – of not being buried close to people of other faiths. In many CLIP cities, however, it is a sheer question of the lack of space available for separate Muslim cemeteries. Fourth, there is the question of the outer appearance of the burial site: careful gardening of the burial site is less known in Islam, a fact that might imply conflicts with Christians. Other differences include the amount of time between death and burial, since Islam prescribes a quick burial after death.

In most of the CLIP cities, however, the issue did and does not lead to controversial debates. In Luxembourg, for instance, according to a survey carried out in 2001, the majority population has a positive attitude towards Islamic cemeteries. How the cities treat Islamic burial rules and cemeteries will be further described in section 4.1.2.

**Dress codes**

Another issue which may lead to conflict between groups concerns that of religious dress codes. This issue has two main aspects.

On the one hand, people wearing religious clothing often are discriminated against. In particular on the labour market, Muslim women wearing a headscarf, but also religious Sikhs, often feel discriminated. Getting employment is thus more difficult for these groups. Besides the labour market, dress codes can be the source for discrimination in other spheres of life such as the housing market and the educational system. Complaints about this discrimination could be found, for instance, in the case studies of Antwerp, Frankfurt, Kirklees, Stuttgart and Vienna.
On the other hand, religious dresses can challenge intergroup relations, because large parts of the majority population assume that Muslim women wearing the headscarf are oppressed and discriminated against by men within their own religious community. Among others, respondents in the cities of Breda, Stuttgart, Sundsvall and Vienna emphasised this aspect.

Religious dress codes and gender roles can also have an impact in sports, particularly in swimming. Women’s swimming is an issue of intergroup relations in several CLIP cities. Many women enjoy swimming, but do not like to do this in the presence of men – or are not allowed to swim when men are present due to religious or cultural norms. This is particularly true for Muslim women. In some cities, Islamic organisations launched initiatives to introduce ‘women’s swimming’ in public swimming pools. These initiatives, however, lead in most cities to public debates, because separate swimming concerns the interpretation of gender roles and opening hours for women put male users at a disadvantage. In Sundsvall, for instance, the initiative to introduce ‘women’s swimming hours’ launched a debate about both gender roles in Islam and the role of public institutions. Some groups, including migrant groups, considered it an unneeded special treatment of Muslims, hindering integration and discriminatory against male swimmers. Similar discussions occurred in Turin, Valencia and Vienna. How the cities reacted to these issues and public debates will be described in section 4.1.3.

**Education**

Religious education is another issue of importance in some CLIP cities. Two topics are related to this issue: religious classes at public schools and the establishment of private religious schools.

The latter is an issue in Kirklees, for example. Representative of Muslim organisations complained about the lack of a state funded Muslim school, which they believe would reflect the community and its needs. The same holds true for Copenhagen and Newport. And even though the Muslim community in Budapest is very small, the Organisation of Muslims in Hungary would like to have a Muslim school in Budapest, which should be open to all students and focus on teaching the Islamic faith and the Arab language. Similarly, in Wolverhampton a private religious school is a desire of the Sikh community.

In Amsterdam, the city currently faces the problem that concerns were raised in the public about the contents and style of teaching in a private Quran school giving Quran and Arabic classes on Saturday, and what effect this teaching might have on integration. These concerns exist, but the schools cannot be controlled by school inspection because they are considered voluntary initiatives.

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19 The topic was raised in the case studies of Amsterdam, Antwerp, Arnsberg, Athens, Bologna, Breda, Budapest, Copenhagen, Dublin, Frankfurt, Hospitalet, Lisbon, Luxembourg, Malmö, Newport, Stuttgart, Sundsvall, Terrassa, Turin, Vienna, Zagreb and Zurich.
The need for (improved) Islam classes in public schools is currently being expressed by Muslim representatives in the cities of Amsterdam, Lisbon, Stuttgart, Turin, Valencia and Vienna. In Vienna, a PhD thesis about anti-democratic attitudes of teachers of Islamic education at Austrian public schools recently received considerable media attention and initiated a controversial political discussion about integration and the value of Muslim religious education.

**Food**

According to the Quran, Muslims are required to eat *halal* food; pork, alcohol, blood, and any meat that has not been slaughtered according to the traditional guidelines of religious slaughtering are forbidden. Other religions, such as Judaism and Hinduism, similarly have specific requirements in relation to food. As a result, food which is served in public institutions such as schools, hospitals, prisons, and at work can create problems for religious minorities. The question that influences public debate and intergroup relations is whether or not to give special treatment to certain groups.

One particular aspect of this issue is **ritualistic (Islamic) slaughtering**. In some European countries, Islamic slaughtering conflicts with animal protection laws that require that animals be stunned before being slaughtered to render the animal unconscious and to prevent the animal from feeling pain. The Islamic practice of slaughtering animals is performed, by contrast, without stunning the animals. It is done by cutting the front of the animal’s neck and having it bleed to death while fully conscious. This may create conflict and disagreement based on sensitivity with regard to animal protection and suffering.

The issue has been referred to, for instance, in the case study of Sundsvall where any ritual slaughtering without stunning is forbidden (as in all of Sweden, Luxembourg, and Switzerland). Furthermore, the issue of *halal* slaughtering was referred to in the case study of Hospitalet, where the problem lay in differences between two Muslim interpretations on how to slaughter, but could be solved by mediators at the slaughterhouse. In Vienna, animal protection activists protested against Islamic slaughtering practices. In other cities, such as Athens or Zagreb, Islamic slaughtering does not cause tension or conflict, because it is quite similar to (Greek) Orthodox practices.

The desire of Muslim parents for *halal* food at public schools was also mentioned in some case studies, e.g. in Lisbon, Sundsvall, Turin and Valencia. In Turin, Muslim groups would like to have *halal* food in public canteens.

In conclusion, although the issues of ritual slaughtering and *halal* food have been raised in many of the case studies, they have not been emphasised as being critical for relations between Muslim groups and the city; and the issues have seldom received much publicity. In the Lisbon case study, it is noted that during the CLIP interviews, Muslims pointed out some religious needs (i.e. *halal* food), which however have never been presented to the Municipality nor indicated by themselves as urgent.
2.4. Prejudice and discrimination

Most CLIP cities describe relationships between majority and different ethnic and religious groups as generally peaceful and unproblematic. In the city of Turku, for instance, there is a broad consensus that intergroup relations are “relatively harmonious”. In Wolverhampton as well, the city considers the “overall state-of-affairs in relation to ethnic and religious groups and organisations to be good” – an assessment that is documented by a survey: the survey, carried out in 2007, found that 88% of all residents agree that their neighbourhood is a place where people from different backgrounds get along well together. Also in Zurich the general state of relations between migrant groups and natives is considered “to be quite pragmatic and friendly” – as in most other CLIP cities as well.

Even in cities where the relations between the main groups are considered peaceful, the quality of intergroup relations seems to differ significantly: while in some cities the groups tolerate one another and live peacefully ‘side by side’, in other cities there is cooperation between groups and the social distance between groups decreases. The latter tendency can be seen in some of the larger CLIP cities with a relatively high percentage of migrants. Survey data from Amsterdam, Frankfurt and Vienna suggests that the different groups in these cities have many friends and acquaintances with ethnic backgrounds other than their own. The large majority of Amsterdammers – either with Dutch or any other ethnic background – have an ethnically mixed group of friends. The data in Amsterdam show a trend towards increased mixing in the city. A survey about intergroup relations in Frankfurt shows similar results: by far most people with a migration background (88%) have persons without a migration background in their circle of friends and acquaintances. This is also true for participants without a migration background: 70% have persons with a migration background in their circle of friends and acquaintances.\(^\text{20}\)

Despite the dominance of rather peaceful intergroup relations prejudice and discrimination between different migrant and majority groups are an urban reality to be found in all the CLIP cities. Prejudice, stereotypes and fears about migrants in general and Muslims in particular occur in every CLIP city, as is reported in the CLIP case studies as well as in a variety of scientific studies.

In Turin, for instance, public opinion toward immigrants has undergone a major transformation in the last twenty years. While two decades ago, a majority of citizens were indifferent, but generally benevolent toward immigrants, the majority of citizens have – due to the economic crisis, the rising number of senior citizens and immigrant children, and the rising fear of criminality – negative feelings towards minorities and immigrants, as stated in the respective case study. In Copenhagen, immigration, especially from non-Western countries, is predominantly seen as a possible threat to the welfare state and in recent years

\(^{20}\) For more information, please see respective case studies and O+S (Dienst Onderzoek en Statistiek Gemeente Amsterdam) 2009 and Halisch 2009.
also as a threat to Danish identity and values (mirrored in the discussions on ‘parallel societies’). Muslim immigrants, in particular, are often singled out in public discourse as difficult to integrate. This assumption also is prevalent in the Netherlands: a national survey showed that about half of the native population thinks that the Western lifestyle does not match with the Muslim one. Thus, prejudice is one of the greatest concerns of most Muslims – according to experts interviewed in Breda, the stereotypical Dutch view on Muslims is that they are generally conservative, that they suppress women, and do not actively stop their children from participating in criminal activity, or even becoming sympathisers of fundamentalist movements.

In some cities, e.g. Amsterdam, Vienna, Stuttgart and Bologna, experts pointed out that the – sometimes even hostile – attitudes towards Muslims are influenced and enforced by international events such as terroristic attacks in New York (‘9/11’), London and Madrid as well as the murder on Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam. This is particularly true for Kirklees: the leader of the men responsible for the London bombings, lived in Dewsbury (a Kirklees’ borough) and worked as a ‘learning mentor’ with migrant children – he was considered an example of a well-integrated Muslim. His involvement in the London bombings created tensions between groups living in Kirklees by reinforcing negative attitudes towards Muslims living in the area; the presence of suspicion and mistrust between the public at large and Muslim communities is apparent. Many local experts interviewed recognise that the pace of change is accelerating and that issues of community cohesion and intercultural relations are becoming more complex as a result of the combination of these events – the emergence of new migrant communities and the growth in Kirklees’ established ethnic minority population – occurring simultaneously with the increasing isolation and deprivation of many white working class communities.

Prejudice and discrimination can occur independently from one another, but quite often they are causally linked and prejudice and fears are translated into discrimination. Consequently, discrimination towards migrants is of significant concern for many migrant representatives and city officials interviewed in the CLIP cities. Despite almost every ethnic and religious group experiencing such discrimination, evidently Muslims seem to face an even greater level compared to most other groups. Evidence for this can also be found in a variety of recent studies, e.g. the EU-MIDIS study carried out by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights.21

Discrimination occurs in different areas. Discrimination in the housing market was mentioned in a variety of case studies: according to the interviewees, migrants have more difficulties in finding high quality, yet affordable housing in a non-segregated area. Since this topic was extensively referred to in the first CLIP module, it will not be discussed in greater

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21 Until now, FRA published short EU-MIDIS reports on discrimination against Muslims and Roma in EU countries in general. In the near future, FRA will publish EU-MIDIS results that refer specifically to some of the CLIP cities.
detail here. Many migrant representatives reported **discrimination in the labour market**: migrants face more challenges than natives when applying for a job, an apprenticeship or even an internship. Discrimination appears to be a particular problem for blacks and Muslims. Employment-related discrimination was considered as an urgent issue of intergroup relations in eight cities.\(^{22}\)

Many migrant representatives complained about **discrimination in the education system**. Although measures such as pre-school education, communication with migrant parents and language training have been introduced in most cities, many respondents believe that school systems are neither doing enough to combat discrimination nor to overcome educational inequality caused by varying ethnic and particularly socio-economic family backgrounds. Since all European cities are knowledge-based societies in which education is immensely important, the education gap between native population groups and migrants are of great concern for both city representatives and representatives of migrant organisations in a variety of CLIP cities.\(^{23}\) Last but not least, prejudice and **discrimination occur in everyday social life**. In most cases, discrimination and racism remains ‘hidden’. However, in some cities, for instance in Dublin and Breda, there were reports from Muslim communities of receiving threatening telephone calls, hate mail and individual physical attacks.\(^{24}\)

In conclusion: the **demand for respect, acceptance and tolerance of migrants in general, and in particular of those from minority religious groups** is a central issue of intergroup relations in cities. Policies to meet these demands will be discussed in chapter four.

### 2.5. Representation of migrants in the media

Media reporting on migration, diversity and intergroup relations can have a significant impact on the perception of migrants at the local level. Hence, media reporting, in particular representations of migrants in the local and/or national media, was discussed in twenty-three case studies.\(^{25}\) Some CLIP case studies mentioned neutral representations of migrants, while others identified overly positive or negative reporting and many reported a mix of all of the above.

In several cities interview partners complained about portrayals of migrants. In Kirklees this critique was aimed at the *Dewsbury Reporter*, whose portrayals of migrants were called hostile and negative. In Newport ethnic and religious minority groups consider one of the

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\(^{22}\) Amsterdam, Antwerp, Arnsberg, Dublin, Frankfurt, Malmö, Stuttgart, Sundsvall and Vienna.

\(^{23}\) This was discussed as an important issue in the case studies on Amsterdam, Arnsberg, Frankfurt, Hospitalet, Kirklees, Lisbon, Luxembourg, Malmö, Stuttgart, Sundsvall, Terrassa, Turin, Valencia, Vienna and Zurich.

\(^{24}\) Similar attacks were reported in the case studies of Malmö, Kirklees, Vienna and Zagreb. Certainly, they also occur in other cities.

regular feature writers of the *South Wales Argus*, the principal local newspaper, to be hostile. Concern was expressed in Zurich with regard to migration background being included in news stories. In Bologna there was concern about the topics covered, as the local media seem to pay attention to immigration only when conflicts develop.

Sundsvall presents a different concern: there is a concern that articles about the situation of refugees are written as tearjerkers and stereotypical.

Some cities specifically criticised the portrayal of migrants in tabloids. For example in Vienna, tabloids are often not objective and have discriminatory tones in their writing. In Dublin as well tabloids tend to be biased, and since the economic downturn the negative tone towards ethnic minorities has increased.

In several cities there were also specific complaints and worries about the portrayal of Islam and Muslims. With regard to Valencia’s media, it was stated that there is little interest in Muslims, except when there is a focus on male chauvinism. According to Vienna’s case study, Muslim women are often portrayed as victims, while Muslim men are portrayed as fundamentalists or terrorists by the media. Muslim representatives in Kirklees expressed concern that the media portray Muslims as an enemy both locally and nationally. A similar observation was made in the case study of Antwerp. According to both the city and representatives of migrant organisations the local daily newspaper *Gazet van Antwerpen* and the regional TV station *ATV* have not always brought positive reports concerning the Muslim community. “Generally, the media try to maintain prejudices against Muslim community or in other words, they fail to break certain stereotypes by reporting mainly about negative occurrences. The media have been focused on supporting Islamophobia and giving accounts of threats connected with the growing number Muslims in Belgium”. An interview partner in Amsterdam stated the media focuses on everything controversial, including anything on Islam and Muslims, and is ‘flexible’ with regard to its attitude on the precision of reporting. In Budapest there are negative and even discriminatory articles about Muslim and Chinese immigrants. In Frankfurt it was criticised that there is an overrepresentation of Muslims in the media in comparison to other migrant religious communities and institutions, such as Hindus or Sikhs.

In Wolverhampton two local newspapers (*Express* and *Star*) are considered by the city as well as (ethnic minority) residents to report very negatively about asylum seekers. The impact is so pronounced that the city council publishes the *One City News* as an attempt to redress the balance of negative local reporting (cf. section 3.4.7).

Though there is a multitude of expressions of concern about the media representation of minority groups, there are several examples of an alternative practice. In Stuttgart and Valencia, for instance, there was praise for articles presenting different religions as well as articles featuring the voices of Muslims. Several media, for instance in Arnsberg, portray good practice intercultural initiatives in an interested and supportive tone. A local newspaper (*Gazeta*) in Wroclaw tried to impact intergroup relations by launching the campaign ‘We are
racists’ in which it wanted to bring attention to the problem of reluctance in interacting with foreigners. As part of this campaign, interviews with immigrants were published under provocative titles. This campaign led to a broad discussion in the city.

We found that certain media or groups of journalists put up an ethical framework for reporting on migrant issues. The National Union of Journalists Protocol in Ireland, for instance, is seen to have a positive impact in Dublin, where it helps to keep reporting, especially about refugees and asylum issues, from being biased.

2.6. Language

Most migrant organisations as well as several city representatives interviewed stressed the issue of language learning. Language performance is crucial for ensuring success at school and for finding appropriate employment, but also an important factor necessary for immigrants to come in contact with natives and other immigrant groups. Hence, it has an enormous impact on intergroup relation and social cohesion in general. The importance of this issue was stressed in twenty-one case studies.²⁶ For some of the cities in the CLIP network, the language issue even is ‘doubled’ due to specific language requirements of the particular region. In Luxembourg, migrant students have to learn both Luxembourgish and French. In the Spanish CLIP cities, there are two official languages as well: in the region Valencia Spanish/Castilian and Valencian; in Terrassa and Hospitalet Spanish/Castilian and Catalan.²⁷

City officials are aware of the importance of migrants’ language competences. This is reflected in the fact that most European cities offer language courses for migrants – above all language courses enhancing competence in the language of the country of immigration, but also language courses enhancing migrants’ competences in their mother tongue (cf. section 3.4.4). Despite this, a variety of experts interviewed claim that the support is not enough and that the cities should offer a broader variety of courses. This is also true for English-speaking cities such as Dublin. Some of the cities’ efforts are referred to in chapter three.

2.7. The use of public space and safety issues

Public space and neighbourhoods are important locations where different ethnic and religious groups meet. Public spaces include market places, parks and public institutions such as libraries and swimming pools, but also spaces that have not been intended as meeting points


²⁷ In other bilingual cities, e.g. Newport in Wales, the dual language requirement is not the same. In Newport – despite the fact that Wales is officially bilingual – migrants can chose to speak either English or Welsh (e.g. for the purpose of citizenship).
at all, for instance street corners or a patch of grass between buildings. Since groups in cities are very diverse, there are also very different perceptions for what and for whom public spaces are for and how they can be used. In some CLIP cities, these varying perceptions seriously challenge intergroup relations.

In the cities of Turin and Vienna there has been conflict about the use of public parks. These often are a favourite place for migrant families to hold weekend picnics and barbeques. On sunny days migrants come in large numbers and enjoy the park facilities. Even though many natives are also used to spending their time in parks, some complain about the ‘occupation’ of ‘their’ parks by migrants. In Turin, for instance, every Sunday, immigrants, especially Peruvians, come together in parks to eat, dance, play and converse. The number of park visitors is over 12,000 people every Sunday in spring and summer. This custom is becoming a social problem and a cause of protests among Italians because of the noise, the amount of rubbish and the use of parks as barbecue areas without suitable facilities.

In other cities, intergroup conflicts occur due to different assumptions on the appropriate behaviour on public squares and on the streets in general. In Hospitalet, Spaniards complain about Latin Americans who drink in the street and gather noisily during the night. In several cases, this concern is related to the issue of safety. In Wolverhampton, Kirklees and Hospitalet, public concern arose about the behaviour of migrants (in general male, often youngsters) hanging around and drinking alcohol in the streets.

Problematic behaviour in public spaces is often found in segregated neighbourhoods: in nearly every CLIP city, migrant organisation representatives emphasised the negative influence of segregated and disadvantaged neighbourhoods (having both a higher concentration of migrant residents and of socio-economically disadvantaged natives) on intergroup relations. On a limited scale, irritations between groups have led to riots in some of the cities, for instance, in Terrassa ten years ago, the irritations between the newly arrived Moroccans and autochthonous Spanish residents escalated: “During a neighbourhood festival some fighting erupted on one of the squares. People got wounded, cars were set on fire and a demonstration was held. The festival had to be cancelled. The media were at that time not positive about the Moroccan immigrants and wrote articles that did not improve the peaceful coexistence of the groups.” But the positive effect of this event was, that immigration and its influence on neighbourhoods were put on the political agenda, and that everyone realised that peaceful coexistence between groups is important.

In Turin as well, “issues of control and safety have been on the agenda for many years”. The residents’ committee of a neighbourhood in which the Arabic community is rather visible “through ethnic shops, women wearing the chador and men wearing long robes” expressed concerns about their personal security towards the city.

In Athens there are tensions due to the high amount of people coming illegally to the city, where they are living under bad conditions. This situation created ‘ghettos’ in the heart of the historical centre, and tensions between new migrants and native neighbours. The latter
complain about the deterioration of their neighbourhood and their living conditions; they are afraid of the new people and they feel that their area is not safe any more. Other cities like Valencia, Breda and Kirklees report about similar worries.

2.8. Imported ethnic and political conflict

In some CLIP cities, intergroup relations are influenced by ethnic or political conflict which originated in emigration countries and has been ‘imported’ by immigration into European cities. These conflicts can be of concern to both migrant communities as well as politicians since they have the potential to influence local intergroup relations in a negative manner.

Examples for such imported conflicts are **tensions between different ethnic and national groups** – such as Turks and Kurds or Serbs and Albanians – that run along traditional conflict lines existing in the countries of origin. The Vienna case study, for instance, reported that there were occasionally critical phases in the Turkish-Kurdish relations in Vienna which were influenced by political developments in Turkey and Iraq. Open manifestations of the Turkish/Kurdish conflict arose in the context of political demonstrations because of Turkish military invasions into Northern Iraq. Thus, in 2006 for example violent incidents involving Turks and Kurds occurred in Vienna. Since then a calming down of the conflict can be observed in the city. Similar tensions have existed in other CLIP cities, e.g. in Stuttgart, Wolverhampton and Kirklees.

A more recent conflict affecting intergroup relations in CLIP cities – in particular between Muslim and Jewish communities – is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Several city visits of the CLIP research team took place during the most recent Israeli bombardment of Gaza. During this conflict a constant stream of images of severely wounded Palestinians could be seen on TV, particularly *Al Jazeera*. In a great number of cities, including Vienna, Malmö, Amsterdam, Terrassa and Hospitalet, migrant representatives reported that the situation of the Palestinians and/or the relations between Muslims and Jews is a great worry for them. In Terrassa, a Muslim group organised a round table on these issues. In most cities, however, local authorities are not overly concerned about this interest in situations in other countries. Although local authorities are aware that a lack of critical reactions of European leaders might cause mistrust and hatred among Muslims against West Europeans, they do not think that this is something that they can or should respond to at the city level. In Amsterdam by contrast, the (Jewish) mayor went to Moroccan associations to talk about this issue, and tried to avoid the development of further hostility. Such preventive intervention can be very useful: in Malmö, some respondents suggested that new conflict lines have been drawn over the past two years. There have been several arson attacks on both Malmö’s main mosque situated at the Islamic Centre and the Jewish Chapel in central Malmö. It was suggested that the troubles in Gaza have compounded inter-religious conflict on the street and also in the classroom. These developments highlight the need for engagement and subsequent dialogue to begin as soon as possible.
2.9. Issues in relation to national minorities

National minorities are ethnic groups in multi-ethnic states, whose inclusion into the state typically is the result of a change of borders between states. If migration plays a role for the development of the minority situation it is not recent immigration like in most CLIP cities, but former migration in history. National minorities aspire for forms of cultural and political autonomy, which often meet the resistance of the majority population and lead to tensions or conflict in intergroup relations.

Within the CLIP network Tallinn and Zagreb are examples of cities where the status of national minorities is an issue in intergroup relations. The issues and tensions exist on the urban level, but originate from the macro structure of the state and international relations. We discuss the issue for the city of Tallinn.

In the Estonian capital, there are two large ethnic groups: ethnic Estonians and ethnic Russians that settled after the occupation of Estonia by the Soviet Union. Intergroup relations in the city are mainly peaceful, but nonetheless characterised by a division along ethnic lines: there are two parallel communities of Estonian and Russian groups. Ethnic media and separate education systems in Estonian and Russian languages reinforce the divisions. All persons interviewed for the case study stressed that both communities are not cooperating and the efforts to establish relations meet with enormous difficulties.

The tense state of intergroup relations can be illustrated by riots and disputes surrounding the relocation of a Soviet World War II memorial, in April 2007. The conflict is about symbols and the interpretation of history. The respective Soviet war memorial is a bronze statue of a Soviet soldier, mourning the soldiers killed in World War II. In 1947, it had been installed in a centrally located place in the city of Tallinn. Today, this ‘bronze soldier’ highlights two different perceptions of history in Estonia: while for many Russian residents the memorial primarily symbolises the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany, many Estonians consider the ‘bronze soldier’ to be a symbol of Soviet occupation and repression. In 2007, the Estonian government decided to relocate the statue to the Military Cemetery at the outskirts of the city. Disagreement over this action led to mass protests, which culminated in rioting and looting in downtown Tallinn, on the night of April 27. Hundreds of people were arrested, about seventy were hurt and the riots even claimed the life of a young Russian. After the clashes, coined the ‘Bronze Night’, the whole Estonian society was out of balance: tensions escalated and relations became somewhat hostile. Today, the problems have not disappeared but the situation has regained stability.

2.10. Gender roles and relations

The issue of gender roles and gender relations in migrant families is referred to in several cities. In most cases, (changing) gender roles are mentioned in the context of Muslim
families. Like the issue of religious dress codes, gender roles challenge intergroup relations in two ways.

On the one hand, several experts interviewed, for instance in the cities of Sundsvall, Malmö, Stuttgart and Arnsberg, stated that individual Muslim families are very traditional in terms of traditions and habits and live in paternalistic family structures manifesting ‘traditional’ role models. This is expressed in discussions between parents and teachers about sexual education at school, women’s rights, threats towards other family members and also cases of female genital mutilation and arranged marriages. Some experts are bothered by these developments and criticise the social isolation of respective families and (inner-family) women’s discrimination. On the other hand, prevalent stereotypical views on the part of the majority about gender relations in Muslim groups challenge mutual perceptions of groups and intergroup relations, when Muslims men are assumed to generally suppress women, as reported in Breda.

In the Malmö case study, the perceived clash between Swedish society and Muslim beliefs in relation to gender roles is illustrated: “The issues surrounding perceived gender roles are … complex. On the one hand, new arrivals are unfamiliar with Swedish gender equality legislation which ultimately conflicts with some traditional aspects of the Muslim faith. An academic at Malmö University suggested that a key issue for the Muslim communities in Malmö is their inability to compromise or be flexible over conflicting ideologies such as gender roles. It was further suggested that Swedish society has compromised a step too far and is afraid to debate conflicting issues for fear of being labelled racist. Equally, the majority population are unfamiliar with traditional aspects of the Muslim faith and this also creates conflict. This evidence suggests that there is a lack of understanding on both sides.”

Violence against women – both migrant and native women – is another very important issue of intergroup relations referred to in some of the case studies. Violence can be both physical and emotional and includes domestic violence, female genital mutilation and unwished arranged or even forced marriages. In Sundsvall, some experts reported on inner-family violence against Muslim women; the same is true in Stuttgart and Arnsberg, but also Russian women seem to be victims of inner-family violence. The issue of violence against women of another background was mentioned in the case study of Hospitalet: “… violence against women, which has always been an issue in Spain, increased since the end of nineties, but violence against Latin-American women has started to increase considerably since 2007.” Feminist and Human Rights groups from the majority and minority society, among others, protest and try to act against the violence against both migrant and native women.

After this discussion of needs and issues in intergroup relations, we now turn to political responses of cities toward these needs and issues.
3. **Patterns of intercultural policies in CLIP cities**

In this chapter we will first discuss general approaches that cities take toward integration and intercultural policies, then look at the ‘organisational chart’ of relations between different organs of city government and migrant groups, which will be followed by an analysis of concrete policies and measures of cities toward migrant and minority groups.

3.1. **General approaches**

**National minority rights**

Some of the CLIP cities do not yet have much immigration, but they do have national minorities within their populations that originate from the multi-ethnic structure of their country’s population, instead of foreign migration. This structure has mostly arisen from the drawing or changing of borders as a result of conflict or war, or when nation states formed, including people of different ethnicities. Like any population ethnic minorities in nation states want favourable material living conditions and aspire to some degree of cultural and political autonomy within the nation state they live in, including recognition of their language. They want to keep ethnic boundaries intact, and do not wish to become similar to the ethnic majority.

Modern international law, many treaties and national legislation recognise the legitimacy of these goals and define the rights of ethnic and national minorities. Integration of minorities into a multi-ethnic nation state that respects and protects ethnic minorities is thus the recognised goal of national minorities in many democratic societies.

Budapest, Prague Tallinn and Zagreb are those CLIP cities in which this general legal framework is relevant for intergroup relations. It shall be briefly described for Zagreb, which has applied the national Croatian legislation. The national framework is called the ‘Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities’. Minorities have rights of representation and cultural autonomy on the basis of this constitutional act. Zagreb has, however, not just enacted the national legal framework, but has taken an additional approach. Thus, institutions and relations in the city are on the one hand defined by national legislation, on the other by the statute of the city of Zagreb, according to which a Committee for National Minorities has been formed which considers issues that are important for implementing rights for national minorities in Zagreb.

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28 Other cities also have officially recognised national minorities, e.g. Sundsvall and Turku, but the minority groups play a less significant role in local intercultural policies of these cities.
Integration policy approach

In the vast majority of CLIP cities, however, intercultural policies and intergroup relations are embedded in an integration policy concept.\(^{29}\) Despite a number of differentiating aspects there is a communality of framing and planning which seems to justify talking of a common integration policy approach. The very great majority of these cities have official documents on integration\(^{30}\) that emphasise the following items:

- Inclusion of individual migrants into welfare state institutions
- respect for the cultures of immigrants and their organisations
- awareness raising in the receiving society
- adaptation of public services
- establishment of consultative bodies of migrants
- raising participation of migrants in public life.

Against the background of such communalities it is possible, at the same time, to refer to some differentiating features within the integration policy approach. While all cities support the integration of individuals and families and want to improve intergroup relations, the weight that is given to the importance of intercultural policies for intergroup relations seems to be different: Sundsvall and Copenhagen are examples of cities that pursue an individual-based strategy. Other cities focus more on promoting groups. Turin, for instance, emphasises social cohesion “on the basis of collaboration among the various formal and informal organisations living in an area: e.g. parishes, ethnic associations, local resident committees, entrepreneur organisations, youth and elderly groups”.

Dialogue between groups, stimulating mutual understanding and keeping or developing relations to groups whose activities and goals one does not much appreciate are central for the approach. This is also evident from Vienna’s policy in the context of radicalisation prevention. “The general perception and attitude of the city toward radicalism among immigrant and minority groups focuses on upholding sustainable relations with all immigrant organisations and fostering sustainable and cautious dialogue”, as mentioned in the case study. This is in line with the strong tradition of corporatist policies in Austria, which tries to include all groups that have a stake in a political process.

Another line of differentiation within the integration approach is the tradition and weight given to forms of explicit anti-discrimination and anti-racism strategies in the United Kingdom and Ireland. Newport, Kirklees Wolverhampton and Dublin stand for this approach.

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\(^{29}\) According to the case study Turku’s concept is a refugee reception concept. When one looks at its characteristics it is very similar to integration concepts and probably is an early phase of an integration concept due to the recency of migration to the city.

\(^{30}\) Most of them use the term ‘integration’ in the title of the document.
and have – on a national and city level – established systems of anti-discrimination and anti-racism institutions, reporting systems and sanctioning systems. As a consequence of the European Anti-Discrimination legislation the other European countries are in a beginning phase of establishing similar institutions.

**Diversity policy approach**

Four cities (Amsterdam, Breda, Hospitalet and Terrassa) do not want to subsume their policies under the category of ‘integration policies’ and call their approach a diversity policy approach, explicitly valuing the ethnic cultures of their inhabitants 31 Not only individuals, but groups in particular are addressed and relations between groups are regarded as central for social cohesion. A central theme in the policies of Amsterdam, for instance, is *Verbinding* (Connecting) of groups; the development of social cohesion is seen as a consequence of the search for connections. The director of the programme *Platform Amsterdam Samen* (‘Platform Amsterdam Together’) explains: “On itself social cohesion is nothing, but for the administration the main issue is where to find connections.” The diversity approach also fully accepts the cultures and religions of migrant groups and looks upon diversity as an asset to urban life. In the Catalan cities there a particular emphasis on equal rights and citizenship for migrants.

### 3.2. Structure of relations between city and migrant and minority groups

Whereas in several parts of public life there are traditions of institutionalised relations – as between economy and state, labour and management, voluntary associations and public authorities – relations between cities and migrant or minority groups are an area, where new patterns of relations and structures had to and have to be ‘invented’, tried out and established. This section looks at the formal and informal structures of urban government.

The **key players** within these structures are the council, the mayor and the administration. All of the cities in the CLIP network are from democratic countries and they have an elected council that is the responsible legislative and budgetary body at the local level. The mayor can be directly elected by the electorate or be elected by the city council. Nothing happens without the work of the administration which executes national, federal states’ and local policies. We will now look at relations that are relevant for intercultural policies.

**The council and its partners for intercultural policies**

The municipal council as the local parliament has to either initiate or sanction basic statements and policy concepts and funds concerning intercultural policies. Most councils

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31 Many other cities equally value diversity, but do not make it the focus of their approach.
have adopted an integration approach, like the ‘Stuttgart Pact for Integration’ or Dublin’s ‘Towards Integration: A City Framework’.

As the body with the budgetary responsibility the council also has to decide on whether a department in the administration should be created (and/or kept) that has the prime responsibility for designing and executing intercultural policies, or whether intercultural policies should be the competence of other departments. Funding decisions also have to be taken by the council on larger projects of immigrant integration and support for migrant and minority organisations.

**Figure 3: The Council and intercultural policies**

The CLIP II module on diversity has shown that the general administration in many cities makes a lot of effort to better service the needs of immigrants and adapt to the diversity of its residents. The great majority of CLIP cities has decided to create a special administrative diversity unit or **department for intercultural affairs** within the administration. Examples include the ‘Office for Integration’ in Dublin, the ‘Office for the Integration of New Citizens’ in Hospitalet, the Centro de Apoyo a la Inmigracion in Valencia, the Department Samen Leven (‘Living together’) in Antwerp or the ‘Department of Integration Affairs’ in Turin and the Unit ‘MA 17’ in Vienna. The weight that a city gives to intercultural policies and integration is reflected in the power, the size and quality of the department to which the responsibility for intercultural relations is designated.

A relationship between the council and migrant groups can be realised by membership of migrant representatives in the council, or by the creation of a consultative body.

The proportion of **persons with a migration background in elected positions**, however, is rather low or zero in most cases. In Athens and Dublin, for example, as in six other cities for which we have the information, there are no elected representatives with a migration

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32 The information has been available in the case studies or via the internet for nineteen cities out of thirty-one.
background in the city council. A major reason for the low degree of migrant representation is the lack of voting rights of foreigners. The fact that many migrants are still foreign nationals and have no voting rights or the right to campaign for political office has been mentioned as a challenging issue in several cities, including Terrassa, Vienna and Stuttgart. Only a few cities have a significant representation of migrants and minorities in the council. For example, 25% of Malmö’s, 20% of Amsterdam’s, 17% of Kirklees’, 16% of Antwerp’s, 15% of Copenhagen’s and 12% of Wolverhampton’s council members have an ethnic minority background. In Tallinn the representation of the Russian national minority is regulated by a national minority protection legislation; twenty out of sixty-one city council seats are held by national minorities.

Since in most cases representation of migrants and minorities in the city parliaments is rather low or even non-existent, the prime articulation and representation of migrants’ interests at the local level is through some kind of consultative body for migrants and migrants’ organisations and/or through single ethnic and minority organisations. The case studies of seventeen cities report that there are such institutionalised consultative institutions. Half of these bodies gather representatives of migrant or minority organisations and NGOs (e.g. the ‘Municipal Council for Interculturality and Citizenship’ in Lisbon) – and thus put a higher emphasis on groups. The other half of bodies gather individuals with migration background and/or respective expertise (e.g. the ‘Foreigners’ Council’ in Zurich) and thus put a higher emphasis on individuals.

Of the latter, the members are either elected (as the ‘Foreigners’ Advisory Council’ in Frankfurt) or appointed (as the ‘International Committee’ in Stuttgart); some bodies have both elected as well as appointed members, as the ‘Integration Council’ in Copenhagen.

In most cities relations between the ‘diversity department’ and a representative body of migrants and single ethnic organisations are not institutionalised and mostly informal. The intensity of contacts depends on issues that have to be solved. Contacts can be initiated from both sides.

Another possibility of enabling migrants’ participation in the political process can be realised by introducing new forms of governance in cities, as exemplified by an approach in Breda. After frustration with the planned top down introduction of a concept of integration for the city it was decided that a public inquiry process ‘from below’ should take place, organised with the help of the communication department of the Breda administration and an expert institute. The process chosen was ‘Appreciative Inquiry’, developed by the American professor in organisational behaviour, David L. Cooperrider. Appreciative inquiry is basically a positive process, in search of what people “see as their dreams” and the focus is on

33 Amsterdam, Antwerp, Arnsberg, Athens, Bologna, Copenhagen, Frankfurt, Hospitalet (still being set up), Kirklees, Lisbon, Luxembourg, Stuttgart, Tallinn, Terrassa, Wolverhampton, Zagreb and Zurich.

34 Subsidies to ethnic organisations are an exception which, of course, have to be formally regulated.
discovery and design. The intentions were to inspire people from different nationalities and backgrounds to join in the policy making process, to activate them and to make them enthusiastic reflecting about a common future. As a starting point, so called Stadsgesprekken (Town Discussions) took place and this resulted in fourteen issues, and these issues became project proposals. A Bouwgroep (Building Group) was established, to steer this process which resulted in a new proposal for an integration concept.

**The mayor and intercultural policies**

Mayors are key players in intercultural policies. In the few cities, where administrative power is with the leader of the council and the mayor has only a representative function this position takes a similar role. He or she has authority over the administration and in this way intercultural policies can become a top priority in the administration’s work. The mayor has influence in the council, can relate to representative bodies of migrants and to the single migrant organisations. His or her voice is also heard in the local media public. The mayor has the opportunity to keep close contact to the different migrant ethnic and religious organisations which represent the migrants’ civil society (see Figure 4).

*Figure 4: The mayor’s role in intercultural policies*

In some cities it is not only the mayor, but the deputy mayor or an Alderman who plays a key role in intercultural policies. In Valencia, for instance, competence for immigration issues including relations to ethnic organisations has officially been transferred from the mayor to the Social Welfare and Integration Alderman. In Terrassa similarly, a deputy mayor has a central role in integration and intercultural policies.

How a major can actively shape a city’s intercultural philosophy and policy, can be seen, for instance, in Stuttgart. It was the mayor who initiated a paradigmatic change of policies from a  

35 As is the case in Kirklees, for example.
traditional ‘foreigners’ policy’ to a diversity policy. He has set an example and finds a lot of recognition in the national public. The staff for intercultural policies is directly responsible to him. The mayor of Amsterdam has similarly played a key role in the new anti-radicalisation policy of the city. He was also involved in a Jewish-Moroccan initiative for inter-religious dialogue.

3.3. Intercultural policies towards ethnic organisations

Most city representatives stated that they consider local ethnic and religious migrant organisations important in the context of integration and intergroup relations. On the one hand, the organisations are helpful for their members, because they provide networks and promote the familiarisation with the ‘new’ society. On the other hand, relations with migrant organisations, and in particular with their leaders, are useful for the city as well. The leaders usually are respected in the migrant communities and can act as bridges between the administration and individual members, bring people together and share information about different cultures and religions.

Intercultural policies of the city toward ethnic organisations reflect the meaning and relevance that cities give to the role of ethnic organisations in urban life and for the integration process. We identified four important components of intercultural policies towards migrant organisations: funding of migrant organisations, empowering them, policies of recognition and policies promoting a shared vision.

3.3.1. Funding of migrant organisations

Cities that pursue a general integration or intergroup strategy appreciate the social capital that is produced through the activities of migrant organisations. Most migrant organisations, however, have very limited financial resources; they lack funding in general and space to run their activities. Thus, in one way or another, most CLIP cities support migrant organisations either through direct financial support (project funding and/or institutional funding) or through providing rooms and/or rent allowances.

The most common way of funding migrant organisations is the provision of direct financial support for cultural, social and educational activities such as festivals, caring for seniors, support for students and language training. Projects associated with commercial, religious, ideological and political interests are generally excluded from municipal financial supports. Some cities promote intercultural projects enhancing intergroup relations. In Copenhagen, for instance, projects funded by the municipality have to highlight the city’s diversity and must be based on cross-cultural cooperation; the city of Stuttgart grants a larger amount of money to events which are conducted by at least two migrant organisations of different ethnicities.
Singular migrant associations get institutional funding, i.e. financial aid which does not depend on specific projects or activities, but constitutes a general fund for the respective association.\textsuperscript{36}

Financial funding of migrant organisations and their activities can be found in twenty-three cities.\textsuperscript{37} The amount of money provided for migrant associations’ activities varies greatly from city to city, depending on the city’s size, the proportion of migrants living in the city, the budget and the city’s general approach towards these organisations. The city of Turku, for instance, annually supports migrant organisations with about € 7,000, Sundsvall with about € 12,400. Lisbon and Zurich spend approximately € 25,000 per year, while the cities of Frankfurt, Newport and Stuttgart annually support migrant organisations’ projects with more than € 200,000.\textsuperscript{38}

The mentioned examples represent cities having \textbf{specific funds for migrant organisations}. In other cities, migrant organisation can apply for \textbf{general funds}. The city of Valencia, for instance, does not have specific budgets for migrant organisations, but the latter may apply for funds for social and cultural activities of civil society organisations in general.

These applications, however, often are not successful, since the organisations do not have enough knowledge about the respective procedures. To overcome this challenge, the city of Breda developed a good practice approach.

\textbf{Box 1: Breda: funding for migrant organisations’ projects}

In Breda, there are two kinds of municipal funds migrant organisations can apply for: ‘Diversity Funds’ which are linked to the policy goals of participation, social cohesion and integration and ‘Funds for Social Development’ (\textit{Fonds Maatschappelijke Ontwikkelingen, FMO}). In the period between 2007 and 2011, the FMO has a budget of ten million Euros to support initiatives of citizens and organisations. Promoted activities should:

- enable citizens to come with ideas about their surrounding,
- increase social cohesion,
- support groups with difficulties and
- develop into a durable service after the subsidy stops.

To increase and improve migrant organisations’ applications, the city presented the funding possibility in information meetings at migrant associations. In addition, municipal

\textsuperscript{36} Associations in the cities of Malmö, Stuttgart and Sundsvall.

\textsuperscript{37} Amsterdam, Antwerp, Bologna, Breda, Copenhagen, Dublin, Frankfurt, Kirkles, Lisbon, Luxembourg, Malmö, Newport, Prague, Stuttgart, Sundsvall, Terrassa, Turin, Turku, Valencia, Vienna, Wolverhampton, Zagreb and Zurich.

\textsuperscript{38} While the cities of Frankfurt and Stuttgart support migrant organisations directly, the city of Newport supports them indirectly: it provides the South East Wales Racial Equality Council (SEWREC), the Gwent Association of Voluntary Organisations (GAVO) and the Citizen Advice Bureau with about £ 198,000. The three organisations then give this money to migrant associations in order to fund their activities.
administrators support organisations having attractive project ideas in transforming the proposals into a well-written application including a budget plan. Thus, residents with little knowledge of the Dutch language have a better chance to get their project funded.

To coordinate municipal and private support for migrant organisations, the city of Turin established an interesting public-private partnership with a private foundation.

**Box 2: Turin: public-private partnership**

In 2008, the Department of Integration Affairs of the city of Turin and the private foundation *Compagnia di San Paolo* established a public-private partnership to combine and coordinate their funds for NGOs.

Together, they addressed calls for proposals to (inter)ethnic associations and schools that could get funding for projects promoting the social inclusion of migrants. During the last two years, two calls have been launched; thirty projects have been funded in the first round, twenty-four in the second. Altogether, the partnership spent € 2.6 million.

Fifteen CLIP cities address the challenge of lacking space via rent allowances or the provision of rooms.39

In five cities, ethnic organisations have the opportunity to obtain rent allowances by the city. Arnsberg, for instance, covers 15% of migrant organisations’ rental costs. In Sundsvall, a rent subsidy for up to 40% of the premises’ costs can be given by the city. Turku pays a significant, but variable part of the rent for several migrant organisations, including religious ones.

Thirteen cities provide municipal space for migrant organisations, either rooms for regular meetings, as in Turin, or larger rooms and public place for specific events. The city of Zurich, for example, provides community centres for the organisations to use. Likewise, in Stuttgart, all ethnic associations are given the opportunity to rent a municipal hall once a year.

Some cities encourage the collective use of buildings. The city of Turin established a database on available venues for special events and meeting places across the city. In Amsterdam, one of the facilities is *Wereldpand* (‘World House’), a multi migrant organisation building. It includes twenty-five organisations which are mainly active in the field of refugee support. Its large premises can be rented by external organisations at a daily rate between € 50 and € 150. Another impressive example of providing space for migrant organisations is the municipal intercultural centre *Zonarelli* in Bologna. It hosts cultural, sport and artistic events (e.g. language, cooking and music courses, films, exhibitions, concerts, seminars and conferences) in order to highlight the cultures of ethnic minorities and foster relations between them and with the native population. Similarly, the ‘House of

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39 Amsterdam, Arnsberg, Bologna, Dublin, Hospitalet, Kirklees, Malmö, Newport, Stuttgart, Sundsvall, Terrassa, Turin, Turku, Zagreb and Zurich.
National Minorities’ in Prague is a meeting place for national minorities which is funded by the city.

**Box 3: Prague: ‘House of National Minorities’**

In 2007 the city of Prague has opened the ‘House of National Minorities’ in which the eleven officially recognised national minorities – the Polish, Bulgarian, Slovak, Roma, Hungarian, German, Ruthenian, Greek, Russian, Croatian and Ukrainian groups – have offices for their civic associations, including rooms for club activities and editorial offices for their publications. The House is a location for social and educational events, promotes amateur artists’ activities (e.g. fine arts, literature and drama), presents minorities’ activities through exhibitions and facilitates the development of minorities’ folklore performances.

The ‘House of National Minorities’ is a place of encounter and cooperation within national minority communities, between national minorities and with the majority society. The House plays a central role as a contact point for everyone who is interested in national minority issues. Furthermore, other ethnic or religious minorities and multicultural associations have the opportunity to use the House in order to get involved and present their activities.

**3.3.2. Empowering and connecting migrant organisations**

Funding is one important means of empowering ethnic organisations. Empowerment, however, is a broader concept. We identified three types of empowerment measures: programmes building capacities of migrant groups, the establishment of umbrella organisations and connecting and involving migrant leaders.

**Capacity building**

Capacity building, in particular training in organisation management and leadership as well as programmes involving migrants as ‘multipliers’, can be considered an important means of empowering ethnic organisations. Nine CLIP case studies reported on respective programmes that can be regarded as good practice initiatives.40

Specific training in organisation management is offered, for instance, in Amsterdam, Newport, Stuttgart, Sundsvall, Turin and Turku.

**Box 4: Newport, Stuttgart, Sundsvall and Turku: courses in association management**

Following the philosophy of ‘providing help to self-help’, the cities of Newport, Stuttgart, Sundsvall and Turku provide or support courses in association management.41 Most courses

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40 Amsterdam, Breda, Dublin, Frankfurt, Newport, Stuttgart, Sundsvall, Turin and Turku.
41 In Stuttgart, the migrant organisations’ umbrella association ‘Forum of the Cultures’ provides the courses, in Newport, it is the umbrella association GAVO, while in Sundsvall it is the city’s Labour Market, Adult Education and Integration Office FAVI. In Turku, the courses were held by the – meanwhile abolished – International Meeting Point (IMP) at the municipal Cultural Centre (Kulittaurikeskas).
focus on administrative and legal aspects such as establishing an association, defining rules, calculating the budget, accountancy and fundraising; other seminars emphasise the setting-up of websites, public relations and computer skills. The courses are offered for all local migrant associations, in particular the board members, and get very positive feedback from the participants.

The cities of Amsterdam, Stuttgart and Turin train Muslim groups in project management, youth work and public relations, provide them with media training and try to connect them with one another as well as with local institutions. These projects are described in more detail in chapter four.

Some capacity building programmes are based on the concept of involving migrants as ‘multipliers’. The idea is that a city trains committed migrants on specific issues; the migrants then act as ‘multipliers’ and transfer their knowledge and competence to their communities. The ‘intercultural stewards’ in Antwerp are one example of migrant ‘multipliers’. There are about thirty volunteers who are committed to enhance intercultural dialogue. They are active in organising and implementing cultural events and festivals and inform their community on municipal projects. Two other good practice examples of the cities of Dublin and Frankfurt are presented in the following.

The Dublin Office for Integration conducted a project, which is already being used as a model throughout Ireland: the ‘Migrant Voters Campaign’. In the course of this campaign, seventy-five migrants were trained and connected and then acted as ‘multipliers’ to raise migrants’ awareness on their right to vote.

**Box 5: Dublin: ‘Migrant Voters Campaign’**

Aims of the ‘Migrant Voters Campaign’, led by Dublin’s Office for Integration, are to empower and enable migrant representatives to increase awareness of community members on their right to vote.

To start with, the city invited all local migrant communities to discuss and agree the project and established a steering committee that consisted of sixteen migrants from twelve different countries, who represent community, religious, cultural and business interests. The committee makes all decisions on the campaign’s operation, policy and practice in a democratic manner. An atmosphere of cooperation and mutual respect underlies all of the work.

The response to the campaign has been very powerful: seventy-five migrants attended courses on how to deliver voter information sessions in their specific migrant communities as well as in other communities across the city. The posters for the campaign have been translated into twenty-five languages.

The city underlines that its leadership and the principles for working together have underpinned its success. If migrant communities are involved in a respectful and meaningful way, including providing the necessary resources to achieve respective aims and objectives,
they will become mobilised as they have through this campaign. Hence, the campaign is a good example of how the active involvement and empowerment of migrant ‘multipliers’ can increase social capital and lead to stronger relations amongst communities.

The city of Frankfurt conducts a variety of projects in which migrants are qualified as ‘multipliers’ to transfer their knowledge to other migrants. A good practice example is the AOE-project (*Ausbildungsorientierte Elternarbeit*) that aims at informing migrant parents on the German educational and training system as well as on issues of child development such as dyslexia, hyperactivity and multilingualism. To reach the parents, the city cooperates with migrant organisations and trains qualified migrants (e.g. teachers, social workers, psychologists) on the issues mentioned. These migrants act as ‘multiplier’ and conduct workshops in migrant organisations and schools. The project is highly appreciated by its participants as well as the city. Currently, about sixty mediators conduct workshops in seventeen different languages.

**Establishment of umbrella organisations**

Another means to empower migrant associations is the establishment of umbrella organisations. Umbrella organisations strengthen cooperation between member associations, enable the members to create and use synergies and can thus increase the associations’ influence within the city. Umbrella organisations of (migrant) associations are mentioned as an important means of empowerment and connecting in six CLIP case studies.42

The umbrella organisation SONDIP in Turku, for instance, has presently twelve member organisations, including cultural associations, ‘multicultural’ associations and student organisations. It consults the city about migrant groups and cooperates with the city and the regional employment service to inform migrants about job-related projects. A further good practice example in the field of migrant associations’ umbrella organisations is the ‘Forum of Cultures’ in Stuttgart.

**Box 6: Stuttgart: ‘Forum of Cultures’**

The ‘Forum of Cultures’ is an umbrella organisation for migrant associations. It aims at raising mutual understanding and active dialogue through seminars and cultural events. Founded by the city in 1998, it now has eighty active member associations; a total of 270 organisations are supported and connected.

The forum, that gets considerable institutional funding by the city, offers advice and other forms of assistance to migrant organisations, e.g. courses on fundraising or intercultural competences, hosts cultural projects such as migrant theatre plays or ‘intercultural breakfasts’, and engages itself in the field of political education. Another activity of the ‘Forum of Cultures’ is the organisation of the city’s yearly ‘Summer Festival of Cultures’.

42 Antwerp, Newport, Stuttgart, Turku, Vienna and Zurich.
Since 2001, it has successfully edited the magazine ‘Intercultural Stuttgart: Encounter of Cultures’, promoting migrant organisations’ activities.

Some umbrella organisations gather specific groups. The city of Zurich, for instance, encouraged Muslim organisations to establish an umbrella organisation (Vereinigung der Islamischen Organisationen in Zürich, VIOZ) in order to represent the ‘Muslim reference point’ for the city. The city of Vienna initiated a network of migrant women’s associations to strengthen these associations and their initiatives and to improve their involvement in urban affairs. In Newport, there are several umbrella organisations supporting refugee services and voluntary work to enhance their cooperation to achieve common goals.

Connecting and involving migrant leaders

In a somewhat stereotypical way ethnic migrant groups are often seen as rather homogenous groups when in fact they usually are socially stratified and differentiated like other populations. It is of high importance to involve community leaders in intercultural policies. Connecting leaders of different ethnic and minority populations with leaders in the majority population creates the opportunity that these may use their leadership positions in their ethnic groups to improve relations between ethnic groups, or, in the case of conflict or even violence, try to stop the conflict or the violence.

The Platform Amsterdam Samen provides an interesting and promising concept of connecting and empowering leadership groups. For instance, it established a network of Muslim ‘key figures’. Other examples are the Tallinn project ‘Kodurahu – Peace in the Community’, the qualification programme of young Muslim leaders and the planned local Islam forum in Stuttgart that will be describes in chapter four.

A further means is migrant leaders’ involvement in local forums. Within local forums, migrant associations get into contact with other relevant actors in the city and become more involved in local decision-making. Six case studies provide information on respective measures. In Vienna, for instance, there are forums at the neighbourhood level that serve as a meeting point for district associations, NGOs and local politicians. The city encourages migrant associations’ participation in these forums. Likewise in Stuttgart and Frankfurt, projects try to enhance the involvement of mosque associations in neighbourhoods.

Other cities established city-wide forums to connect and empower migrant associations. Within the ‘Social Network’ (Rede Social) in Lisbon associations operating in the social

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43 The ‘Intercultural Cities’ project and the White Paper of the Council of Europe have both emphasised the importance of intercultural leaders in intercultural policies (Eurofound 2009: 37).

44 Alternatively elite groups might also use their influence to mobilise and further aggravate a conflict.

sector exchange information and develop common strategies for local social policies. More than two-hundred partners are involved, including various migrant associations.46

### 3.3.3. Policies of recognition

Funding and empowerment are important policies towards migrant organisations that, in one way or another, are applied by most CLIP cities. Policies of recognition are crucial as well. The case studies clearly show that migrants have a need for (more) recognition.

Pursuing policies of acceptance and recognition means to treat migrants and minorities as equal in a universalistic sense, yet to recognise and respect the cultural and ethnic particularistic traits of individuals and groups. Thus, recognition is a principle and basic orientation relevant for different spheres of social life. It can, however, be translated in concrete policy measures.

The installation of an institutionalised **consultative body of migrant and/or minority representatives** that advises the city council and its committees in all matters of local politics is an example for such a concrete policy. The installation of such a council officially recognises the importance of migrants and minorities for the city and values their expert knowledge and assessments (cf. section 3.2). In nearly all cases, however, there is a discussion on what the actual power of such an unelected body should be.

Policies of recognition are also part of a national minority policy, which wants to keep ethnic boundaries intact. In the case of migrant ethnic minorities, policies of recognition can go along with acculturation policies and processes that – in the course of generations – will eventually lead to obscuring former ethnic boundaries in a process of new nation building.

**Box 7: Zagreb: institutionalised and informal contacts between city and minorities**

The city’s relation to national minorities is institutionalised in the form of a special council for national minorities in the city. Among others, each national minority that is represented in the council celebrates certain holidays important to their respective ethnic or national tradition. Those events are usually visited by city representatives and members of other ethnic minorities that show respect and recognition.

Respecting and valuing ethnic, cultural and religious customs, symbols and holidays and giving it a place in the city’s life is of importance for minority groups. Several cities do so by supporting ethnic heritage events and intercultural festivals, as will be described in section

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46 There are several similar examples. The city of Wroclaw, for instance, established two forums for ethnic minority organisations to exchange experiences and cooperate, the ‘Working Group for National and Ethnic Minorities’ and the ‘Centre of Information and Social Development’. In Wolverhampton, the ‘Community Cohesion Forum’ provides a platform and an institutionalised structure for maintaining and improving relations between ethnic and religious organisations, and between these organisations and the city. The forum meets on a bi-monthly basis and encourages organisations to work together to promote cohesion and integration across the city.
3.4. Sending greeting cards for ethnic and religious holidays to local organisations is a rather simple, but highly valued measure that shows the respect and recognition for migrants’ heritage, as can be observed in many cities.

Likewise, according to the case studies, most migrant organisations highly regard mutual invitations. Thus, several city officials – both administrative and political officials – invite migrant organisations’ representatives to official events and accepting invitations by these organisations. The Social Alderman of the city of Valencia, the Integration Commissioner of the city of Stuttgart, the mayor of the city of Newport and many other city representatives frequently attend minority ethnic events and celebrations such as the Chinese New Year and iftar dinners during Ramadan.

In turn several cities invite migrant representatives for official receptions. In Arnsberg and Frankfurt, for instance, high level politicians invite representatives of local organisations to receptions; the cities of Breda, Vienna and Zurich invite Muslim representatives to iftar dinners in the town hall. More informal gatherings can be found, for instance, in Breda: the diversity officer arranged informal ‘Meet and Greet’ gatherings between city staff and migrant groups at the town hall so that officials get to talk to migrants and get confronted directly with their questions. They learn to understand migrants’ needs and develop personal, direct contacts. For the migrants, such contacts are another form of being respected, taken seriously and being recognised.

Continuous informal contacts are another important dimension of relations between city and migrant organisations. Migrant representatives of the smaller cities Arnsberg and Sundsvall, for instance, praised the non-institutionalised and low-threshold personal contact with both administrative officers and local politicians such as the mayor in Arnsberg and the Chairman of the Labour Market, Adult Education and Integration Committee in Sundsvall. Such kind of non-institutionalised, informal contact between the city and migrant groups seems to be a success factor of integration policies in smaller cities. In larger cities, however, such contacts are feasible as well. According to the numerous interviews conducted with migrant representatives during the city visits in Frankfurt, the Office for Multicultural Affairs (AmkA) is highly appreciated as a crucial partner by the ethnic associations and religious migrant communities. The AmkA’s philosophy, in particular the active involvement and valorisation of migrant groups, can be considered as good practice other cities can learn from.

3.3.4. Promoting a shared vision

Organisations are formed to pursue a common interest. Migrant organisations are no exception to this rule. Some mainly aim at preserving ‘their’ culture and conduct cultural and religious activities; others mainly provide support for their members, or aim at acting as a representative voice on behalf of a group and/or improving the organisations’ recognition in urban life. Of course combinations are also possible.
Pursuing these interests is regarded as a legitimate goal, yet, this is not enough to ensure integration and social cohesion in a city.

Conflicts can arise when groups strive for different goals, or when they strive for goals that each urgently desires, but which can be attained by one group only at the expense of the other (Sherif and Sherif 1969: 239, Esser 2000: 39). There are divergent interests about material goods (such as funding resources), but also about values, beliefs, norms and lifestyles.

To avoid or solve conflicts some cities explicitly strive for arriving at a ‘shared vision’ in the city. The ‘Faro Declaration’ on intercultural dialogue, issued by the Council of Europe, also mentions a shared political vision as an important goal for (and of) intercultural dialogue (Council of Europe 2005).

An example can be found in Amsterdam. The Platform Amsterdam Samen wants to promote a “shared vision of a hopeful future” as a basis for peaceful intergroup relations in the city. This shared vision must go beyond the respective individual interests followed by the organisation and be a super-ordinate goal for all. Likewise, the Spanish cities of Terrassa and Hospitalet promote a peaceful ‘living together’ of all groups, using the slogan of Convivencia.

The British cities of Kirklees and Newport promote a shared vision within their community strategies. In Kirklees, ‘Shaping Our Future Together: Kirklees Community Cohesion Strategy’ was developed with partners and aims at making sure that everyone has a sense of belonging to their communities and considers Kirklees to be a welcoming and enjoyable place to live and work. Similarly, Newport’s Local Strategic Partnership developed ‘A Community Strategy for Newport – Building Our Future Together 2005 – 2015’.

An interesting example in the context of relations to national minorities that tries to establish common visions is a project of the city of Tallinn, connecting Estonians and Russians.

**Box 8: Tallinn: Kodurahu – Peace in the Community**

The city programme Kodurahu – Peace in the Community aims at improving the relations between Estonians and Russian living in Tallinn. It is focused on the development of intergroup relations and interactions between both communities through different forms of communication. In all activities, the authorities strive for the common interest of the groups in order to bring them closer and to reduce the division between two communities in one city society. The programme includes five working groups with NGO leaders on media, education, culture, politics and economics as well as training trips for the NGO leaders, media scholarships for journalist, a mentor programme and other activities.

A reduction of conflict and a basis for cooperation can be achieved when actors find a ‘super-ordinate’ goal that it is unattainable by one group singly and can be reached only through a common effort (Sherif/Sherif 1969: 255). Social cohesion and integration in the city can be such a super-ordinate goal, if it has successfully been promoted as a shared vision by the city and the ethnic associations. A super-ordinate goal is not some kind of formula compromise
which each side interpret differently. A super-ordinate goal must be a ‘genuine’ goal and in line with the interests of the groups.

3.4. Policies improving attitudes and relations between groups

In different degrees and kinds, prejudice and stereotypes between ethnic groups tend to be found in all CLIP cities. This needs to be addressed when considering intergroup relations, because stereotypes and prejudice can develop into discrimination and threaten the social cohesion in a city. As Eurofound states, “the core issue of intercultural policies is to influence the mindset and related behaviour of culturally diverse groups. In practice that means to initiate polices, programmes and activities which have the objectives: to create mutual knowledge from other cultures, to accept and tolerate each other, to create empathy, to trust each other, to cooperate with each other across cultural boundaries … and to create intercultural relationships on the individual and organisations level” (Eurofound 2009: 77).

This section explores policies and measures that cities can pursue to reduce hostile attitudes and enhance relations between groups. We identified eight policy types: institutionalised intercultural dialogue, humanising the ‘other’ by creating informal contact, (inter)cultural events, intercultural competence building, anti-racism/anti-discrimination work, propagating an inclusive identity strategy, communication strategies and public space management.

3.4.1. Institutionalised intercultural dialogue

The introduction to this report recalls that the European Union has declared the year 2008 as the year of intercultural dialogue. Intercultural dialogue can be defined as “an open and respectful exchange of views between individuals and groups with different ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic background and heritage on the basis of mutual understanding and respect”, as done by the Council of Europe (2008: 17).

To our great surprise none of the case studies has any information on comparable activities and institutions under the explicit heading of ‘intercultural dialogue’, in the sense that individuals or groups sit around a table to exchange and discuss different cultural values, views and traditions. We could not identify single events, conferences or courses that explicitly declared themselves as intercultural dialogue.

There are, however, various initiatives to foster inter-religious dialogue, which must be understood as part of an intercultural dialogue. The CLIP network has indeed identified numerous inter-religious dialogue activities organised by churches, religious associations, cities and NGOs. The two forms of interreligious dialogues – the dialogue about faith topics and the dialogue of religious representatives about secular topics such as social cohesion – are described and discussed in section 4.2.
Referring to the other parts of the definition and the broad understanding of intercultural dialogue it is evident that almost all activities and initiatives improving attitudes and relations between groups are forms of intercultural dialogue as well.

3.4.2. Humanising the ‘other’ by creating informal contact

Stereotypes and prejudice between groups and a devaluation of ‘other’ groups are reinforced by limited contact among and knowledge about other groups. Hence, contact may contribute to reduce these stereotypes and thus help to “humanise” the ‘other’, as Staub (2007) called it.47 It is important to note that contact per se does not necessarily reduce prejudice, but may even reinforce it. Contact generally can be a successful means of changing attitudes if groups meet in terms of equality and engage in mutually rewarding activities. This is, however, often difficult to realise. Staub claims that even if this ‘ideal’ condition is not given, contact can help reducing prejudice, since contact may lead to shake prejudice by experiencing ‘the other’ in a direct interaction, and not through stereotypical information.

In most CLIP cities, we find many initiatives creating opportunities to meet and build contacts. The different attempts can be categorised as

- attempts to create informal contact between individuals of different ethnic groups and
- attempts to encourage migrants’ participation in majority organisations.

Creating informal contact between individuals of different ethnic groups

The Malmö Central Library developed a project connecting individuals: a ‘Life Library’, where members of the public borrow a person rather than a book for forty-five minutes to find out more about their particular experiences. The ‘person-on-loan’ changes weekly. People on loan come from diverse backgrounds. For example, previous participants have included a transvestite, a lesbian, a homeless man, an ex-convict, a Muslim and an Imam. This is a popular project and attracts wide participation from both minority and majority groups. Another good practice example is the ‘International Cooking Night’ in Arnsberg, appreciated by both its (migrant) participants and the city officials.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 9: Arnsberg: ‘International Cooking Night’</th>
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<td>The good practice series International Cooking Night in Arnsberg is organised by the NGO Internationaler Arbeitskreis and financially supported by the city. International Cooking Night occurs around five times a year; each evening is attended by approximately fifty people with different ethnic background and focuses on a different topic relating to a specific region.</td>
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47 Upon request of the city of Amsterdam, Staub (2007) applied his research about intergroup relations to the situation with Muslims in Amsterdam after the murder of Theo van Gogh. A few of his points can be summarised as follows: (1) humanise the ‘other’, for example through media projects and or stimulating contact, (2) promote dialogue between Dutch and Muslim leaders to develop a shared vision and (3) to involve minority groups in political debates.
Participants spend an evening together while learning about and cooking food related to the specific theme. The series therefore makes it possible for participants to get to know each other, try new foods and talk about different cultures. Another element that makes this series a good practice is that each evening is organised by a different ethnic or social group.

Two other good practices are organised by the Kirklees Faith Forum, which encourages all faith communities to work together and challenge all forms of discrimination and injustice. First, the forum offers ‘£5 Faith Meals’: all communities from all faiths are invited to take part in a ‘faith meal’ where a ‘menu of topics’ is provided for discussion over supper. These meals are very popular and well attended. In addition, the Kirklees Faith Forum developed the ‘Tea for Two’ project in which neighbours from differing ethnic backgrounds are encouraged to visit each others’ homes for tea in an attempt to encourage them get to know one another, break down cultural barriers and reach a better understanding of one another’s lives.

Sport can be an effective means to establish contacts between individuals of different ethnic groups. A good practice example is the annual week long football project called ‘Soccer Fest’ in Dublin: parents and children representing over forty different nationalities come together for a football tournament. Plans to convert this project into a Sports Fest involving other sports such as basketball and swimming are underway.

Some cities use (new) media projects to ‘humanise the other’ – in particular young people. The city of Arnsberg, for instance, conducted a video project: school children were taught about filming techniques and then visited Spätaussiedler classmates from the former Soviet Union and interviewed their families. The film was shown in the course of local exhibits. Likewise, the intercultural centre of the city of Bologna (Zonarelli) runs a project that focuses on the participation of ‘second generations’ and encourages exchanges with other native young people. Interesting activities – of which most are implemented in cooperation with migrant organisations – are a web TV run by Italian and foreign young people (‘Crossing TV’), a series of workshops on interculturality (‘I Go Around With the Radio on My Shoulder’) and a festival with meetings, readings, videos, music and theatre performances promoted by second generations (‘Second Generations Festival’).

In Kirklees, the city’s Community Cohesion Strategy is directed to both the majority and minority populations for improving relations – among others by bringing the majority or settled populations together with people from different backgrounds. Thereby, different women’s groups are linked to each other, for example a women group predominantly having Asian Muslim members has developed links with a women group predominantly having white Christian members. They meet two to three times per term in a relaxed atmosphere and discuss issues through a common fusion of interests such as cookery, education, and family

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48 The project is called ‘2 X 1 X 2g. Expression and Identity’.
life in an open and safe environment. These meetings constitute a rather easy and very successful example of how positive intercultural dialogue can be achieved.

**Encouragement of migrants’ participation in majority organisations**

Successful practices that aim to improve relations between the majority and minority populations include the encouragement of newcomers and minorities to participate in local majority associations.

The city of Malmö, for instance, funds the project ‘**integration through non-profit associations**’. The NGO MIP, an umbrella organisation representing some 250 local associations, runs the project. The participating associations have mentors who are allocated to each new arrival and provide information concerning projects they consider most appropriate for the new arrival. This project is produced in eleven different languages and available in various public organisations, including schools. Likewise, the city of Athens encourages migrant children to participate in the Greek scout movement which currently has 2,500 registered members in Athens.

**Box 10: Athens: ‘Responsible Little Citizens’**

The city’s Intercultural Centre of the Migrant Services Department collaborates with the Athens Scouts to integrate migrant children into the Scout Movement. The programme shall last for seven years, enabling 500 foreign children to register in the movement.

For 2009, the Intercultural Centre undertakes the integration of hundred children, aged seven to twelve, by covering their registration and uniform expenses as well as their participation expenses for the various activities. A social worker of the Intercultural Centre is responsible for the cooperation with parents and children.

The objectives of this initiative are to raise migrant children’s environmental conscience, increase their competence and self-esteem through outdoor life, technical skills, spiritual development, community service and social interaction and thus to make the children ‘responsible little citizens’ integrated in Greek society.

In a variety of CLIP cities, sports are considered “a useful instrument for enforcing dialogue and social cohesion among natives and migrants, among old and new generations, among people with different religious backgrounds”, as stated in the Luxembourg case study. The two Swedish CLIP cities make an effort to establish contacts between migrants and local majority sports clubs: MISO, the Malmö Sports Associations Cooperation Organisation, helps to integrate newcomers to different clubs across Malmö city. The city of Sundsvall supports a project in which members of a local football club inform migrants, in particular newly arrived youth, about the local clubs and help them to get into contact with these.
**Box 11: Sundsvall: contact and integration through sport – the project ‘Fotboll Plus’**

The city of Sundsvall supports the project ‘fotboll plus’. Its basic aim is to strengthen the immigrant children’s self-confidence, extend their social networks and counteract the feeling of being left out of the community. These goals should be achieved through the children’s participation in one of the clubs in the city. Therefore, members of the football club visit migrants, e.g. at language courses, inform them about different clubs and help them to find meaningful leisure time activities. They present various activities, such as swimming for women, aerobics etc., that allow migrants to try out different sports and facilitate contact between immigrants and sports clubs in the Sundsvall area.

3.4.3. (Inter)Cultural events

Attitude change research has shown that changing the ‘feeling’ component within the structure of an attitude can effectively contribute to a shift in attitude. Experiencing diversity through art and other cultural programmes can be regarded as a means with which to influence ethnic and racial stereotypes among a population. Therefore, the majority of CLIP cities support a large set of such events and activities, including intercultural festivals. These increase the visibility of the city’s cultural diversity and encourage the city’s entire population to interact with, learn about and enjoy other cultures. Cities do this by featuring cultural activities involving theatre, music and film as well as offering food specific to certain ethnic groups. In general, the cities do not organise these events on their own; usually these are planned and organised in cooperation with migrant organisations, a migrant representative council and/or local mainstream organisations, such as (cultural) associations, welfare organisations, NGOs and churches. Such cooperation can already be valued as an achievement of its own.

As a means of enhancing intergroup relations and social cohesion in the city, (inter)cultural festivals were specifically mentioned in twenty-one case studies. According to their (initial) goals, these (inter)-cultural events can be classified as

- celebrating ethnic heritage,
- intercultural events celebrating diversity and internationality and
- traditional local festivals that encourage the participation of migrant groups and consequently become ‘intercultural’.

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Celebrating ethnic heritage

As previously mentioned in chapter two, the preservation of cultural heritage is a common need of migrants and minorities in most CLIP cities. Migrants and national minorities have cultural preferences and adhere to cultural practises that are often different to the preferences and practises of the majority population. Minorities desire to practice and keep alive some elements of the culture and history of their country of origin; they want it to be represented and recognised in the cultural life of the cities in which they live. This desire is not necessarily related to a rejection of the majority culture and should not be assessed as hindering the integration process. Instead, it helps migrants feeling at home in their new city.

Thus, many CLIP cities value the ethnic identity and heritage of migrant groups as part of a policy of recognition and actively support ethnic or religious heritage events by providing funds, manpower and/or logistical assistance. Valencia, for instance, supports (among others) the Ukrainian Independence Day and the Columbian National Celebration, while Wolverhampton and Kirklees support the Black History Month. Moreover, many cities support the organisation of the Irish St. Patrick’s Day (e.g. Luxembourg), the Chinese New Year (e.g. Antwerp, Dublin and Turin) and a variety of other annual religious or secular holidays such as the Peruvian Feast of Our Lady, the Feast for Buddha, the Africa Day, or the end of Ramadan.

Box 12: Newport: encouragement to celebrate ethnic heritage festivals

The city recognises the importance of ethnic heritage festivals for religious and ethnic communities and supports them. Major festivals, such as Chinese New Year, Baha’i New Year, Eid ul-Fitr (end of Ramadan), Pakistani Independence Day or the Bangladeshi Independence Day, are celebrated by the communities and are open to other residents to join.

In the city of Zagreb, it is less a question of migrant heritage, and more of the heritage of ethnic and religious minorities traditionally living in the city. The city supports activities that are organised to preserve the ethnic, cultural and religious identity of ethnic and religious minorities. For the past several years, for example, the Jewish holiday Hanukkah has been celebrated at the main city square; the 1st candle on Menorah was lit by the ambassador of Israel and the city mayor.

Another example for celebrating a national holiday is the festival ’23 Nisan’ (meaning April 23rd) in Stuttgart which is attended by up to twenty thousand children and adults each year. The festival, which is organised by German-Turkish associations and financially supported by the city, is based on an official Turkish national holiday celebrating children. Today, it has an international message and is used in Stuttgart to encourage integration and learning about different cultures at a young age.
Intercultural events celebrating diversity

Another way of recognising the ethnic and religious heritage of the local minority populations are intercultural events that celebrate both the different individual cultures and the diversity and internationality of the local population in general. Some of these events took part within the framework of the European wide campaign ‘European Year of Intercultural Dialogue’ in 2008 and where supported by the EU. Most, however, are local events with a longer history, financed by cities and local organisations.

Some of these events primarily have the character of a big ‘party’ with music and food from different migrant cultures. Vienna and Luxembourg, for instance, have festivals focusing on immigration (‘Immigrants’ Day’ and Festival des migrations respectively), while other cities organise or support festivals focusing on internationality in general, such as the ‘Malmö Festival’, the ‘Maindee Festival’ in Newport, the Bazaar festival in Antwerp, the ‘Global Village’ in Dublin, the ‘International Day’ in Copenhagen, the ‘International Mother Language Day’ appreciating different migrant languages in Sundsvall and the intercultural festival in Lisbon.

Box 13: Lisbon: intercultural festival ‘ImigrArte’

The annual three-day festival ImigrArte involves many different ethnic associations as well as the city of Lisbon that provides technical and logistical support (i.e. placards and throwaways, stages, sound systems etc.) and promotes the event. The aim is to enhance the intercultural dialogue through artistic performances, such as music and dancing shows and ateliers, screening of movies, debates, expositions and food.

The cooperation of different local migrant organisations that organise the festival has to be considered crucial: not only the festival itself, but the common organisation of the festival is an important aspect of enhancing intergroup relations, e.g. concerning the ‘DIES Internationalis’ in Arnsberg and the Luxembourg festival.

Box 14: Luxembourg: ‘Festival des Migrations’

For twenty-six years, the city of Luxembourg has organised an intercultural festival. Each year, there is significant public interest in the event, at which people find information about cultures, taste food from various countries, and collect information about the role and activities of ethnic associations in the city. This event represents, on the one hand, a good opportunity to improve relations between the city and migrants and, on the other hand, communication among the various migrant groups, which collaborate for the organisation and the success of the event.

In some, mainly Eastern European cities, the festivals focus on national minorities, such as the festival of national minorities and ethnic groups living in the Czech Republic named ‘Prague – Heart of the Nations’. In Zagreb, the coordination of national minorities has established the ‘Day of national minorities’ which is held in April every year. Apart from city
representatives of national minorities, the mayor, representatives of government offices and representatives of the city offices attend this event. The national television station regularly reports on this day.

Other events put a higher emphasis on awareness raising and knowledge building and transfer about different cultures and religions. The Turin event ‘Identity & Diversity’, which took place annually from 1997 to 2002, conveyed knowledge of the different ethnic, religious and cultural aspects of migration; the city council in Wolverhampton does so by hosting an annual multi-faith festival involving pupils from schools across the city. Likewise, the city of Newport supports events aimed at increasing knowledge of other ethnic groups. For instance, the city participates in the UK-wide Refugee Week during June every year, a programme of events (including social and sporting events but also lectures, discussions, conferences etc.) which explain and celebrate the contribution of refugees in the UK. The German wide ‘intercultural week’ campaign initiated by the Churches has similar aims: over the course of this week, which also takes place in Frankfurt, there are events focusing on music or cooking as well as presentations and round tables on different cultures and religions.

Valencia took advantage of the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue and organised and financed the project *Divercinema: Cine para la convivencia intercultural*. The project’s goal was to sensitise children to intercultural issues through various audiovisual means such as movies, a music laboratory and two exhibits, one on toys from around the world and the other on drums. Specific didactic materials were produced to support discussion and work in the classroom. Similarly, the city of Turin used audiovisual means and organised an intercultural film festival *Mondi vicini – mondi lontani* (‘Worlds Far away – Worlds Nearby’).

**Local festivals with migrant participation**

The Dublin ‘Fusion Project’ in conjunction with St. Patrick’s Day is an interesting approach to celebrating a traditional national holiday, while simultaneously including migrant groups. The project’s goal is to engage migrant communities in the Irish national festival. A similar orientation can be seen in Wroclaw, where intercultural events were incorporated into the larger festival on Wroclaw’s Day.

**Box 15: Wroclaw: ‘Kaleidoscope of Cultures’**

The first ‘Kaleidoscope of Cultures’ was held in 2008 as part of ‘Wroclaw’s Day’. In addition to the traditional festivities on Wroclaw’s Day, religious and ethnic minorities presented their culture to a wider public in the city centre. This new element of the festival was quite successful and, consequently, the municipality and the minority organisations have decided to continue their cooperation.

Migrant organisations in Vienna have been encouraged to participate in the annual district festivals. As part of these festivals, they have the opportunity to present their organisation and whatever they believe the native population should know about them. As an element of a
larger city festival in Frankfurt, (which includes open door events at museums), the Office for Multicultural Affairs (AmK) organises the ‘Frankfurt Stage’ featuring diverse cultural programmes. In Valencia, the Ecuadorian Summer Celebration and a city festival – which are celebrated on the same day – were combined to form a unique, intercultural, citywide event.

In conclusion we could say that (inter)cultural festivals are found in almost every CLIP city and that a range of cities support these events by providing political support, financial or material funding, logistical support, manpower and/or rooms. The ethnic heritage and intercultural festivals are often popular events in the cities and regarded as a success by both city officials and migrant organisations’ representatives. At the same time it is important to note that a festival in itself does not necessarily improve daily intercultural relations. Cooperation in the preparation and organising the festival, however, can be a source of experiences that contribute to attitude change and possibly an improvement in intergroup relations.

3.4.4. Intercultural competence building

Intercultural competence helps to reduce cultural misunderstandings and improve peaceful intergroup relations. Furthermore, intercultural competence can constitute a valuable resource for the local economy. For these reasons, several CLIP cities make an effort to raise the intercultural competence of their residents. Some of these measures, considered important by several city representatives, are presented in the following:

- intercultural training of administrative staff,
- projects for intercultural education and
- programmes improving migrants’ linguistic competence.

Intercultural training for city staff

Several CLIP cities offer intercultural and diversity training.\(^{50}\) They provide courses for frontline staff (who have direct contact with clients) and/or senior managers (with human resource responsibilities) in order to inform them about the particular needs of ethnic or religious communities, cultural and religious practices and the importance of ensuring equal opportunities for migrants and minorities.

The city of Copenhagen, for instance, requires its staff in the top two grades of the city administration to attend a one-day course on diversity management. The German cities of Frankfurt and Stuttgart offer \textbf{intercultural training} for their staff: Frankfurt produced a manual on intercultural orientation and guidelines for implementing intercultural competence; Stuttgart conducts workshops on intercultural communication. In

\(^{50}\) For example, the cities of Amsterdam, Breda Copenhagen, Dublin, Newport, Prague, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Turin, Valencia or Wolverhampton.
Wolverhampton, **equality and diversity mainstreaming** is implemented: the city offers an ‘equality essentials’ induction course for its employees, requires all new social care workers to take part in a course which includes equality and diversity training, embeds diversity issues into training programmes and organises briefings on equality with senior management staff. Furthermore, the city launched a series of lunchtime events called ‘One City, Many People’ that were aimed at city council staff and colleagues from its partner agencies in order to raise knowledge and awareness about a range of diversity issues. The city of Prague organises annual one-day seminars to raise city staff’s **awareness for minorities’ rights**. Staff members get into contact with foreigners, minorities and politicians and discuss topics such as structures of organisations that work with migrants, laws dealing with residence rights of foreign citizens and integration concepts. Attempts to improve the intercultural awareness of the police are presented below.

Furthermore, several CLIP cities\(^{51}\) improve their staff’s intercultural competence by enhancing the **recruitment of employees with a migration or ethnic minority background**.\(^{52}\)

### Intercultural education at schools

Apart from intercultural and diversity training for the cities’ staff, intercultural education programmes for pupils are another way of enhancing knowledge about different cultures and, thus, intergroup relations. In Newport, Kirklees and Valencia there are specific projects aimed at schools. In Newport schools awareness-raising programmes examine different cultural and religious communities. These usually occur in relation to a specific holiday or other established celebration, such as Christmas or Black History Month. The impressive good practice project ‘Interfaith Kirklees’, initiated by the city, makes it possible for school classes to have real-life experiences with the different religions in Kirklees by going on fieldtrips to interfaith centres.

**Box 16: Kirklees: ‘Interfaith Kirklees’**

In the course of the city project ‘Interfaith Kirklees’, seven religious communities – a Buddhist, a Sikh, a Hindu, two Muslim and two Christian communities – established ‘interfaith centres’ at their places of worship. At these centres, children learn about particular religious practices and can ask questions. Furthermore, learning packages were produced and representatives from each of the faith communities were trained as guides.

Even though some parents were reluctant to let their children participate in the visits (particularly when visiting the mosque) at the beginning, the project generally received a

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\(^{51}\) Such as Amsterdam, Antwerp, Copenhagen, Dublin, Frankfurt, Malmö, Vienna and Wolverhampton.

\(^{52}\) For more information on intercultural competence building in CLIP cities please see the concluding report of the second CLIP module on equality and diversity in jobs and services (Spencer 2008).
positive feedback by both children and schools. There is an increased interest in religious education at school, as well as a greater awareness of religious communities in the larger community. The different religious communities are becoming increasingly aware of each other and starting to create additional partnerships. Thus, the project is “considered by interviewees to be positive and successful attempts at encouraging intercultural dialogue”.

The project *Carpeta Educative: Todos a Una por Diversidad* in Valencia establishes spaces for interculturality in all schools in the city; Spanish and migrant NGOs cooperate to design intercultural activities for teachers, children and parents – with and without a migration background. Teachers can participate at a regular programme of seminars on interculturality, conflict mediation and the prevention of racism and xenophobia. For students, there are, on the one hand, extra-curricular activities such as theatre and video projects and, on the other hand, specific programmes within the curriculum, such as basic courses on interculturality for primary school’s pupils or more elaborated seminars on racism, prejudice and xenophobia for students attending secondary school. Support activities for parent associations include, first, activities aiming at sensitising on immigration and intercultural relations, and, second, specific services of information and translation for foreign parents in order to favour their participation in school activities.

In some cities, for instance Frankfurt and Sundsvall, ‘*Abrahamic* projects’ take place in schools in order to teach pupils about Christianity, Judaism and Islam. In the city of Frankfurt, ‘Abrahamic Teams’ consisting of representatives from the three religious communities, visit schools and present their religion. Pupils can ask questions and thus get to know particularities and similarities of these three world religions. The city of Sundsvall, a regional theatre company, the Church of Sweden and the Islamic Cultural Centre organised a theatre project on Abraham/Ibrahim in schools that was accompanied by a discussion with local religious representatives. Information about the play was provided for the students in advance, in order to encourage interaction and learning before the performance took place. Since the pupils raised a variety of important questions and started interesting discussions, the city as well as the religious representatives regarded the common initiative a great success that should be repeated in the future.

**Improving migrants’ linguistic competences**

Language is a key element in intergroup relations. Consequently, most CLIP cities invest in migrants’ language training and offer language courses for them. Two kinds of courses can be differentiated: language courses for competence in the language of the country of immigration and language courses for migrants’ competences in their mother tongue.

Courses of the first category, **classes supporting migrants’ competence in the language of the immigration country**, are offered in every European city, meeting different needs and competences. Since language classes improve intergroup relations only in an indirect manner, we will not elaborate this issue, but provide some good practice examples. In several cities,
for example in Athens, Frankfurt and Stuttgart, some of the language courses are offered in combination with childcare. This is particularly helpful for mothers and highly appreciated. The programme ‘Swedish for Immigrants’ (SFI) is an impressive good practice example to meet the need for language support which is offered in a lot of Swedish cities, including the CLIP cities of Malmö and Sundsvall. These classes aim not only at improving the language skills, but directly at integrating migrants into the labour market as well. Most migrants interviewed in the course of the Sundsvall field visit complimented the city for offering these language courses.

**Box 17: Sundsvall and Malmö: ‘Swedish for Immigrants’ (SFI)**

For newly arrived adults, the cities of Malmö and Sundsvall offer ‘Swedish for Immigrants’ (SFI) courses. They include Swedish language classes and an introductory programme aimed at improving the immigrants’ integration in the local labour market. Residents of the respective cities, who lack basic Swedish language skills, have the right to enrol in a SFI class. The class is fulltime and free-of-charge.

The central aim of the courses is to impart a ‘functional knowledge’ of Swedish to the students; the improvement of linguistic skills supports the goal of helping immigrants succeed in the work force. The core elements of the introductory programme are work experience placements based on needs of the local labour market, individual needs and skills, computer-aided learning and a module dealing with occupational specific Swedish, career choice or continued studies. The course concentrates on the person’s access to the labour market and takes measures to find work experience placements and/or job placements. Participants lacking certified training will be supported in finding an entry-level job or preparing to re-enter the job market. As part of the preparation for re-entering the job market with a new career, participants receive placement in a temporary job, a fulltime internship or an individual and profession orientated job training. In addition to employment preparation, participants are encouraged to take part in associations in the city.

Dutch cities are improving Dutch language training for those who have lived in the Netherlands for many years without learning the language. Breda has organised a ‘twinning’ programme that puts people together in pairs with Dutch nationals in order to practice Dutch.

As discussed above, in some of the CLIP cities, the language issue is ‘doubled’ due to specific, language requirements of the particular region. For the case of Luxembourg, it is reported that migrant students enrolled in Luxembourgish schools have to build skills in Luxembourgish, German and French. In particular the organisation of Luxembourgish language courses represents a strategic and crucial activity for the city. The main problem with active participation in these courses is the timetable, which sometimes overlaps with work-time. In order to overcome this problem, an mp3 service is now available on the website of the city. Likewise in the Catalan city of Hospitalet, a political debate has been started on how to encourage immigrants to learn not only Spanish/Castilian but also Catalan. The Hospitalet Action Plan fosters this learning process and started a campaign to make
migrant parents aware that they have free access to Catalan courses. Migrant associations’ demands to organise language training in Catalan are always accepted and completely subsidised, directly by the city or through the autonomous Catalan Government.

The second category of courses, **classes enhancing migrants’ competences in their mother tongue** or the language of migrant children’s parents, respectively, is less common. This kind of courses is often provided by migrant communities, but less frequently by cities. Good practice examples can again be found in Scandinavia. The governments finance mother language support for immigrant children, which is implemented in Turku, Malmö and Sundsvall. Equally, the city of Bologna cooperates with migrant organisations to offer mother tongue classes for migrant children within the city’s intercultural centre Zonarelli.

**Box 18: Sundsvall: ‘Centre for Mother Tongue Education’**

Since the 1980s, immigrant children in Sweden can take mother tongue courses free of charge. In 2005, the city of Sundsvall established a Centre for Mother Tongue Education (*Modersmålscentrum*), in which thirty-eight teachers teach twenty-eight languages. In addition, the city and the centre collaborate in celebrating ‘International Mother Language Day’, initiated by the UNESCO. The celebration in Sundsvall consists of dance, music and reading of literature.

Both kinds of language classes are of use to migrants and the city society as a whole. Courses that provide migrants with language competence in the language of the country of immigration are important preconditions for the integration process. Language competence is needed for social and cultural integration, and in particular for structural integration, i.e. the integration in the education system and the labour market. It can be considered as a significant – perhaps even the most important – means enhancing the integration process. In addition, language courses in migrants’ mother tongue are assessed as helpful for both migrants and the city. It is argued that these classes enhance the self-esteem of migrants, since they can better express themselves in their mother tongue and learn to view their additional language skills as a resource. The receiving society can use the intercultural competences of the migrants to enhance its economic performance.

### 3.4.5. Anti-racism/anti-discrimination work

Discrimination against people with an ethnic minority background and racism are issues that were raised in every CLIP city. Many cities have taken up attempts in order to fight discrimination and racism. They can be put into three categories: municipal programmes to fight discrimination and racism, anti-discrimination offices and anti-racism and anti-discrimination projects.

Integrated **programmes to fight prejudice, discrimination and racism** exist in cities such as Bologna, Frankfurt, Malmö, Newport, Wolverhampton and Zurich. In order to fight against racism and to ensure a peaceful social coexistence of residents of different cultures,
the city of Frankfurt released a ‘Declaration on Racism and Anti-Semitism’ in the course of the United Nation’s Anti-Racism Day in 1990 and reaffirmed it in 2000. Diminishing discrimination is an important goal in Zurich’s Integration Concept and part of Wolverhampton’s equal opportunities policy. The city of Malmö issued an Anti-Discrimination Plan and Committee; Bologna has developed anti-discrimination and anti-racism programmes in partnership with local and international organisation since the 1990s. The British cities of Kirklees, Newport and Wolverhampton are required by the Race Relations Act to work towards the elimination of racial discrimination.

In order to provide the residents with the opportunity to report discrimination as well as to monitor the incidents, several cities installed **anti-discrimination offices**. This is done, for instance, by the cities of Amsterdam, Bologna, Breda, Frankfurt, Newport, Sundsvall, Vienna and Wolverhampton. In Amsterdam, complaints about discrimination can be addressed to the Anti-Discrimination Office Amsterdam. The office is considered important by the city and therefore actively supported with an information campaign stating that discrimination should be reported. Sundsvall’s anti-discrimination office is based in the office of the Swedish Red Cross, whereas in Frankfurt, the Office for Multicultural Affairs (AmkA) is the official ‘anti-discrimination body’ where people who feel discriminated against can file a complaint. In Bologna, a free helpline to report discrimination was set up in the course of the project ‘Monitoring Racist Behaviours’. Furthermore, the city of Bologna hired an Ombudsman residents can approach when feeling discriminated against by the local administration. The city of Wolverhampton employs a full-time Racial Harassment Officer who monitors and responds to racist issues such as abuse and discrimination. Furthermore, in order to actively encourage the reporting of racist incidents, the city council installed a multi-agency committed to tackle racist harassment – the ‘Wolverhampton Racial Harassment Partnership’. A similar institution exists in Newport, where cases of hate crime, racism and discrimination can be reported to the ‘Newport Hate Crime Forum’.

**Box 19: Newport: ‘Newport Hate Crime Forum’**

Newport City Council established the ‘Newport Hate Crime Forum’. It should help the council to know about hate crimes, support the victims and prevent future incidents. Residents are provided with information about hate crimes and how to report when they witness or fall victim to one. A hate crime is thereby defined as “any offence committed against a person or property, which is motivated by the offender’s hatred of people because they are seen as being different” and thus includes discrimination due to race or religion. They can be reported either by the victim, a witness or a third party.

The forum provides access to report forms on their website in various languages (e.g. Urdu, Somali, French, Chinese and Arabic) that can be filled in and sent back online or downloaded and be returned to the equality council SEWREC with which the forum cooperates. Reports can also be made by telephone or in person at the local police station or other victim support groups whose contact details can be found on the website.
Though it is believed that there needs to be more effort put into making people aware of its existence and operation, the Newport Hate Crime Forum is considered to be a positive and important good practice project.

NGOs are of particular importance in terms of projects combating racism and discrimination. Several CLIP cities cooperate with or support NGOs and their projects financially. The city of Vienna, for instance, supports the NGO ZARA (‘Civil Courage and Combating Racism’) that runs a legal office for victims of racism and discrimination, provides counselling and focuses on anti-racism trainings and workshops for children and adults. In Prague, the NGO SLOVO 21 fights against racism and xenophobia, provides relevant information and generally helps migrants to integrate in the city. The city of Turku cooperates with various NGOs, sports clubs, churches and political parties that are active against racism. In Turin and, again, Vienna, networks of NGOs and other ethnic or religious organisations take up activities to combat racism and xenophobia and are supported for this by the cities.

Using sports to bring people with different ethnic backgrounds together is another important means to tackle racism. The city of Dublin, for instance, has part-funded the ‘Count us in’ project. Twelve schools in Dublin participated in an inter-school sports day in an attempt to build social capital and create intercultural dialogue through the use of sport. The project is run by ‘Sports against Racism in Ireland’ (SARI) which was founded in order to oppose an increase in racist attacks from a small but aggressive section of the population in Ireland.

Other crucial actors conducting projects that combat racism and particularly discrimination are the social partners. In the city of Vienna, the organisation ‘Colourful Democracy for All’ (Bunte Demokratie für alle) was founded within the Chamber of Work. Its aim is to fight for the interests of immigrants in the labour market and against all kinds of discrimination. Likewise, the local branch of the trade union ver.di in Stuttgart organises seminars and trainings concerning migrants’ discrimination on the labour market and how to combat it. The trade union CCOO has set up an information centre for immigrants (Centre d’Informació per a Treballadors i Treballadores Estrangers, CITE) in several Catalan cities, like Mataró, Terrassa and Hospitalet that organises and participates in awareness campaigns against racism.

3.4.6. Inclusive identity strategy

Some CLIP cities try to create a ‘we-feeling’ among its residents – regardless of whether they belong to the native group or have a migration background. These projects aim at building a common city identity which exists alongside an ethnic identity. Such a common city identity creates similar collective feelings among different ethnic groups and can lead to an improvement of mutual images of one another. This is what Hewstone (2004: 12) has called a
‘dual identity model’.\textsuperscript{53} It is based on the concept of continuing subgroup identities, which are, however, superseded by a common, larger group identity. A necessary condition for the success of such a strategy is that the larger group identity is sufficiently inclusive to express the existing differences in a complex manner. Good practice examples can be found in four cities.\textsuperscript{54}

Good examples for such initiatives are the ‘We Amsterdammers’ campaign and, inspired by the Amsterdam idea, the ‘We Copenhageners’ campaign. Both initiatives aim at strengthening a sense of belonging to the city and enhancing social cohesion in general.

**Box 20: Copenhagen: ‘We Copenhageners’**

The VI KBH’R’-campaign, as it is originally called in Danish, is a three-year-project having two main goals: (1) to highlight and celebrate the city’s diversity and (2) to strengthen inclusion and dialogue between citizens of the city to and make more Copenhageners feel accepted as equal citizens (“We are all a part of a unity. We are all Copenhageners”).

A resource group of thirteen key persons organise a number of publicity activities such as the International Day, a poetry competition and photo competition and provides funds for local events. To “ensure ownership and local embeddedness”, subsidies are available for events that (a) show and highlight the city’s diversity, (b) are based on cross-cultural cooperation, (c) are locally anchored by including other local associations than the applier and (d) are open for all citizens. Cultural and religious events that are already existent can receive sponsorship, if they rethink their events in such a way that make more Copenhageners interested in participating.

The Antwerp approach is comparable to these campaigns. In 2006, the Department of Marketing and Communication introduced the slogan ‘t’ Stad is van iedereen – ‘this city is for everyone’, emphasising the importance of diversity for the city.

Another example is the ‘Belonging to Dewsbury Campaign’ in Kirklees: since cohesion indicators in Dewsbury were worse than in other parts of the borough, community leaders, partner agencies and council officers launched this campaign to change perceptions, feelings, attitudes and beliefs about different communities and thus to promote togetherness and respect, reduce divisions between groups and create a stronger sense of belonging. An integrated public relations campaign targets key messages and images celebrating diversity in the local area. A ‘Belonging to Dewsbury Pledge’, a ‘Together we belong’ poster campaign, school projects linked to the campaign themes and support from political parties and partner organisations, including local area committees, should ensure that the campaign reaches its target audience. According to the cities’ website, an evaluation framework is in place, so that Kirklees Council could be able to assess the campaign’s impact.

\textsuperscript{53} Meaning more than one identity, not per definition limited to two identities.

\textsuperscript{54} Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Kirklees and Vienna.
Additional to this is the ‘Feeling at Home Project’ in two of Vienna’s districts. It is considered a success by the city, all participating institutions and the CLIP research team because it is supported by migrants as well as natives who live in the neighbourhoods. The local residents, companies, schools and other institutions are motivated to carry out tasks they think will improve the quality of life in the area and the relationships between the people who live there. The project motivated residents to identify with the neighbourhood they live in and to be proud of their homes. The above mentioned project of the intercultural centre Zonarelli in Bologna also is a project fostering the local identity of the residents. It should provide young people, both Italian and foreign, with instruments to contribute to the building of a ‘new local citizenship’.

3.4.7. Cities’ communication strategies

Public communication and media reporting exert influence on public opinion making and political agenda setting and thus have an impact on intergroup relations in the city. Therefore, some cities developed strategies on how to communicate about minorities, diversity and intergroup relations. These strategies can include the provision of information in various languages. Further, several cities have established contact with local media or monitor media reporting regarding intergroup relations.

Several CLIP cities aim at communicating a certain city image: cities such as Budapest and Wroclaw emphasise their multiethnic heritage; Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Frankfurt, Stuttgart and Vienna stress that they are international cities, where the population’s diversity is valued.

Several cities try to make diversity visible and present the diverse population and its activities in a positive way. One possibility for doing this is to award prizes. The city of Frankfurt awards the ‘Integration Prize’ to acknowledge persons and institutions that conducted programme improving mutual respect for cultural heritages. The city of Turku expresses its appreciation of residents’ engagement in its multicultural society with two awards, the ‘New Citizen of Turku’ and ‘Multicultural Actor’ awards.

**Box 21: Turku: ‘New Citizen of Turku’ and ‘Multicultural Actor’ awards**

The city of Turku wants to build bridges between migrants and natives and attempts to raise public consciousness that the city benefits of immigration and the resulting diversity. In order to reach these goals, the city annually assigns two awards: first, the city awards the year’s ‘New Citizen of Turku’, an award given to an inhabitant who has received Finnish citizenship in the previous year and fosters the city’s success. Second, the city awards the year’s ‘Multicultural Actor’.

55 The current year’s ‘New Citizen of Turku’ is an Iraqi entrepreneur who is active in a number of boards and committees. The current year’s ‘Multicultural Actor’ is a teacher who trains immigrants.
The process of choosing the award recipients is open to the public: residents can make suggestions via internet and city libraries; the jury, which processes the suggestions, comprises migrant representatives, journalists, city officials and NGOs. Finally, the mayor selects the awardees based on the jury’s preparatory work. The local media extensively report on the awards that are recognised in the public.

Other cities, for instance the city of Turin, support ethnic associations in making their work visible to the wider public: the monthly newsletter *Torino plurale* offers migrant organisations the opportunity to present themselves and their activities. To increase the diffusion of this information, a summary of the newsletter is published in the multi-lingual information magazine *Popoli news*. Likewise in Stuttgart, information about migrant organisations’ activities is published in the ‘Encounter of Cultures’, a magazine which is co-financed by the city. In Luxembourg, the city magazine dedicates a section to the ‘international community’ and describes a specific migrant community living in the city. Furthermore, cities such as Stuttgart, Turin, Vienna and Wolverhampton publish an annual multi-ethnic and multi-faith calendar which contains information on holidays celebrated all over the world.

**Cooperation with local media, co-funding of media projects and improving journalists’ (intercultural) competence** are further means to enhance intergroup relations. Practically every city provides local media with information about municipal policies and events. Apart from that, however, there are programmes and initiatives improving media reporting on diversity. The mayor of Amsterdam, for instance, is interviewed weekly on the local television station and he routinely includes a message related to intercultural and inter-religious dialogue and talks about the importance of tolerance. The city of Amsterdam conducted a larger project and (co-)paid for the production of the ‘West Side Soap’, which is a TV series on the lives of four families – a Turkish, a Moroccan, a Surinamese and a Dutch family – who become neighbours and all kinds of themes pass by: love, discrimination, education, friends and work. It is not only meant to fit in Staub’s strategy mentioned above that people should know more about each others’ life and culture, but also to show how interconnected people in any street in Amsterdam already are. On the one hand it fits to experiences of people, on the other hand it is meant to fight prejudice.

The city of Turin followed a similar idea: Maghreb Muslim women’s stories are collected in various videos which were funded by the municipality and shown at the cinema to Turin residents.

The city of Bologna signed the region-wide ‘Agreement on Intercultural Communication’ the goal of which is to improve migrants’ opportunities of self-representation and increasing communication on their activities. This includes, among others, promoting ‘multicultural’ media and offering training for journalists working within this context. In cooperation with partnership agencies, the council of Kirklees offers media training for (migrant) organisations. The city of Turin was involved in a European project called *Migra* aiming to
prepare migrant journalists to work for local newspapers. None of the six participating journalists was hired by a newspaper though, but they set up the inter-ethnic association Piemondo, which realised a project analysing how local media report news on migration issues. Monitoring of local newspapers’ reporting on topics regarding migration, ethnic minorities and intergroup relations is also done in Newport through the equality commission.

To counter negative media reporting, the city of Wolverhampton even issued a publication of its own – the ‘One City News’ that draw a positive picture of the city’s diverse population and should enhance intergroup relations.

**Box 22: Wolverhampton: ‘One City News’**

‘One City News’ is Wolverhampton Partnership’s free quarterly newspaper for all residents of the city. It was established by the city in an attempt to redress the balance of negative reporting by local newspapers regarding the topics of asylum seekers and ethnic groups in general. ‘One City News’ gives important news and relevant information about services, developments and initiatives from the private, voluntary and public sector including the Police and Fire Services, City Council and voluntary groups throughout Wolverhampton. The paper is delivered to every household in Wolverhampton, can be picked up from most public buildings across the city and is also available online.

In order to promote the international and ‘multicultural’ image, but also to improve communication with various ethnic groups, many cities provide information in different languages. Translated information on the cities’ websites as well as translated information brochures are thereby most common. The city of Vienna is particularly active in this regard: its strategy ‘Vienna speaks many languages’ is a cornerstone of its overall diversity policy. Apart from translating the municipal website into various migrant languages, Vienna developed a glossary of administrative words translated into other languages, prints a magazine offering important information for new residents and has a multi-lingual online service that provides residents with important information on legal information, the locations of German classes, women’s issues, children, further training, health care, emergencies, and daily life and leisure activities. The city of Tallinn publishes a free newspaper in both Estonian and Russian in order to communicate with the Russian speaking group in the city. ‘Athens International Radio’ (“The station that speaks you language”) is a further good practice example of providing information in different languages.

**Box 23: Athens: ‘Athens International Radio’**

‘Athens International Radio’ was set up by the mayor in 2004 as a three-month project to inform and entertain the visitors coming to Athens for the Olympic Games. The station was an instant hit and therefore continued broadcasting. Its purposes, however, have gradually

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56 This is done by cities such as Dublin, Frankfurt, Kirklees, Newport, Stuttgart, Turin, Turku, Vienna and Wolverhampton.
changed: today, it caters not only for the needs of visitors, but mainly for those who live in the city permanently. It started to look at issues closely affecting the immigrant communities in Athens and makes an effort to work together with them. ‘Athens International Radio’ is considered a success: it broadcasts in fifteen different languages and offers cultural, social and sports coverage as well as, in cooperation with the BBC, RFI and Deutsche Welle, Greek, Balkan and European news.

Several cities embed different approaches within their communication strategy. The Office for Multicultural Affairs (AmkA) in the city of Frankfurt, for instance, has its own public relations section and a relatively large budget for the communication work – which “is the key word for the office”. The AmkA publishes its documents in several languages and maintains contacts with local migrant media as well as German newspapers and TV stations.

**Box 24: Frankfurt: public communication of the AmkA**

Frankfurt’s Office for Multicultural Affairs (AmkA) considers public communication as crucial and established a specific section for public relations within its office. The AmkA’s strategic approach to public relations is offering neutral information to residents with and without a migration background. Thus, it issues publications and information in various languages. Personal contacts – particularly to members of different ethnic or religious organisations – play an important role in its public relations approach. The AmkA maintains close cooperation with the local print media and has a distribution list for foreign media sources. It issues press releases through these sources, in addition to using new media, such as newsletters and the internet.

### 3.4.8. Public space management

As discussed in chapter two, neighbourhoods and other public spaces including markets, public parks, public institutions and street corners are important locations for different ethnic and religious groups to meet and interact with other groups. Because these places are public and enjoyed by many different groups in many different ways, such interactions cause conflict and thus seriously challenge intergroup relations. This section discusses how CLIP cities attempt to manage or solve these conflicts.

Both Turin and Vienna have developed projects to help solve conflicts over the use of **public parks**. Noise, the amount of rubbish and barbequing in areas without any suitable facilities in Turin’s parks developed into problems and intercultural conflicts. In order to attempt to satisfy all of Turin’s residents, the city and migrant associations created partnerships for public space management.

**Box 25: Turin: regulating the use of public parks together with local associations**

To meet the needs of native and immigrant public park users, the city of Turin has developed a counselling initiative, addressed specifically to the Peruvian community to better regulate their park use. The city
Dedicated a specific area within the public park that is equipped for hosting parties and other gatherings and
created an association responsible for organising park gatherings and maintaining that park rules are observed.

To solve a similar conflict in Vienna, the city’s diversity department launched the initiative ‘Outdoor Grill Caretakers Speaking Native Languages’ (Muttersprachliche Grillplatzmeister) to mediate conflicts between migrants, who use public barbecue grills in parks, and native Austrians, who often feel disturbed by these activities.

In other cities, intercultural conflicts occur in neighbourhoods or on city streets. In Frankfurt, when neighbourhood conflicts occur, residents can approach the Office of Multicultural Affairs (AmkA), which developed a mediation project for multi-ethnic neighbourhoods. As part of this project community members were trained as voluntary mediators. The AmkA takes care of the technical organisation, the processing of requests and the involvement of local authorities and other appropriate institutions. Community members trained as mediators are responsible for conflict analysis, bringing together those involved in a conflict and mediating the discussions. Interviewees reported that this project has prevented conflicts, been a relief for the police and local authorities and empowered the local community members involved in mediation.

The Mediation Service in Hospitalet consists of twelve staff members who respond to neighbourhood conflicts, public space occupation complaints, and concerns with regard to employment and public services competition. The goals of the Mediation Service are to find compromises, increase mutual understanding and make people aware of laws. A key to its success is the expertise of its employees and their community connections. Likewise, the city of Bologna established a ‘Service of Cultural Mediation and Social Interpreting’ (with mediators stemming from more than twenty countries), contracted to a non-profit association of mediators. The city and the local health agency ASL (Azienda Sanitaria Locale) pay an annual sum to the service to guarantee a certain number of mediation hours for their own services, while other organisations such as schools and hospitals pay each time they use the services. In any case it costs much less than hiring mediators, allowing to a high number of city organisations to offer mediation services. The service can be used both for answering to occasional needs and for developing complex projects, such as the ‘Parents Permanent Workshop’, set up in a school to establish encounter between Italian and foreign parents, their children and the school teachers.

In the city of Amsterdam, there are interesting projects regarding street-based youth gangs. The project ‘Connect’ is a bottom up initiative of the Moroccan Saïd Bensellam, who works with young Moroccan street boys that are considered unreachable by the regular youth work. Together with Saïd, the street boys make a plan for a more positive future perspective; they are involved in local activities that ‘connect’ the street boys to society. For instance, some youth get trained at the ‘Flying Brigade’ and support the police by negotiating and...
stopping escalating conflicts in a neighbourhood, others participate in the ‘Parking Project’ and arrange parking at big events. The ‘connecting’ activities are considered improving the situation of the youngsters and contributing to a safer and more positive multicultural neighbourhood. The initiative, which meanwhile has broadened its activities and includes parents as well, has gained nation-wide recognition and won many prices.

**Box 26: Amsterdam: ‘Young in Westerpark’**

The project ‘Young in Westerpark’ was based on worries about youth gangs in the streets of the Amsterdam city district Westerpark. The basic idea behind is that identity and self confidence of youngsters are the keys to success to develop a peaceful neighbourhood. The project’s approach has four rules that are easy to apply and widely agreed in the district: (1) everyone is part of ‘us’, (2) we care for each other, (3) we care about our surrounding and (4) we control ourselves. These rules are repeated everywhere, at schools, at Quran lessons at the mosque, at the football club and on the squares. When any fight takes place the involved are put around a table, so the problem is solved and at the same time ties are created. These ‘Socratic Talks’ have more effect than punishing the youngsters; they stimulate them to search for the norms behind certain decisions and to find solutions by questioning.

The project, which started in 2005, is supported by seventy local organisations. It can be considered a good practice of public space management; it focuses on connecting people and avoiding polarisation. Therefore, problems are solved fast and breeding grounds for tensions are removed from a very early moment onwards, not only because it starts with kids, but also because small fights cannot develop into big ones.

In Malmö the lack of space for migrant and ethnic groups to meet and socialise impacted intergroup interaction in public spaces. This was the case in the library, where there was a decrease in women coming to the library, because migrant men would gather there to play cards and chess. In order to provide for the needs of both the men and women, the Malmö library introduced specific areas for playing chess – an initiative regarded as good practice by many people interviewed during the respective field visit.

**Box 27: Malmö: chess rooms in the Rosengård city district library**

The new layout of the Rosengård city district library located in a shopping mall is a good practice example for responding to the request of migrant organisations for space. Before the rearranging of library space many local migrant men gathered in the library’s central areas to play chess or cards. That limited the space for weekly lectures and deterred local women from coming to the library. Now, the library consists of a room dedicated to chess, where the men meet and chat. The number of women visiting, meeting in the central areas and attending weekly lectures has increased significantly since then.

Furthermore, the library has become very international. Books in different languages, newspapers from around the world and an extensive language library are available. The
library staff, which is multilingual, provides computer and internet courses and runs a weekly language café where various topics are discussed in Swedish.

3.5. Policies improving the relations between police and migrant groups

Intergroup relations in ethnically mixed populations are peaceful in most CLIP cities. Nevertheless, cultural and religious diversity can also be a source of conflict. To prevent, reduce and overcome conflicts between different ethnic groups and to secure social cohesion on the local level, the police can be a key player in cities – regardless of whether the local police are part of the municipal government or belong to a national police force.

There are significant differences in the way the police can precede. While in some cities the local police force seems to act somewhat reactive, it is rather proactive in others and represents one of the important players in local intercultural policies.

The proactive approaches reported on in the CLIP case studies can be divided into three categories: intercultural education and competence building of police officers, including introduction of a specific unit within the police, informational campaigns about the police and police-related topics for migrants, including crime and conflict prevention and institutionalised dialogue and cooperation between police and migrant organisations. Some CLIP cities follow one of these approaches, but in most cases, several single elements are combined into a larger approach or even strategy.

3.5.1. Intercultural education of police officers

Educational and other projects to increase intercultural awareness and competence of the police constitute the first major category. Gaining intercultural competence is vital in order to reduce prejudices and establish understanding. It helps the police to comprehend conflicts within a migrant community, between different migrant groups or between migrant groups and the native population and thus enhances their ability to solve these conflicts. Furthermore, intercultural competences can improve the relations as well as cooperation with migrant groups, e.g. when providing prevention measures. Therefore, projects enhancing intercultural competence of police officers are implemented in several CLIP cities.57

Since communication is an important key in intergroup relations, some CLIP cities offer migrant language courses for police officers. In Wolverhampton, for instance, a language school has organised a basic Punjabi language course for police officers. This class has been positively received by the participants and is viewed as a way to support community relations. Course participants have the opportunity to receive accreditation.

57 As far as we know this kind of measure exists in the ten cities of Bologna, Dublin, Frankfurt, Kirklees, Stuttgart, Turin, Valencia, Vienna, Wolverhampton and Zurich.
Several other cities provide intercultural education within broader projects involving the police and migrants. Vienna’s project ‘Fair and Sensitive – Police and Africans’ focuses – among others – on the education of police officers to improve the communication with immigrants in general and with Africans in particular. The initiative was founded by Vienna’s Federal State Office of Criminal Investigation and African migrant organisations. It features educational and sensitising workshops for police officers and the establishment of an advice centre in a café. Another project involving the police and migrants in Vienna – ‘Advice and Help Relaunched’ – also aims at increasing mutual understanding through intercultural training. Intercultural competence building of police officers is also a vital part of Stuttgart’s programme ‘Cooperation between the Police and Mosque Associations’, where the first stage of the project was teaching police officers about Islam. Also the cities of Valencia and Turin carried out training projects for city officials and local police officers that should provide knowledge on immigration phenomena and sensitise about immigrants’ social situation and living conditions.

The project ‘Police and Migrants Engage in Dialogue’ in Frankfurt is based on the assumption that tensions between the police and migrants can arise when they do not know much about each other. Thus, there are specific workshops for police officers where they can discuss problems with migrants as well as learn about requests from migrants. In addition, they receive instruction about migrant cultures and are confronted with negative experiences that migrants have had with the police.

Another method to enhance intercultural competences and work efficiently and effectively within a diverse population is to establish special police units dealing with intercultural affairs. In Antwerp, for instance, the local police installed a specific ‘Diversity Unit’ which developed initiatives such as the police’s slogan ‘A Heart for Diversity’. In Dublin, a police department is responsible for the implementation of strategies and policies focusing on racial, ethnic, cultural and religious diversity.

Box 28: Dublin: ‘Ethnic Liaison Unit’

Dublin’s Ethnic Liaison Unit consists of three ethnic liaison officers, who were appointed to deal with racism and problems regarding multiculturalism and are well received and respected across migrant and religious communities. For the past two years, the unit has operated a police clinic after Friday prayer alternating in the Clonskeagh and the South Circular mosques. At these clinics the officers provide advice and respond to the concerns of Muslims in the area. Additionally, the Store Street Police Station established the ‘North Inner City New Communities Forum’, an ethnic minority forum, which involves five police stations. In this forum issues concerning ethnic and religious minorities are discussed. The forum holds meetings every three months for representatives from the police, DCC, the business community, public representatives and other interested parties. Muslim representatives from the Clonskeagh and South Circular mosques also provide police cultural awareness training.
The police force in Zurich founded a taskforce for preventing or solving intercultural conflicts; this taskforce cooperates with an external mediator from the Zurich Competence Centre for Intercultural Conflicts, which is involved in the training programme at the Canton’s police academy. The police force is active in complaint management, as it pre-screens complaints before action is taken. One specific unit works to prevent football related youth conflicts. It has, for example, implemented an exchange of officers at the international level to police large events and football matches. In addition, it works specifically with young people with migration background and Imams in Zurich to prevent sport related conflicts. Another important aspect of Zurich’s approach is community policing. As part of this approach, an officer is assigned to specific streets in a neighbourhood.

Another, supplementary way of improving the police force’s intercultural competencies is the recruitment of police officers with a migration background. This is done, for instance, in Dublin, where there was a significant under-representation of police officers with an ethnic minority background, by launching an ethnic minority recruitment drive. It was not very successful, though: less than ten of the two-hundred applicants are currently employed. Similarly, the local police in Malmö have been addressing the issue of under-representation of migrant police officers for some time; they make slow process in recruiting migrant staff. Nonetheless, these approaches have to be considered as very important. The importance and influence of having officers with a migration background can be seen, for instance, in the city of Kirklees. As part of the ‘Kirklees connect’ project police officers with diverse cultural and ethnic backgrounds provide telephone advice about cultural awareness to other police officers.

Other local authorities installed mediation services to overcome intercultural conflicts (cf. section 3.4.8). These intercultural competent task forces are often organised by the city, but cooperate closely with the police. For instance Hospitalet, like Zurich, is active in crime prevention and specifically focuses on avoiding or solving neighbourhood conflicts. Instead of assigning a separate taskforce, this work is done primarily by the ‘Mediation Service’, an office with twelve staff members that works closely with the police. The police notify the ‘Mediation Service’ of disagreements between citizens, and the ‘Mediation Service’ then steps in to help solve the conflict.

While the above mentioned projects and activities are based on the police’ initiative, in some CLIP cities, migrant organisations encourage the police to start an intercultural opening-up process. Regarding the dialogue between the police and migration groups, one trend that we recognised is that migrant organisations and religious organisations are interested in or already actively invite police officers to visit their communities. This can be seen in Amsterdam, for example. In addition to its other extensive activities, the Moslim Jongeren Amsterdam began inviting representatives of the police to visit and attend its programmes as a result of the feeling that they had been targeted by the police. The Sikh communities in Wolverhampton would also like to establish such a connection with the police, but despite attempts to get the police to hold clinics at their temples, the police have yet to do that.
According to the respective case study, this neglect is especially noteworthy, because over 15,000 people attend Sikh temples on Sundays in Wolverhampton.

3.5.2. Information on the police for migrants

Another category of approaches includes information campaigns on police-related topics for migrants. In addition to providing valuable information on crime prevention and national laws, this approach aims at encouraging interaction between the police and migrant groups. Thus, fears and prejudice are reduced and migrants feel less reluctant to approach the police when problems and conflicts occur.

Kirklees offers both intercultural resources for police officers (see above) and information programmes for migrant groups. The police force hosts ‘carousel’ police clinics providing 

**information services to migrant groups.** These clinics take place in many different locations, including mosques and interfaith centres. It is worthwhile to note that although these ‘carousel’ police clinics as well as the afore-mentioned project ‘Kirklees connect’ sound promising, none of the Muslim organisations who participated in the CLIP study were aware of them.

The project ‘Police and Migrants Engage in Dialogue’ in Frankfurt, which was partially introduced above, not only offers intercultural education for police officers, but also 

**information programmes for NGOs’ and migrant associations’ representatives on police structures** and opportunities for dialogue between the police and migrant groups. Following the separate workshops for police officers on the one hand and migrants and NGO representatives on the other hand, there is a third workshop for all participants of the two prior workshops. As part of this last workshop participants have the opportunity to constructively discuss issues important to them and make requests to other participants. Currently, the police in Frankfurt are working on plans for a project to specifically enhance dialogue with Muslims. This project will probably begin in December 2009.

Newport’s strategy includes not only a dialogue forum (see below), but also cooperative 

**police monitoring, hate crime prevention and information programmes in individual mosques.** In Newport police monitoring is completed in co-operation with the Imams of the mosques. The police have also established specific policies in order to deal with hate crime. Recently the police established a **community cohesion team** made up of five police officers with expertise in communications and community work. The police also hold regular police clinics in each of the mosques. Newport’s approach is supported by all individuals and organisations interviewed during the field visit.
3.5.3. Institutionalised dialogue between police and migrant organisations

The third approach discussed here is institutionalised dialogue and cooperation between the police and migrant organisations. In general, the first approaches – intercultural education for police officers and information campaigns for migrants – are the basis of a constructive dialogue and are hence a substantial part of this attempt. Having an institutionalised and regular dialogue has to be seen, however, as an approach with a new quality.

In some cities, such a strategy additionally aims at increasing the openness of ethnic or faith-based migrant organisations to the city administration and society as a whole, as some organisations are – for different reasons – rather isolated. The goal is to overcome this isolation and integrate the organisations in society, while also increasing the organisations’ involvement in their respective city district.

In order to obtain these aims, there are (regular) meetings between the police and migrant organisations in some CLIP cities. Sundsvall initiated round table discussion groups, where stakeholders in the city’s public life gather to discuss important community issues and neighbourhood problems. These round tables also include migrant groups and the police. Similar initiatives are organised, for instance, in the cities of Arnsberg and Stuttgart. A very positive and efficient aspect of these projects is that challenges or problems can be solved quickly, as important stakeholders are all present. According to both, police officers and migrants interviewed, the round table discussion groups facilitate the interaction of persons, who might not normally interact with one another.

Institutionalised dialogue and cooperation can also be an aspect of broader projects involving the police and migrants. The already mentioned project ‘Advice and Help Relaunched’ in Vienna is based on the strategy of community policing and began in 2005. It is a cooperation of the Department for Integration and Diversity Affairs (MA 17) with Vienna’s police, aiming to increase mutual understanding through intercultural training, personal involvement and face-to-face meetings. As part of this initiative employees from the city and police officers meet regularly with community representatives, ethnic and cultural organisations and religious leaders to discuss neighbourhood safety issues.

In Newport, a dialogue forum has also been initiated. The ‘Gwent Police BME Community Liaison meetings’ occur regularly and are attended by the police and community leaders from different city districts, ethnic heritages and religious affiliations. As a result of these meetings, community leaders and senior police officers have been able to establish trust between one another, which has allowed them to honestly express concerns about policing.

More ‘unconventional’ initiatives can be found in Vienna and Amsterdam: the Vienna project ‘Fair and Sensitive’ mentioned above also features elements to encourage dialogue between

58 As far as we know, regular dialogue as well as cooperation between the police and migrants of migrant organisations exists in the cities of Amsterdam, Arnsberg, Breda, Malmö, Newport, Stuttgart, Sundsvall, Turku and Vienna.
police officers and Africans: the project organises multicultural events, including cooperative activities such as football matches and making music. In Amsterdam, Muslim youngsters support the police in stopping escalating conflicts as a ‘Flying Brigade’ (cf. section 3.4.8).

Another good practice project that combines the three approaches – intercultural education of police officers, information campaigns for migrants and an institutionalised dialogue – is the ‘Cooperation between the Police and Mosque Associations’ in Stuttgart. The project goals for the police are to gain inter-cultural competence regarding Islam and include mosque associations in communal crime prevention. The mosque associations and their members become actively integrated in their neighbourhoods, and the police and local mosque associations build strong contacts to one another.

**Box 29: Stuttgart: ‘Cooperation between the Police and Mosque Associations’**

The good practice project ‘Cooperation between the Police and Mosque Associations’ is part of the nation-wide initiative ‘Transfer of intercultural Competences’ (TiK), which aims at the intercultural ‘opening-up’ of city administrations (increasing awareness and openness). In Stuttgart, the project has the four following goals:

1. The police gains inter-cultural competence regarding Islam.
2. The police and the local mosque associations build strong contacts to one another.
3. The mosque associations are included in communal crime prevention.
4. The mosque associations and their members become actively integrated in their neighbourhoods.

The cooperation began in one city district, where the local police – after achieving a basic knowledge of Islam – contacted the mosque of the Turkish-Islamic Union DITIB, visited the mosque and invited the mosque’s management board to the police station. Having gained the trust of the Muslim association, the police started to organise informational events. At the beginning, they dealt with ‘harmless’ topics, such as traffic safety and later they included issues like drugs, raising children, preventing youth criminality and even abuse in the home. Other Muslim organisations have since then started to take part in the project, and today, all police stations in Stuttgart have contact persons for mosque associations. In addition to establishing such connections, a handbook about the initiative was also created.

The feedback on the project has been very positive. As a result, both police and mosque associations started a joint intercultural opening-up process. The Muslim communities are better involved in their city districts, participate in local safety and district committees and have become more appreciated members of their districts.

By conducting this project, which is highly appreciated by Muslim representatives, the police and the city, the police were the first official institution approaching the local mosque associations. A member of one association stated: “The police achieved what no one had previously achieved: it helped us to open up to the outside and to build bridges from here to
the outside. It was able to do this in two ways: first, through the police, we were able to trust ourselves to open up. Second, other organisations were then open to working with us, because the police also had been.” This project can be seen as an outstanding example of a good practice project.
4. Meeting religious needs and fostering inter-religious dialogue

As was noted earlier in this report, migration into Europe has brought ‘new’ religions to most CLIP cities. Religious identities and needs can be the cause of tension and conflict between groups; partly due to different traditions and practise among religions, but also due to the heightened political anxiety around the rise of religious fundamentalism. This chapter outlines policies for meeting religious needs, fostering inter-religious dialogue and the approach of cities towards Muslim groups.

4.1. Policies for meeting religious needs

Religious needs and practises of migrant and minority groups have become an issue in intergroup relations in the large majority of CLIP cities. Thus, policies to meet religious needs exist in twenty-four of the cities. They mainly concern religious buildings, cemeteries, food, dress codes and Islamic instruction. The following sections describe the cities’ attitudes and policies in more detail. Since the Muslim community clearly represents the largest religious migrant community, most policies refer to this group.

4.1.1. Construction of religious buildings

The desire for larger places of worship and for representative religious buildings was expressed in the majority of CLIP cities. In most cases, this need was articulated by Muslim groups, but also Buddhists, Sikhs and Jews attempt to have representative temples/synagogues. Most cities seem to be aware of these needs, and many of them are generally supportive. While some cities do not seem to consider the support of buildings for religious migrant communities a municipal task, other cities such as Frankfurt, Turin and Stuttgart, actively support initiatives for the construction or maintenance of religious buildings. Several other cities who do not actively support the construction of new buildings, however, are engaged in preventing neighbourhood conflicts surrounding this issue.


60 Further policies relate to religious facilities at public hospitals and religious holidays. They will not be discussed in this section since they play only a minor role in city policies.

61 In one way or another, seventeen cities seem to support the construction or preservation of religious buildings, either though funds, counselling, information or political support. Following the case studies, the following twelve cities do not support the building of religious buildings: Budapest, Copenhagen, Dublin, Kirklees, Luxembourg, Newport, Prague, Sundsvall, Tallinn, Wolverhampton, Wroclaw and Valencia. (The latter once gave a piece of land to one Muslim organisation to build a mosque; since then, however, the city has never funded neither granted premises to any other Muslim community.)
There are different ways in which cities deal with demands for religious buildings and how they attempt to enhance intergroup relations. The approaches include:

- funding,
- counselling for religious communities,
- information campaigns and linking religious communities and neighbours and
- organising political support.

**Funding** is an important means with regard to religious buildings. The cities can provide funding in terms of direct financial support or provide indirect funding such as giving land to the communities for the mosques to be built on. The cities of Athens and Lisbon, for instance, followed the latter strategy. Yet other cities, such as Arnsberg, pay a portion of the rent for the mosque, as it would for every other migrant association.

Another approach in meeting migrants’ – as well as prospective neighbours’ – needs is the effective **counselling of religious communities**, as practised in Stuttgart. After previously experiencing a conflict related to the construction of a mosque, the city of Stuttgart developed a procedure which is supposed to prevent future conflicts: even before a community buys property, it can receive counselling from the city. On the one hand, the department for city planning and construction outlines the planning and building laws and regulations that need to be considered; on the other hand the department for integration policy discusses potential neighbourhood problems with the community.

Similarly, the city of Frankfurt offers an institutionalised form of counselling for religious communities and has appointed one staff member of the Office for Multicultural Affairs (AmkA) as the official contact person for religious communities and their questions with regard to conflicts about plans for the construction of religious buildings. Likewise, the city of Vienna provides supervision and support for the construction of mosques.

Apart from such institutionalised forms of counselling, less formal kinds of counselling can also be very effective. This is evident in Zurich, where the deputy police chief visited the imam of a mosque in order to solve traffic and parking problems that are common during Friday prayers. This visit was much appreciated and the neighbourhood problems related to the mosque could be immediately resolved.

A third way of dealing with the issue of religious buildings and conflicts surrounding them includes **information campaigns for the local population** and **mediation** efforts that bring religious community members, neighbours and protesting groups together in order to reduce mutual prejudice and fears. These programmes generally aim to reduce prejudice and fears that some of the residents living in the mosque’s neighbourhood may have towards Islam. The city of Frankfurt, for instance, employed such a strategy. During a conflict over the construction of a new mosque in the city district of Hausen, city officials organised various meetings with the neighbours and mosque representatives in order to respond to concerns and
fears. Similarly, the Breda mosque started an information campaign for the residents surrounding the mosque which helped to bring the Muslim community and neighbours together and to foster peaceful relationships between the two groups. The same is true for Vienna: mediation in conflicts about centres of Islamic life is also an important activity of the municipal department for integration and diversity. The city of Terrassa – when confronted with the need to build a Baptist Evangelical church – was able to convince the neighbours about the religious community’s right to build a new church.

**Organising political and public support** is another means of dealing with the problems surrounding the construction of mosques and other religious buildings. The city of Frankfurt, for instance, has been actively supporting the construction of a new mosque in the district of Hausen. Apart from conducting meetings between the Muslim community and neighbours, the city also fought openly in the urban public against right-wing parties that use neighbourhood conflicts to mobilise people for their xenophobic views. When the right-wing party NPD organised a protest against the project, the city took an active part in a counter-demonstration, making it clear that right-wing extremism, racism and Islamophobia are not accepted in the city and that religious freedom includes the right to have a place to worship. The Muslim community and its plans were not only supported by Frankfurt’s Lord Mayor, the staff of the Office for Multicultural Affairs (AmkA) and other important political actors, but also by various members of established religious communities as well as representatives of social partners and large parts of the majority population.

The city of Terrassa provides much political encouragement for its Muslim communities and their needs. The city employs a clear communication strategy, imparting to the public that mosques belong to the city.

**Box 30: Terrassa: supporting the acceptance of mosques**

The city of Terrassa has a clear standpoint on the issue of religious buildings: it supports the notion that religious communities have the right to a place of worship – preferably in the areas where they live. Thus, it actively supports religious communities – mainly Muslims – in providing more places of worship and in celebrating (Islamic) holidays. In order to prevent and mediate conflicts, the city’s public communication strategy plays a vital part. The municipality categorically states that mosques belong to cities and should not be isolated in the industrial outskirts, but rather, like churches, become an integral part of neighbourhoods.

**4.1.2. Burials and cemeteries**

Despite many migrants’ intention to be buried in their place of origin, more and more migrants are buried in their country of immigration. Increasingly European cities have become aware of the issue of burials and cemeteries and are attempting to meet the demands or consider an approach.
As lack of space is a common challenge, there are only few cities, such as Dublin and Vienna, which have a separate Islamic cemetery. The latter city provided the premises for a new Islamic cemetery in 2008. This cemetery, which is the first Islamic cemetery in Austria, was financed by OPEC-funds, the State of Qatar and also by a considerable number of small donors. Other cities, such as Amsterdam, Athens and Malmö, are in the initial stages of building a separate Islamic cemetery.

In sixteen cities, however, a particular corner of an existing cemetery is reserved for Muslims. While in some of these cities, such solutions have appeared to have met the needs of Muslims, several other cities, such as Malmö, Dublin and Newport, expressed concern that the cemeteries (or the parts of the cemetery respectively) are still too small.

In most cities, the cemeteries in question are exclusively run by the city; in other cities, churches run the cemeteries. In both cases, however, the installation of a Muslim cemetery seems to have been implemented without severe conflicts. In the cities of Sundsvall and Turku, for instance, the Swedish Church, and the Finnish Church respectively, is completely responsible for running the cemetery, including an atheist and a Muslim corner. The local Islamic organisations are very satisfied with the cemeteries and the way the churches handles them.

As discussed in chapter two, however, the topic of burials is not only a question of space but also of burial rites. A major issue is the use of a coffin. In cities like Amsterdam and Zagreb, Islamic rites are completely allowed and in a city such as Lisbon, it is possible to bury the deceased without a coffin. The city of Zurich still requires a coffin – yet allows for the use of a cardboard coffin. Other cities, by contrast, require a wooden coffin when Muslims are buried. This is true, for instance, in the cities of Bologna, Stuttgart and Terrassa. Still, Muslim representatives interviewed during the field visits in Bologna, for instance, were generally satisfied with the way Islamic burials are handled by the city.

A second challenge originates from the fact that there are different burial rules within the Muslim community. The question is how one does respect the religious rules when denominational groups within the Muslim community have different views of these rules. In Amsterdam and Zurich, the cities coordinated various representatives from different religious and ethnic Muslim communities to gather and negotiate the modes of a consensual burial rite. In Zurich, Muslims even set up the ‘Association of Islamic organisations in Zurich’ (VIOZ) to discuss the issue and, hence, set up negotiations between the Muslim communities and the city. In both cities, the representatives negotiated for several years until a compromise was accepted by all partners.

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62 It is evident in the cities of Arnsberg, Bologna, Breda, Budapest, Frankfurt, Kirklees, Lisbon, Luxembourg, Malmö, Newport, Stuttgart, Sundsvall, Turin, Turku, Valencia and Zurich.
4.1.3. Dress codes

Religious dress codes are also an issue challenging intergroup relations in many CLIP cities. There are, however, hardly any municipal policies concerning religious dress codes; cities just follow federal and state laws. Some European countries have banned wearing headscarves and other conspicuous religious symbols in schools and other public institutions or at the workplace. The Netherlands, for instance, banned the burka (full cover) for teachers. Similarly, in some Länder institutions in Germany, it is forbidden to wear a headscarf or other conspicuous religious signs. In Antwerp, a sudden introduction of a headscarf ban in public institutions confronted the women with the decision whether to take off the scarf or to lose the job. Though these kinds of bans are mainly directed towards Muslim women, they also affect other religious groups, e.g. in cities such as Frankfurt, Sikh men are not allowed to wear a turban when working in a public institution. In other cities, such as Zurich, Luxembourg or Vienna, there are no restrictions on what one can wear in the workplace. Despite the lack of legal restrictions conflicts about the hijab exist in places such as Vienna and according to the Federal Agency for Labour and the Austrian Trade Union, women wearing a headscarf face discrimination in the labour market.

As mentioned in chapter two, religious dress codes can have an impact on women’s swimming. Thus, some municipal swimming pools have introduced ‘women’s swimming’, which consists of the pool being open for several hours only for women. For some cities, such as Stuttgart, this system was established several years ago and is considered ‘normal’. Stuttgart did not even categorise these special hours of operation as an initiative focusing on Muslim groups, but as a service for women in general. A similar development can be found in Turin: on Sunday, one of the local swimming pools opens for women only. By doing so, the city complied with a request from migrant organisations. The initiative was made possible by cooperation between the city and various regional associations.

Such initiatives provoked or continue to provoke, however, public discussion in other cities. In Sundsvall, the initiative to introduce ‘women’s swimming’ hours launched public debates and resistance. Nevertheless, the initiative was successful; the city followed the female Muslim representative’s proposal. In Valencia, by contrast, the local Islamic Cultural Centre’s request to reserve some hours in the public swimming pool for (Muslim) women was rejected by the city. The Valencian sport department argued that restrictions on access to public utilities cannot be allowed on the basis of a group’s particular needs. Frankfurt previously had organised women’s swimming hours at public pools. Following a similar line of argument used by the city of Valencia, however, and due to the city’s scarce financial resources most of these initiatives were not continued. Currently, there is only one swimming pool offering separate hours for women, located at the outskirts of the city.

One way of avoiding separate opening hours for ‘women’s swimming’ while still making it possible for religious Muslim women to use a public pool even when men are present is to allow for ‘burkini swimming’. The ‘burkini’ – a special swim suit made of sportive material
that covers the whole body except for the face, hands and feet – is, for example, permitted in Amsterdam, Vienna and Zurich as well as in several British cities.

4.1.4. Education

Like policies regarding dress codes, the issue of **Muslim schools and Islamic classes at public schools** can hardly be handled at the municipal level, because education is generally governed by a federal or state level government. Most of the CLIP countries generally allow ethnic or religious minorities to establish (private) schools. Still, there are no city policies on how to deal with these schools. In the city of Amsterdam, for instance, there are already six Islamic primary schools and one Islamic secondary school that attract considerable media and public attention, mainly because of concerns about ideological teaching in these schools and possible consequences for integration. They are carefully supervised by the general school inspections, but apart from that, no other measures have been taken.63

Regarding religious education at public schools, some cities support demands from Muslim communities. Stuttgart, for instance, promoted an initiative to establish Islamic classes at public schools.

**Box 31: Stuttgart: Islamic classes in public schools**

Two elementary schools in the city of Stuttgart take part in a model project. The schools not only provide denominational Christian religious education to children, but also offer denominational Islamic religious education (conducted in German) to Muslim children as part of the general curriculum. Instruction is given according to an approved curriculum by state certified teachers, who belong to the respective religious groups.

The city of Stuttgart believes the project to be beneficial, campaigned for it and actively supports it; city officials are in close contact with the schools conducting the model project as well as with parents of the participating children.

4.1.5. Food

Another need that may require a further review of policy regards food and dietary requirements, since some religions have specific rules on what one is allowed to eat. In particular food served in public institutions such as schools, the workplace, hospitals and prisons can create problems for religious persons. There is, however, currently no European legal framework for dealing with these issues.

As a result, the situation across Europe is extremely diverse. In a variety of public institutions this issue is simply ignored. Institutions that try to meet religious needs either offer the

63 In August 2009 the funds of five Dutch schools were cut, because the comments of the School Inspection had not led to necessary improvements in teaching and building. One of them was an Islamic School in Amsterdam.
possibility to obtain food prepared in compliance with religious prescriptions, as done, for instance, in some British schools, or they offer foods (such as eggs or fish) that can be eaten by everyone, irrespective of religion. Newport city council catering has established an initiative to improve the quality of halal food available in schools. A project linking school cooks with Gwent Education Multi-Ethnic Support Service staff has been established to provide advice to school cooks concerning the preparation and cooking of halal dishes in schools. Similarly, in the cities of Turin and Valencia, public schools have been meeting the different religious needs of pupils for years by offering special food.

One certain aspect of the issue of food is ritual (Islamic/Jewish) slaughtering. While in some cities religious slaughtering created public controversies, in others the debate remained a matter for experts. In Vienna, for instance, Islamic and Jewish slaughtering is legal if certain rules of animal protection law are strictly observed. In Zagreb as well, many food companies have a halal certificate enabling them to not only sell halal food in Croatia, but also export their goods to other (Muslim) countries. In Turin, the city owns a public ritual butcher (halal and kosher).

4.2. Inter-religious dialogue

Inter-religious dialogue can be understood as a form of intercultural dialogue that gathers religions. Forms of inter-religious dialogue exist in practically every CLIP city. We can differentiate between two kinds of inter-religious dialogue. On the one hand, there is a ‘pure’ inter-religious dialogue covering faith issues such as differences and commonalities between religions. Other initiatives gather representatives of different religious communities to discuss societal and political issues. In general, these are labelled as ‘inter-religious dialogue’ as well, but could also be seen as forms of ‘intercultural dialogue’.

The initiatives differ concerning the number of religious communities participating. Some projects include representatives of one religion with different denominations. Ecumenical approaches, for instance, include different Christian communities such as Roman-Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox and Baptist representatives. Other initiatives gather Muslims of different denominations. Further kinds of religious dialogue take place between two different faiths. In many cities, there are initiatives promoting Christian-Islamic dialogue. Another example is the ‘Jewish Moroccan Network Amsterdam’ that fosters the relations between Judaism and Islam. Other inter-religious activities include various religious groups, e.g. the religious councils in Frankfurt and Stuttgart.

Most of these inter-religious initiatives were established in a ‘bottom-up’ process by members of religious communities, some were initiated by city officials that invited religious representatives to participate. The CLIP cities can be categorised into three groups according to their involvement in interfaith activities.
City officials of five cities initiated inter-religious dialogue such as round tables of various religions and inter-religious networks or councils and participate in these initiatives.64

Twelve cities did not initiate inter-religious projects, since they consider this not as a municipal responsibility, but as a responsibility of religious communities. Still several of these cities actively support inter-religious initiatives through cooperation, communication or even funds.65

Eleven cities are not involved in inter-religious projects.66

The following section 4.2.1 presents examples of initiatives focusing on topics of religion; inter-religious initiatives focusing on societal and political issues will be presented in section 4.2.2.

4.2.1. Inter-religious dialogue about faith topics

Dialogue about religion and related issues is an important means of getting to know other religions and their belief systems. Regular institutionalised inter-religious dialogue about faith topics currently exists in seventeen cities.67 Further, occasional inter-religious meetings formerly took place in six others.68

A ‘classic’ example for this kind of dialogue can be found in Arnsberg. In 2000, the city initiated a project called ‘Between Minaret and Steeple’ to increase knowledge about and establish relations between the local Christian and Muslim communities. This project has resulted in a regular, institutionalised inter-religious dialogue between members of local religious communities. The meetings, that take place several times per year, are organised by the religious community themselves; the city is represented by an officer. In the course of the discussions, the differences, but in particular the similarities between the religions are of core interest. Celebrations and holidays, the role of women, education of children and ‘common’ saints have been the topics of the discourse. Discussing violence and terrorism is of particular interest, emphasising the peaceful nature of the religions and, thus, reducing mutual prejudice. Not only should knowledge increase, but also the development of stable relationships and friendships between believers of different background. Similar initiatives

64 Amsterdam, Arnsberg, Kirklees, Stuttgart and Zurich.
65 This holds true for the cities of Breda, Frankfurt, Lisbon, Malmö, Newport, Terrassa Turin, Vienna, Wolverhampton, Wrocław and Zagreb.
66 Athens, Bologna, Budapest, Copenhagen, Dublin, Hospitalet, Luxembourg, Prague, Sundsvall, Tallinn, Turku and Valencia belong to this group. Nevertheless, we have to emphasise that some of these cities, Valencia for instance, previously supported or even initiated inter-religious initiatives that do not seem to be active anymore.
67 Amsterdam, Arnsberg, Budapest, Dublin, Frankfurt, Lisbon, Malmö, Newport, Kirklees, Stuttgart, Turin, Turku, Valencia, Vienna, Wolverhampton, Zagreb and Zurich
68 Antwerp, Athens, Bologna, Breda, Copenhagen and Sundsvall.
gathering religious people discussing about religion-related topics can be found in most other CLIP cities as well.

Another kind of dialogue can be found in Stuttgart where a **round table of religious leaders** has been established by the Lord Mayor: the ‘Round Table of Religions’. They discussed themes such as values in different religions and developed a ‘Manifesto for a peaceful and active cooperation of religions in Stuttgart’ that stresses the positive aspects of the plurality of cultures and religions in society. The manifesto emphasises that peaceful living-together in the city is a responsibility of everyone, regardless of religious belief and calls for tolerance and respect in regard to religious beliefs of others. Such round tables of religious leaders can also be found in other cities, e.g. in Wolverhampton and Frankfurt.

**‘Abrahamic’ projects** are another form of inter-religious dialogue that are designed to enhance the mutual understanding and relationship between Christianity, Judaism and Islam. They exist in several forms. As mentioned above, some Abrahamic teams, e.g. in the cities of Frankfurt and Sundsvall, are engaged in intercultural education at schools. In the city of Lisbon, the *Fórum Abraâmico* organises and attends meetings, workshops, conferences and events that can promote knowledge of the three faiths, underlining their positive aspects. Similarly, the ‘Three Religions Chair’ (*Cátedra de las Tres Religiones*) of the University of Valencia offers courses, seminars and conferences on the three religions’ founders and on inter-religious dialogue. The *Cátedra* is open to the contribution of different religious confessions and cooperate, for instance, with the Orthodox Church of Valencia, Valencian Muslim organisations and a Baha’i community. Abrahamic projects also exist in the cities of Dublin, Malmö and Stuttgart.

Inter-religious dialogue can also be supported on the occasion of ‘**Open Mosque Days**’ that are common in almost every CLIP city. More information these initiatives will be given below.

Moreover, **festivals or other joint public activities** can be the opportunities for inter-religious dialogues. The ‘Intercultural Weeks’ in Frankfurt – initiated by the churches – are an example that creates a platform for discussions and aims to offer the possibility of networking and dialogue between different groups and to break down prejudices and stereotypes by exhibitions, cooking classes, sporting events and podium discussions. Similarly, the Newport ‘Interfaith Group’ celebrates the ‘One World Week’, including a

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69 Between 2003 and 2007, representatives of the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church, the Turkish-Islamic Union DITIB, the Baha’i, the Bosnian Islamic, the Israeliite and the Buddhist community came together.

70 In signing the proclamation, the representatives agreed to encourage mutual respect and tolerance, fight against extremism, fundamentalism and nationalism, organise encounters and dialogue between communities and strive for equal opportunities. They stated that conflicts should be solved non-violently, that religion cannot be used to legitimate violence and should not be misused for political purposes.

71 It was established in 2000, following an agreement between the University of Valencia, the Centro Ecuménico Padre Congar, the Federación de Comunidades Israelitas de España and the Union de Comunidades Islámicas de España (UCIDE).
sharing of food and public debates, and the Wolverhampton Inter Faith Council organises a ‘Faith Week’.

These kind of activities include common preaches. In the city of Amsterdam, there is an interesting initiative concerning preaches: During the project ‘Amsterdam with Heart and Soul’ members of different religious communities preach for the members’ of a different belief: Christian reverends preach in mosques, while Imams preach in churches.

4.2.2. Inter-religious dialogue about secular topics

Another way of organising inter-religious dialogue is to gather representatives of different religious communities to initiate dialogues about issues that are not, or only in an indirect way, related to religion. These initiatives, which could be seen as intercultural dialogue as well, generally address issues concerning the interactions of the religious groups in everyday life, political, social or societal topics. Institutionalised initiatives gathering religious representatives to discuss mainly secular topics are depicted in five case studies.72

In Amsterdam, for instance, there is a ‘Religious Council’ that organises debates and meetings to bridge differences between various religious communities. In general, the city is represented by a staff member, the mayor or an alderman. Particularly when intergroup tensions rise, the council makes an effort to counter prejudice and stereotypes.

The ‘Council of Religions’ in Frankfurt works in similar ways and addresses current issues that are related to the peaceful cohabitation of religions in the city.

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**Box 32: Frankfurt: ‘Council of Religions’**

The Council of Religions was founded in a ‘bottom-up’ process in April 2009. For five years a private initiating circle consisting of representatives of the largest religions prepared the establishment of this autonomous council. The city of Frankfurt – and particularly the Department of Integration and its affiliated Office for Multicultural Affairs – supported the council’s development, although it was and continues not to be a formal member. Today the council has twenty-three members from nine religious communities and continues to receive the support of the city.

The council’s main goal is fostering dialogue both between the city and the various religions as well as among the different religious communities. It aims at overcoming conflicts between religious groups in the city and thus supporting the peaceful co-existence of Frankfurt’s diverse population and having a positive impact on integration. Thereby, the Council of Religions does not engage itself in theological questions but instead comments on questions regarding daily religious life. Though it is still too early to properly assess the full impact of the council’s work, what the council has already achieved in realising inter-

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72 Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Malmö, Terrassa and Wroclaw.
In Malmö, the Swedish Church and the Islamic Centre maintain an inter-religious dialogue. It started in a neighbourhood context and developed into a good working relationship. Representatives of both the Islamic Centre and the Swedish Church as well as city officials meet regularly in order to discuss current issues affecting the parties. Furthermore, the Islamic Centre initiated cooperation and various inter-religious activities with other (religious) organisations that aim at promoting integration and intergroup relations. Examples are the monthly ‘Free Debates’ which are open to everybody to discuss any topics of interest, and the project ‘Girls Talk’ for girls from all faiths to speak about issues and concerns they have relating to puberty.

In the city of Wroclaw, the Muslim Culture Centre initiated the ‘Wrocław Convention for Inter-religious Dialogue’. Representatives of Christianity, Islam and Judaism participated and signed a declaration on mutual respect and joint activities. The convention should be continued in 2009. Another example for inter-religious dialogue in Wroclaw is the ‘Quarter of the Four Religions’ which includes the Roman Catholic, Lutheran and Orthodox churches as well as the Jewish community. Apart from enhancing dialogue and relations between the religions, they also create conditions for cooperation in various social fields, particularly in charity, cultural activities and minority rights protection.

Inter-religious dialogue in the city of Terrassa has been initiated by the local Bahá’í community, since interfaith dialogue constitutes a part of their religion. Bahá’í organise projects such as conferences and round tables bringing Christians, Jews and Muslims together. It is noteworthy that faith related issues are not talked about, since these would not lead to a useful discussion. Human rights, children, family, citizenship and religion and integration are the topics of such discussions. The discussion process is flexible and changes according to the issues that are relevant.

Another impressive good practice example for improving the relations between religious communities is the ‘Jewish Moroccan Network Amsterdam’, which started off with a speech of the mayor in February 2006.

**Box 33: Amsterdam: ‘Jewish Moroccan Network Amsterdam’**

The Jewish Moroccan Network attempts to enhance relations between Jewish and Muslim communities as well as relations between these religious groups and the majority society. It was founded, first, because anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim prejudices show a lot of similarities, so it is considered necessary to fight them with one voice and, second, because of the worries that the two groups had with regards to each other. The network’s specific goals include:

1. resisting the expression of anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and discrimination in general,
2. improving the Dutch social and political climate and
(3) resisting the ‘ingroup-outgroup thinking’ as well as the stigmatisation of specific groups.

To reach these goals, the network connects people and helps them to come into contact, to get to know each other and to find common goals. The network also organises meetings between Muslims and Jews at school. It offers presentations of family experiences during the Second World War by Jewish and Moroccan youngsters. When a crisis involving the relationship between Jews and Muslims occurs, both in the Netherlands and elsewhere, the network has representatives of both groups publicly speak about the issue. In February 2009, for example, the network arranged gatherings in mosques so that Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam could talk about the Gaza conflict.

4.3. Improving relations with Muslim communities

The CLIP network has decided to focus the third module on relations to, and dialogue with Muslim communities for the following reasons: on the one hand, because Islam is by far the largest ‘new’ religion in European countries of immigration – in most CLIP cities, Islam has become the second largest religion after Christianity. On the other hand, because Muslims are often perceived as disconnected from ‘European life’. In many countries there is little interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims at the neighbourhood level and in other important social arenas of non working life and Muslims face discrimination more often than most other groups.73

Representing a significant group in most of the CLIP cities, some observers might assume that cities have formulated a specific strategy about relations towards Muslims. This is, however, not the case in any of the cities included in the current module of the CLIP project. **None of the cities has an explicit strategic concept that is specifically aimed at Muslim communities.** Three arguments are given by the cities to explain this.

First, almost all cities stated that they do not have a specific policy strategy aimed at Muslim groups because they have a general policy approach on how to manage relations between different ethnic and religious groups and/or on how to integrate migrant groups into local society. Such a general approach includes _all_ ethnic or religious migrant groups; thus, an explicit approach towards Muslims is not considered necessary. Some cities, like Stuttgart, believe that such a specific approach would even be inappropriate and counterproductive and in other cities like Malmö, particular policies that only address Muslims are even seen as potentially discriminatory.

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73 For example, one out of three Muslim respondents of the new European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey ‘EU-MIDIS’, which was carried out by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), stated that he or she had experienced discrimination in the past twelve months (FRA 2009b: 3). The Gallup World Poll shows that a major complaint across Muslim societies is that ‘the West’ denigrates Islam and Muslims and equates Islam with terrorism (cf. Esposito and Mogahed 2007).
Second, religious issues are not considered a municipal policy topic. The author of the Turku case study elaborates on this position: “When it comes to religion (in whatever form) policy documents have been silent. It is obviously not seen as a relevant policy concern.” A similar idea was voiced in Bologna, where “religion has never been regarded as an object of public action”. There is no special treatment reserved to religious communities, may they be Catholic or Muslim. The same seems to be true for Prague, Budapest and Tallinn. Some other cities, in particular Amsterdam and Breda, also emphasise the importance of the separation of religion and government.

A third reason for the lack of a specific policy approach is attributed to the number of Muslims in a city and/or the absence of problems related to Muslims in some cities. In Luxembourg, Prague and Wroclaw, for example, there is only a small number of Muslims living in the city; in Dublin, Zagreb and again Luxembourg, relations with Muslim communities are not considered sufficiently problematic to warrant a specific set of policy responses.

Despite this lack of officially adopted strategic policies aimed towards Muslim communities in all CLIP cities, in practice, however, several cities (in particular Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Vienna and Turin) have a political focus on Muslims and organise various projects and initiatives to improve relations with this group. Most of the other CLIP cities also acknowledge the importance of Islam for intergroup relations and conduct individual projects that are primarily aimed at Muslim communities.

4.3.1. Recognising Muslim communities and establishing relationships

Relations with Muslim communities are generally reported to be good by the CLIP cities; there were no reports about problematic relations or conflicts between the city administration and Muslim associations in any of the case studies. Nonetheless, the relations differ: while in some cities, both city officials and migrant representatives praised the excellent relations – explicitly in Arnsberg, Frankfurt, Lisbon, Wroclaw and Sundsvall –, Muslim representatives in other cities, for instance in Newport, Dublin and Stuttgart would like to improve the relationships.

Most of the CLIP cities consider regular contacts to play a vital role in order to improve relations with Muslim communities. Thus, nearly all cities with a considerable Muslim population maintain contacts with mosque associations: twenty-four cities have regular contacts with many local Muslim organisations; most of these cities institutionalised these contacts. In Athens, Budapest, Prague and Tallinn, by contrast, there are no regular contacts.

between the city and Muslim organisations. It is evident, that the kind and extent of the ‘regular contacts’ differ greatly.

The most important kind of contact does not seem to be the institutionalised, formal contact, but the informal conversations, phone calls and discussions about issues of daily life, funding and (common) activities, general requests and information between Muslim organisations and both city administrative staff and politicians, In every CLIP city, this kind of contact, based on mutual respect, is considered as most important.

Additionally, invitations of city officials by Muslim communities and vice versa are considered as helpful. As already discussed in chapter three, invitations are a symbol of mutual recognition and acceptance and can thus effectively enhance intergroup relations in a city. Therefore, several city officials invite Muslim representatives to official receptions and vice versa.

Several cities, e.g. Arnsberg, Lisbon and Frankfurt, invite Muslim representatives for official political receptions. In Arnsberg, the mayor invites committed representatives of local organisations to his New Year’s Reception; the leaders of the Muslim associations are always invited. The same holds true for the ‘spring reception’ in Frankfurt.

The annual (fast-breaking) iftar dinners during the Islamic month of Ramadan are important occasions for mutual invitations. In several cities, Muslim communities invite city representatives to attend the fast-breaking – and the officials make an effort to accept these invitations. In the city of Zurich, the city even organises iftar dinners at their town hall.

**Box 34: Zurich: Hosting of iftar dinners in the town hall**

At the end of Ramadan, the Zurich city president invites all local imams to the town hall for an iftar dinner in order to give a public statement of respect and recognition. This practice has been considered by all interview partners from the Muslim community as being very positive and effective.

Likewise, the mayor of the city of Vienna hosts iftar dinners and invites both Muslim representatives as well as local politicians for that they can meet each other. Besides the mayor’s event, there are several iftar receptions every year which are hosted by political parties, the mayor, senior government officials and other members of the public. Also the city of Breda once hosted an iftar dinner.

The lord mayor of the city of Stuttgart uses the religious month of Ramadan to improve relations to Muslim communities by sending greeting cards to local mosque associations.

Another means of enhancing relations with Muslim communities is their active involvement in public holidays and festivals as well as in municipal projects. In Lisbon, for instance,
Muslims actively participate in the celebration of the Day of Portugal and of the Portuguese Communities: there are both Catholic and Islamic services in order to affirm the belonging of Muslims to Portuguese society. The local intercultural festival in Arnsberg and a variety of other festivals are opened by multi-faith prayers, including Muslims.

Supplementary to the discussed occasional meetings, cities can organise an institutionalised, regular communication process between the city and representatives of the local Muslim population. The city of Stuttgart attempts to establish such a communication and cooperation forum: a ‘Local Islam Forum’. This forum should discuss and solve questions of co-existence and cooperation between Muslims and non-Muslims in Stuttgart. To prepare this forum, the city invited representatives of local mosque associations as well as of city institutions, welfare organisations, schools, media and police.

Apart from contacts, support influences the relations between the cities and Muslim communities. Some cities, for example Arnsberg, Bologna, Luxembourg and Vienna offer financial support to Muslim organisations, e.g. for activities or rooms.

‘Getting to know them’ is an important prerequisite for establishing contacts with Muslim organisations. Therefore, nine cities launched systematic programmes to gather information on Muslim life. The cities of Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Hospitalet and Terrassa, for instance, commissioned researchers to interview representatives of the various religious communities in order to gain systematic information about them (size, activities etc.) as well as to learn the migrant representatives’ assessments for local policies. Similarly, Turin’s Integration Affairs Department collected requests and demands of Muslims to understand the needs of the Islamic communities. Likewise, the city of Dublin carried out research on demands of Muslim communities. In the city of Kirklees, there was research on Islamic organisations, later published as ‘Mapping of Faiths’. The Islamic Centre of Malmö appointed two community researchers to collect data concerning the main interfaith issues within the city in the course of the project ‘New Ways’ and then established an inter-religious council to respond to those issues. In Vienna, the Division for Integration and Diversity (MA 17) cooperated with a Turkish media organisation (ZAMAN Avusturya) to carry out a survey among two hundred young people with Muslim background about their attitudes and experiences in Austria and their attitudes towards integration in general.

Finally, it is noteworthy that even though most cities are principally committed to get in contact or even cooperate with Muslim organisations in general, some of these cities are not in contact or do not cooperate with all of them. One, more practical, reason for that is that some cities do not (yet) know every community, as in Dublin, where the city administration is in an early stage of establishing contacts. Similarly, in Vienna, there are various smaller Muslim communities the city does not know and, thus, has no contact with.

76 In 2006, the Federal Ministry of the Interior initiated a German Islam Conference. The Stuttgart local Islam Conference should be along the lines of the conference on the national level.
Another reason for a lack of contact is a political assessment of the respective Muslim communities: the city of Antwerp, for instance, is not willing to have contacts with organisations that are suspected as Islamistic due to radical views and calling for radicalisation. The city of Stuttgart decided to be in contact with every migrant organisation, but not to cooperate with Islamistic organisations that are suspected of being politically extremist and acting against the constitution and are under the observation of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. The cities of Hospitalet, Kirklees and Malmö try to be in contact with every Muslim community, but several conservative mosque associations refuse to have contact with the municipality.

4.3.2. Empowerment and (political) involvement of Muslim representatives

It has already been discussed that the empowerment and involvement of migrant organisations can be a useful means with which to promote their activities and improve intergroup relations in general. Empowerment and involvement can also be specifically organised for Muslims. Several CLIP cities, such as Amsterdam, Kirklees, Newport, Stuttgart and Turin, employ this approach and launch programmes and initiatives that target Muslim communities.

The city of Turin empowers Muslim associations in their ability to use the media, to cooperate with local institutions and to present themselves to the majority population, e.g. by encouraging their participation in the city’s events and in training activities. Another project that aims to embed Muslim communities into local structures and to offer training to their leading members, takes place in Stuttgart. The city’s project ‘intercultural opening-up and qualification of Muslim organisations’ has been positively assessed by all Muslim participants and city officials.

Box 35: Stuttgart: qualification of young Muslim leaders

In order to reduce the possibility of mosque associations remaining in isolation (as some are), to help foster their establishment in local structures and to build contacts with German organisations, the city of Stuttgart developed the project ‘intercultural opening-up and qualification of Muslim organisations’.

The city – namely staff from the Integration Department, including a former Imam – offer regular training sessions for active young members of the associations who are often responsible for the mosques’ youth groups. Since April 2008, twenty-five young members from six mosque associations have participated in the project’s weekend classes. There they learned about association leadership, project management, youth work and public relations and establishing contact with the city’s offices and local NGOs.

Imams and the associations’ chairmen, both credited as being responsible for the opening-up of the organisations to the larger community, are included in the project. Muslim women are also included in the project to help strengthen their roles within the associations.
Apart from the training sessions, another long-term objective is the formation of an ‘intercultural task force’ that accompanies changes in the communities, mediates in the instance of conflicts and supports the population’s acceptance of Islam.

This project is a good practice example for many reasons: it demonstrates how cities can support the opening-up of mosque associations, establish efficient partnerships, and enhance both the integration and the peaceful co-existence of all residents in the city.

In much the same way, the city of Amsterdam is stressing the possibility of linking different Muslim organisations and establishing networks. Consequently, it gathered active young Muslims from various organisations such as the Poldermoskee, Moslim Jongeren Amsterdam and also from more conservative organisations in order to form a ‘Network of Key Figures’. The members were given organisational and media training. They were then encouraged to organise activities in their own groups, even though they could also more easily connect to similarly active groups in other parts of town. Since the members of the network had all been actively involved in Muslim associations previously, and had transferred practical skills and knowledge during the training courses, the training was successful and the network is considered as an achievement.

In Kirklees, the city council worked with mosques and madressahs (supplementary Islamic religious schools) in order to evaluate their youth work and then subsequently published guidance material aimed at helping to improve it. The city of Newport developed an interesting training programme for Imams and Muslim youth workers and teachers.

**Box 36: Newport: The child protection project in madressahs**

In the course of the Welsh Government’s programme ‘Communities First’ – which aims to improve the living conditions and prospects of people from disadvantaged communities – the city council’s Social Services Department and the BME Communities First Partnership established a working relationship that provided training programmes and support packages about child protection for mosques and madressahs (Islamic religious schools).

This project raised Imams’ awareness about forced marriage and ‘honour-based’ violence and promoted ‘positive parenting’; Imams are now expected to ensure that appropriate checks are carried out on staff working with children. Therefore, guidelines were produced on good working practices at madressahs, and specific training being made available. Furthermore, the project has helped relatively isolated mosques to establish positive relationships with the city and has encouraged some Imams to participate in community life. In some cases, the project has radically transformed attitudes.

Conclusively, the project supported not only child protection in Islamic schools, but also established and fostered positive relationships, where none had previously existed.

Some cities make an effort to connect and empower female Muslim representatives. This can be an effective means of overcoming women’s isolation and actively involving more of
the Muslim community via these women. The Stuttgart project just discussed considers these issues; the city attempts to actively involve women representatives in the project. Likewise, the city of Turin promotes several approaches focusing on Muslim women, mainly through Italian language courses, training courses about city services and empowerment processes. Giving tools to these women to access city services and to develop relations with other women is recognised as an important strategy to empower Muslim women.

In addition to these cities, the city of Frankfurt strives to empower Muslim women. It currently establishes a working group with Muslim women, who are engaged in local mosque associations to connect, qualify and empower them and supports a bottom-up initiative of committed Muslim women who are involved in associations’ activities.77

4.3.3. Information about and contact with Islam

In order to improve relations with Muslim communities, some CLIP cities do not only apply policies that target Muslims, but also strive to reach the majority population. An important means in this regard is to inform residents about Islam. Fears and prejudice about a group are more likely to develop when the group in question remains unknown. Hence, providing information about Muslim culture and religion is another way of enhancing conditions for better intergroup relations. Several CLIP cities have launched projects which inform about Islam – often in cooperation with local Muslim communities.

Some CLIP cities, such as Malmö, Terrassa, Turin and Arnsberg, conduct seminars and exhibits on Islam. The city of Malmö organises seminars for its residents at which Muslim representatives present their culture and religion in various ways. Similarly, in Terrassa, there are lectures about Islam and Moroccan society that are addressed to the whole population. Likewise, the ‘House for Peace’ in Antwerp, supported by churches, Muslim organisations and the city, organised evening meetings “about and with Muslims in Antwerp” dealing with issues such as history of Islam and the headscarf debate. The city of Turin’s Intercultural Centre implemented educational projects for school pupils, such as ‘Open Door to Maghrebi Islam’, which discussed Moroccan life in Italy and ‘Candid Islam’ which presented Muslim women’s lives.

The city of Arnsberg managed two projects to close the knowledge gap between Christians and Muslims. The popular project ‘Between Minaret and Steeple’ was conceptualised as a series of events that should be interesting for different target groups. It included rather academic lectures and speeches on Islam in general, practice-relevant training sessions on gender issues and Islam, theatre projects with children as well as visits to churches and

77 The ‘Competence Centre for Muslim Women’ aims at creating a network and therewith strengthening Muslim women, emphasising their abilities and supporting their integration into society via education (e.g. intercultural training and courses conducted in the participants’ mother tongue), informal meetings and counselling (e.g. about school systems).
mosques. The activities were a starting point for further cooperation. Similarly, the ‘Quran Project’ aimed to provide information on Islam.

**Box 37: Arnsberg: ‘Quran Project’**

In order to achieve a better understanding of Islam, the city of Arnsberg, local Muslim organisations, the Central Institute ‘Islam Archive Germany’ and a university organised the ‘Quran Project’. The project includes a travelling exhibition and an exhibit on Muslim integration in Arnsberg. The former, ‘Translating the Quran – Bridges between Cultures’, highlights how the translation of the Quran – and thus the perception of Islam in Europe – has changed over the centuries. The latter is more personal and emphasises the Quran’s relevance to Muslims in Arnsberg. It was prepared in local workshops with Muslim residents who described their migration history and the role of the Quran in their everyday lives. Furthermore, there are various additional programmes also about Islam, including training courses for teachers and various cultural events.

Another possibility of informing the majority population about Islam is to provide written information: the city of Vienna, for instance, has issued an information bulletin to inform the general public about Ramadan.

**Box 38: Vienna: ‘Ramadan Information Bulletin’**

The city of Vienna issues an information flyer which provides practical information about the duration of Ramadan, the expected increase in traffic and the shortage of parking space. The mosque associations distribute these bulletins in their neighbourhoods in order to inform the residents about this special month.

Apart from projects and events that are primarily developed by the cities themselves, there are various initiatives launched by Muslim communities, mosque associations and Islamic centres. The most common are the ‘Open Mosque’ days. In most CLIP cities, mosques open their doors to the wider public during specific days and, by doing so, inform their visitors about Islam and religious practices. In Valencia, for example, this is done during the yearly ‘Cultural Week’ and includes various events. In Stuttgart, a mosque participates in the cities’ ‘open door’ museum nights.

**Box 39: Valencia: ‘Open Mosque Days’**

In Valencia, mosques open their doors to the public on particular occasions. During the ‘Cultural Week’ in the district of Orriol, for instance, the local mosque of the Islamic Cultural Centre is open to the neighbourhood and other residents who are interested. Programmes inform non-Muslims about Islam. ‘Open Mosque Days’ are offered by other Muslim communities in the city as well. Many mosques are open to schools wishing to visit.

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78 For instance in the cities of Arnsberg, Dublin, Frankfurt, Kirklees, Luxembourg, Malmö, Stuttgart, Sundsvall, Turin, Valencia and Vienna.
In the city of Wroclaw, the Centre of Muslim Culture provides information about Islam during the ‘Day of Muslim Culture’.

In Amsterdam, the **Ramadan festival** brings Muslim and non-Muslim families together for dinner. During the four weeks long intercultural dialogue festival there are private and outdoor *iftar* dinners as well as public events such as music performances, lectures and debates. The festival is organised by Muslim, Christian, Jewish and non-religious organisations and supported by the city. It aims at providing insight into the Islamic fasting season and Muslim life in general, bringing people together and encouraging the perception that the Ramadan period is an opportunity for the common celebration of all residents.

Likewise, some mosques, in cities such as Arnsberg, Kirklees, Malmö, Newport, Stuttgart or Wroclaw, regularly invite school classes in order to present Islam to the students. In Kirklees, two mosque associations are members of the ‘Interfaith Kirklees’ project and present their religion and practices to school classes. Another good practice example of an ‘open’ Muslim community that launches projects aims at informing the public about Islam is the ‘Islamic Community of Lisbon’.

**Box 40: Lisbon: ‘Islamic Community of Lisbon’ (CIL)**

The ‘Islamic Community of Lisbon’ (CIL) has gone to great efforts to make Islam comprehensible to non-Muslims. It founded the ‘Portuguese Centre of Islamic Studies’ and runs the Central Mosque, which is a good practice example of an ‘open’ mosque. Here, the Quran (in Portuguese) as well as videos about Islamic history, culture and religion are available. The walls of the mosque’s main prayer room are decorated with sentences from the Quran that were translated into Portuguese. The CIL organises free Arabic courses in the mosque that are mainly attended by non-Muslim students. Furthermore, it organises conferences, workshops and trips around Lisbon, showcasing the city’s Islamic heritage and its effects on its architecture.

Information about Muslim culture and religion are also made available on the internet: over the course of the European Year of Equal Opportunities for All in 2007, the Re-Integration Centre for Migrant Workers in Athens launched a website with information on religious practices, maps showing where mosques are located in the city, as well as information about discrimination that Muslims often face. A plethora of other cities also provide information on religious communities on their municipal websites.
5. Tendencies of radicalisation and de-radicalisation policies

This chapter deals the issue of radicalisation in the cities that are members of the CLIP network. In many cities the topic of immigration has become politicised and radical ideological groups have developed around the issue. This concerns both the majority and minority populations. Xenophobic, nativist groups have formed in parts of the majority, on the side of minorities the issue of Islamist terrorism that some cities have recently experienced has strained intergroup relations.

For some cities radicalisation was a sensitive issue to discuss. As a consequence the case studies vary substantially in relation to the information provided on the topic.

We begin by explaining what exactly is meant by the term ‘radicalisation’ in the context of this report. We then provide an overview of the evidence in relation to issues of radicalisation within the majority population and policies developed by cities in response to concerns about the impact of this radicalisation on the safety of individuals and for intergroup relations. We then look at processes of radicalisation, including radicalisation based on religious ideology, within the minority population and policies which are being developed at the city level (often in the context of national initiatives) to deal with the potential risks with which this is associated.

5.1. What is radicalisation?

Radicalisation in democratic societies is a process of de-legitimisation of the political system in parts of a population, ranging from distrust to outright rejection of the political and societal system, coupled with a readiness to use undemocratic, unconstitutional means in the political process (Buijs, Demant and Hamdy 2006; Jesse 2004). Radicalisation is fed by political, cultural or religious ideologies and beliefs and can lead to radicalism as an attitude and behaviour in individuals and groups. Radicalism includes right-wing or left-wing political extremism, extreme political or ethnic nationalism, and – observable in most religions – religious-political extremism. In the context of the CLIP project we focus on radicalisation processes in both the majority and the migrant or minority populations.

As to the majority population we are interested in right-wing, anti-immigrant political radicalism. It is a historically known phenomenon in immigration societies happening particularly in times of economic crisis and has been studied as ‘nativism’. Nativism in the United States, for example, occurred as early as the 1830s, when a strong movement against Irish immigrants became a relevant influence in American politics. Nativism is found in the new immigration societies of Europe as well. Cities are the places where nativism occurs. The outbreak of nativism is usually accompanied by a public perception that immigration has greatly increased and is getting out of control. “When foreign accents are few, they are ignored. However, when they grow in numbers and concentrate in visible spaces (as in the
cities, FH), they trigger increasing apprehension. Natives are put on the defensive, as they fear that their way of life and their control of the levers of political and economic power will be lost to the newcomers” (Portes and Rumbaut 2006: 346).

Nativist groups are in recent literature often categorized as hate groups whereas their crimes are considered hate crimes. Farley (2005: 441) has summarised research on the conditions that explain the rise of such hate groups and what makes certain people receptive towards nativist ideologies: “… competition and perceived threat, feelings of personal insecurity, and a need to scapegoat have all been identified as factors that contribute to prejudice…for these reasons, the highest levels of prejudice generally have been found in people who are experiencing downward economic mobility…Thus, support for hate groups … often is strongest when economic conditions worsen”.

Growing economic inequality in society is another condition that feeds hate against minorities and migrants (ibidem). If (right wing) political leadership organises prejudice and hate, we see the rise of a nativist anti-immigrant movement that often is ready to use militant means outside the democratic process to reach its goals.

As to the migrant or minority population the concern of cities presently is about religious-political radicalisation. Religious-political radicalisation in principle can occur in any religion and population. The history of Christianity is full of such cases. The concern in present day European cities, however, is primarily about radicalisation among Muslim migrants, about Islamism.

Buijs, Demant and Hamdy (2006) have done a valuable empirical study on this movement which helps to explain the phenomenon. It refers to the Netherlands, but seems to be transferable to other European countries as well.

Looking at some individual characteristics of Islamist extremists it has been found that they are young, are males, are often from the second and third immigrant generation, are mostly rather well educated and frequently define themselves as ‘reborn’.

Buijs et al. state that radicalisation processes begin with an individual on a quest and that individual circumstances can play an important part in this. The feeling of having reached a crisis point in one’s life is such a circumstance. “The quest that follows usually begins with questions such as ‘who am I?’ ‘what do I want?’ ‘what is my purpose here on earth?’ ‘is there a God?’…Parents are not in a position to give conclusive answers…The young people will then hunt for someone who can provide them with answers to these questions. In the context of this quest they become involved in the process of forging new social links, which can also meet their requirements for warmth and security. What is important is the feeling of belonging somewhere, of feeling connected with a group” (ibidem: 175/176).

The more links an individual has with society and the more varied they are, the slower and more tortuous will be the process. Young people, particularly of the second or third migrant generation, often experience marginality, a status of not or unsure social belonging.
Marginality is connected with feelings of insecurity and alienation and tends to make people receptive for the attempts of radical organisations to recruit new members (Heckmann 2004). Young people who are well integrated in family and religious Islamic community thus do not tend to be easily influenced by the recruitment efforts of extremist religious organisations.

Regarding a political dimension of the radicalisation process in young minority people there is often a feeling of injustice as a motivation for the new orientations. Injustice not only as something personally experienced, but as the frustration over the ill treatment of groups one identifies with, such as the frustration about prejudice against Islam in the West, the ill treatment of the Palestinians and of Islamic states. The feeling of injustice done to others can provoke solidarity with these groups and a motivation of revenge for their suffering. A study by the European Parliament (2007: 16) on Islam in the European Union emphasises that the perception of international conflicts as in the Middle East often motivates terrorist groups.

Radicalisation that we have observed in the city case studies has different dimensions. It can be both an attitude (attitudinal radicalisation) and/or behaviour, for instance verbal or non-verbal abuse, committing a crime, or discriminating. Radicalisation can be found in the media public, as a radical rhetoric, that need not necessarily be linked to behaviour, but often is.

Radicalisation can occur as individual attitudes and behaviour, but it has a different quality and more influence, when it is organised in groups and networks and has organisational resources for mobilisation. The kind of organisation is another important dimension in the analysis of radicalisation processes.

What is the relation between radicalism and terrorism? Political or religious radicalism is not the same as terrorism. Radicalisation and radicalism is a ‘necessary’ step towards terrorism, but has a very different attitude towards the use of violence. Cities can and do develop policies against radicalisation and radicalism – in that sense a preventive policy against terrorism – but have to leave dealing with terrorism and its secret organisation to the police.

In the context of the CLIP case studies it is often difficult to decide what radicalisation is and what is not. Is it radicalisation, when, like it has been described in the case study on Turin, autochthonous inhabitants of a city quarter protest the changes and – in their eyes – deterioration of the quality of life in their quarter, when significant groups of migrants have moved in, when house prices have fallen and when there is more noise, dirt and crime in the streets than before the migrants moved in? The protest can be called radical and anti-immigrant if it mobilises ethnic, racist and anti-immigrant prejudice and discrimination, but should not be called radical and anti-immigrant if it uses legitimate arguments and procedures in the democratic process.

In social life, but also in the social sciences, different terms quite often are used for describing the same or similar phenomena. In some case studies, like on Vienna and Wolverhampton, reference is made to forms of ‘extremism’. The reality referred to, however, is the same as in other case studies which use the term radicalism or radicalisation.
processes.\textsuperscript{79} If this is a terminological problem which can be rather easily solved, the question of the existence or non-existence of radicalisation processes and tendencies in cities is a more difficult issue. It concerns the question of empirically measuring and knowing about radicalisation tendencies in the population. Quite a few cities and the researchers of the CLIP project team are unsure about the empirical reality of these phenomena, as is reported in the case studies. In Table 4 we have recorded radicalisation forms and trends in different cities and have marked those cities with a question mark, where the empirical judgement on the existence of radicalisation tendencies is uncertain.

### Table 3: Radicalisation tendencies in segments of city population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political radicalisation tendencies</th>
<th>In majority group</th>
<th>In minority group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam, Antwerp, Breda, Copenhagen, Kirklees, Turin, Turku, Vienna, Wolverhampton, Dublin (?), Malmö (?)</td>
<td>Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Vienna</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious-political radicalisation tendencies</th>
<th>Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Kirklees, Breda (?), Dublin (?), Malmö (?), Stuttgart (?), Vienna (?)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No radicalisation reported</th>
<th>Arnsberg, Athens, Bologna, Frankfurt, Lisbon, Luxembourg, Hospitalet, Newport, Stuttgart, Sundsvall, Tallinn, Terrassa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Concern over future radicalisation | Dublin, Newport, Turku, Valencia |

Sources: CLIP case studies

\textsuperscript{?} = evidence is controversial; for the rest of cities it was not possible to extract sufficient information from the case studies

Table 4 demonstrates that a \textbf{majority of cities does not report political radicalisation tendencies} neither in the majority nor the minority population. Political radicalisation tendencies related to immigration issues in the majority are reported in nine cities; in two further cities the evidence is not clear. The political radicalisation tendencies reported for the minority groups (three cases) refer to ‘imported conflict’ due to historical or present conflict in the country of origin.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{79} Breda is another case: the case study describes the same phenomena as other cities, but emphasises that the representative of the diversity department regards radicalisation or radicalism too “heavy” a concept to capture the reality to the town.

\textsuperscript{80} For example the Turkish – Kurdish conflict.
Religious-political radicalisation tendencies are only reported for the minority population and in all cases the concern is about Islamist radicalisation. It is worth noting, however, that only in four cities the existence of such tendencies seems to be evident. In six other cities the evidence and the perception of the situation is controversial.

The history and sociology of nativism teaches that times of economic crisis very often deteriorate the relations between migrant and non-migrant groups in immigration societies. In four cities it has been clearly stated that one is much concerned about a deterioration of intergroup relations due to the present economic crisis.

5.2. Radicalisation in the majority population

In this section we will first report on the cities’ descriptions of radicalisation in the majority population. The approaches and measures taken by cities towards such radicalisation will then be discussed.

5.2.1. Patterns of radicalisation

A group of eleven cities does not report significant radicalisation processes in the population against immigrant groups. There are prejudiced individuals, as might be expected, isolated incidents of discrimination or even violence, but there is no or very little organisation of anti-immigrant feelings and no significant support for such tendencies in the majority population. This is reported for Arnsberg, Athens, Bologna, Frankfurt, Hospitalet, Lisbon, Luxembourg, Newport, Stuttgart, Sundsvall, Terrassa and Valencia.

Where radicalisation was found the following patterns were identified:

- Attitudinal radicalisation
- Voting for anti-immigrant parties
- Multi-layered radicalisation processes in parts of city populations
- Cities as a staging ground for radical groups from outside.

Attitudinal radicalisation

Attitudinal radicalisation relates to attitudes in parts of the majority population within a city. In the absence of recent representative surveys, evidence of attitudinal radicalisation of parts of the population comes primarily from interviewed experts in the cities. Thus, this phenomenon cannot be quantified at the moment, but still expresses that radicalisation in the perception of cities is a rather widespread phenomenon. Attitudinal radicalisation implies that the attitudes have not yet translated into anti-immigrant action, or rather that there are only isolated incidents of verbal or physical abuse. Attitudinal radicalisation additionally is characterised by the absence of systematic organisation of anti-immigrant feelings. Attitudinal radicalisation has been reported for Dublin. In Dublin, but also in Valencia,
considerable concern was expressed that the effects of the present economic crisis might radicalise larger segments of the population, both in terms of attitudes and behaviour.

**Voting for anti-immigrant parties**

Radical, openly anti-immigrant parties have gained certain influence in elections in the CLIP cities of Amsterdam, Antwerp, Kirklees and Vienna. In Wolverhampton support for the British National Party has significantly increased in some quarters of the city, and Turku reports initial success for a nationalist anti-immigrant party. When radical parties use the democratic institutions to gain influence and power it does not make them less radical. The adverse influence of election success of right-wing, anti-immigrant and often anti-Muslim parties on intergroup relations consists of making intercultural and inter-religious dialogue more difficult and possibly reinforces radical trends in the minority groups. The Amsterdam case study notes that the electoral success of right wing parties with open anti-Muslim statements, like PVV will necessitate a lot of extra effort “to convince the Muslims of the good intentions of the Dutch”.81

Anti-immigrant parties have gained strength within the Austrian Parliament and the Viennese City Council since the early 1990s. The Vienna case study emphasises that this “has not left much room for the development of anti-immigrant and anti-minority groups outside of the parliamentary arena”. The effect of this parliamentary institutionalisation of anti-immigrant radicalism on intergroup relations seems to be ambivalent: on the one side the parliamentary institutionalisation provides legitimacy and lots of publicity to an undemocratic movement, on the other hand one could argue that a large and more radical, openly neo-Nazi movement might have an even more detrimental effect on intergroup relations and intercultural and inter-religious dialogue. The Austrian Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism reports that right-wing extremist positions only find weak support among the public and that they would have only rather limited success in the recruitment of active supporters.

**Multi-layered radicalisation processes**

Respondents from the city of Kirklees have expressed concern over forms of a multi-layered radicalisation in parts of its majority population. This pattern is characterised by negative attitudes, by organisation, voting for a radical, anti-immigrant party and discriminating behaviour of parts of the population against minorities. The council considers integration to be severely undermined. As we shall see later on, Kirklees has set up a comprehensive system to deal with these problems.

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81 PVV got 13% of the vote in the 2009 European elections and became the second largest party in the city.
Cities as a staging ground for radical groups from outside

The city of Arnsberg does not report significant radicalisation, but there have nonetheless been attempts by outside radical Neo-Nazi groups to use the city as a staging ground for their anti-immigrant activities. This is happening very frequently in other cities in Germany as well, often in those which have some kind of historic and symbolic meaning in the eyes of the radical groups.

In Bologna as well, the city has been used as a stage for the anti-immigrant actions of the Northern League, despite the city’s fight against racism and ethnic discrimination. And Breda reports that anti-immigrant groups from surrounding villages come together in the outgoing district of the city.

5.2.2. Policies and measures against radicalisation tendencies within the majority

Some cities, like Arnsberg, Sundsvall or Valencia, for which no significant radicalisation is reported, have no explicit policy against radicalisation. Others have explicit policies of which some examples are presented in the following.

Support for civil society groups

In most cities there are a number of civil society groups who fight radicalisation and anti-immigrant movements within the majority population. They range from single local activities responding to some kind of ethnocentric or racist incident, to sustained, long term efforts of large scale organisations such as welfare associations or foundations to change attitudes. Civil society initiatives generally operate on their own resources, but could be additionally supported by the municipality. The city of Vienna for example supports such organisations to fight racism and anti-immigrant sentiment. Kirklee is another example. Here the anti-radical forces include interfaith forums, the national organisation Stop Hate UK, the main political parties (Labour, Conservatives and Liberals) and trade unions.

Cultural counter-mobilisation

Another kind of measure against radicalisation in which the municipality and civil society can cooperate is ‘cultural counter-mobilisation’. By cultural counter-mobilisation we mean a form of protest against radicalisation processes that uses cultural and artistic forms. An attempt is made to organise and mobilise culturally against the inhumane and pessimistic message of radical groups by celebrating a lively international festival that appeals to larger segments of the majority population.

**Box 41: Arnsberg: ‘Open to the World Festival’**

The city of Arnsberg had been chosen by neo-Nazis from Hamburg to serve as a staging ground for a big demonstration in 2001. In response to that the city and representatives from 200 associations got together and organised an attractive cultural festival against nationalism,
extremism and violence with music, theatre, information stands and exhibits. As a consequence the neo-Nazis gave up their plans.

**Reporting systems for discrimination**

This is a pattern which refers to extensive reporting systems for hate crimes and discrimination against the minority population. Usually the police is the institution to address when reporting on crimes. Some cities provide for additional and/or alternative institutions. The municipality of Kirklees has followed recommendations from the MacPherson Report\(^{82}\), as stated in the Kirklees case study: “As such, Kirklees was the first local authority in West Yorkshire, alongside Leeds, to launch the Third Party Reporting Centre Scheme in 2002. The reporting centres are venues other than police stations where people can report hate crimes, in an anonymous way and without having to be in contact with the police. Kirklees also has its own online reporting website as well as the national one, both of which allow users to report hate incidents directly from home. … In addition, a third way of reporting hate crimes was launched as a Home Office Pilot in July 2006. This line offers a chance to speak to an operator. Reports can be made on the line and future action will be followed up by the police force where the incident occurred…. A fourth and final option to report hate crimes is by going to a police station. The Police Service in Kirklees has seen an improvement in the resources and skills put into dealing with hate crimes. Specific officers are now in place to deal with any hate crime or other incident that is reported at the station”.

**Social control measures**

Changing anti-immigrant attitudes, ethnic or racist prejudice in a population is a difficult task and takes time. Cities, however, can increase forms of social control measures against radicalisation processes directly and in a short time perspective: One does not wait until attitudes have changed, but increases control and sanctions against unwanted behaviour.

Kirklees has developed a special measure to protect people from discrimination and harassment by radicalised groups when looking for housing, as illustrated in the box.

**Box 42: Kirklees: ‘Safe Tenant Initiative’**

The safe tenant initiative gives migrants and minorities more protection when viewing a property and for the first weeks after moving into a new home. Under the scheme tenants will receive an agreed number of home visits by housing staff and the police, if necessary, during the first weeks of their tenancy. This is to check that everything is working out well and to take details of any incidents of harassment that may have occurred. It is believed that having

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\(^{82}\) The report by Sir William MacPherson in 1999 followed an inquiry into the Metropolitan Police’s investigation of the murder of a black teenager, Stephen Lawrence. Nobody has been convicted of his murder. The report contained allegations of incompetence and racism on the part of the police.
housing officers and police in the area can have a positive effect in putting off people who might otherwise take part in harassment.

In Newport the police plays a significant role in monitoring the activities of xenophobic, Islamophobic and anti-Semitic groups. As reported in the case study: “The police have also played a role in maintaining good relations by providing additional uniformed officers to patrol areas around mosques at times of tension, for example following incidents at the Newport mosques… and the London terrorist events on 2005…According to the city, the police monitoring in Newport is carried out with the cooperation of the Imams at each of the mosques. In addition, the police have established specific policies to deal with incidents of hate crime…and have recently established a community cohesion team”.

5.3. Radicalisation in the minority population

In this section we first report on the description by the cities in relation to radicalisation tendencies within the migrant and minority population. We will then describe policy approaches against these tendencies.

It must be noted that cities and researchers often remark that it is quite difficult to gain insight into minority radicalisation processes and to formulate clear cut statements in regard to these processes (cf. table 4). We still have cautiously tried to identify certain patterns of minority radicalisation in the case study reports and will discuss these.

Some cities report that they do not have radicalisation in their minority population. Arnsberg, Athens, Bologna, Lisbon, Luxembourg, Newport, Sundsvall, Turin, Turku, Valencia and Wolverhampton belong to this group.

5.3.1. Patterns of radicalisation

Regarding radicalisation tendencies within the minority population, several patterns of radicalisation can be identified.

Attitudinal religious radicalisation

Attitudinal radicalisation is a pattern in which radical attitudes in some parts of the minority population can be observed or inferred from documents such as leaflets, newspapers, speeches. Attitudinal radicalisation refers to processes in which radical attitudes are not yet connected with radical behaviour, and in which the attitudinal radicalisation has not yet taken the form of radical organisation. Attitudinal religious radicalisation is reported for small groups of Muslims in Dublin and Vienna.
Radical mosque

Islam is not a homogeneous religion, but, on the contrary, very heterogeneous and internally differentiated and divided. The pattern of ‘radical mosque’ refers to one or several mosques where radical imams have groups of followers in varying numbers. In comparison to attitudinal radicalisation ‘radical mosque’ means that a form of organisation exists, however loose that may be.

It is not easy to judge whether a mosque can be regarded as radical or Islamist. It is often the internal security services who do the classification. For cities it is not easy to challenge the classifications of mosques by the internal security services, since they do not have similar information at their disposal.

Radicalisation as a security threat

For Amsterdam, Copenhagen and Kirklees the city studies report cases of religious-political radicalisation processes within the migrant or minority population. For Breda, Dublin, Malmö, Stuttgart and Vienna the CLIP researchers got conflicting, inconclusive information on such tendencies. Where religious radicalisation is reported it is also understood as a security threat. The city of Kirklees is a case in point. According to the case study, the city can be regarded as a high risk area for potential radicalisation in the name of Islam: “There is threat of both political and religious radicalisation which could potentially be a mixture of attitudinal and organised, formal and informal. This was demonstrated by the participation of some members of the Muslim community in Kirklees in the London bombings in 2005”, as the case study reports. The characteristics of potential members or supporters of such radicalised groups in the city are not known locally yet potential groups do demonstrate their influence in the media or other action.

Ethnic conflict import

Finally, some cities report political radicalisation and intergroup conflict within the migrant population in regard to political conflict in the country of origin (Frankfurt, Stuttgart, and Vienna). It is different from religious radicalisation. The political conflict originates from conflict in the country of origin, as seen between Turks and Kurds in the case of Turkey, and has been ‘imported’ via migration into the immigration country.

5.3.2. Policies and measures against radicalisation tendencies in the minority

It can justly be argued that any measure and effort for integration (indirectly) is also a preventive measure against radicalisation. In the following, we will present cases of intercultural policies which are related to preventing or controlling radicalisation processes in the migrant and minority population. The section first discusses preventive measures by minority groups, then preventive measures by majority groups and ends by examining the
‘Amsterdam approach’, a research based, multi-level preventive and anti-radicalisation strategy developed in Amsterdam.

**Preventive measures of Muslim groups**

Many Muslims are well aware of the potential damage done to their religion and group by radical rhetoric and action. They have started initiatives that should prevent radicalisation.

Imams could be agents of radicalisation within the Muslim population. It is essential, therefore, to **avoid hiring radical imams**. The careful choice and education of imams by mosque associations can therefore be an important measure to prevent radicalisation. A better alternative to train Imams is to have chairs of theology for Islam at European universities, like in the Netherlands.

**Box 43: Terrassa: careful choice and education of imams**

The Terrassa Mosque *Association Cultural Musulmana de Terrassa*, for instance, does not like travelling Imams and investigates carefully the background of a new imam before they hire him. Their umbrella organisation has founded an imam school in Madrid, where twenty boys are studying now. The Terrassa mosque prefers to take imams from that school to be sure that they get the right kind of imam.

Preventive measures against radicalisation include the **control of travelling imams** who offer to preach in a mosque. An example is the *Al Fath* mosque in Hospitalet. The board members of the mosque question anybody that turns up and intervene immediately if they suspect that there is an attempt to radicalise the believers. The case study reports: “When the usual imam was on haj (yearly pilgrimage) a travelling imam turned up that came from a nearby town in Catalonia who was known to have an extremist community with relations to Al Qaida. The Al Fath mosque interrogated him and told him he could preach, but only if he would just talk about the Koran and leave any reference to international politics out, nothing about the Iraqis, nothing about the Palestinians. He kept his promise, but the mosque officials managed to get rid of him”.

The attractiveness of radical religious groups for young people often consists of providing social relations and a sense of belonging to a group. Thus, offering alternatives for isolated young people, for instance **youth clubs**, could be a preventive measure against recruiting attempts by radical Islamist groups. The remarkable feature of the Young Muslim Club in Dublin described in the box is that it originates from within the minority.

**Box 44: Dublin: Young Muslims Club**

In Dublin there are groups among the migrants and minority populations that attempt to mobilise against radicalisation: one organisation within the Muslim population has established a young Muslims club, “away from the mosque to try and encourage them to integrate and communicate with other young people from other parts of Dublin society. The
stated aims of this project are to try to prevent younger people becoming isolated and potentially radicalised”.

A remarkable initiative has been taken by young Muslims in Amsterdam. Faced by the difference between their needs and the existing more traditional structures in the mosques often run by elderly first-generation immigrants, they established an ‘open’, mosque for young people, the *Poldermoskee* (‘Polder mosque’). The name of the mosque represents its philosophy, for it refers to the *poldermodel*, the Dutch traditional mode of discussions between groups in order to reach consensus.

**Box 45: Amsterdam: Poldermoskee**

Young Muslims founded the liberal ‘polder mosque’, the philosophy of which is based on five pillars:

1. The language of lectures and sermons is Dutch, only smaller rituals consist of Arab verses.
2. The mosque is an inter-ethnic institution, including imams of different ethnic backgrounds who also follow different branches of Islam.
3. Young people are the primary target audience of the mosque’s programmes.
4. The mosque is kindly disposed towards women; there are no dressing rules and women can pray in the same hall behind men.
5. The mosque is a bridge between Muslims and non-Muslims. It invites all people from its neighbourhood, cooperates with the city district authorities and organises informational events, guided tours and discussions – even on topics that are perceived as taboo subjects, such as honour killings, homosexuality or domestic violence.

The *Poldermoskee* tries to bring different views of Islam together; hence, intense discussions take place. Generally, it has a liberal image, but there are also more conservative members. Amsterdam’s local authorities highly appreciate the mosque. The mosque is financially struggling but has not asked for funding from the city.

The *Poldermoskee* is not only appreciated by its members, but, according to the case study, also “very much appreciated by the authorities on all levels and is considered by many exactly what both Dutch and Muslims were waiting for”.

**Preventive measures of majority groups**

*Trust building* is not any special policy or measure toward minorities. Instead it is a general approach that is relevant in all kinds of social relations. Still, in majority minority relations trust building and trust are extremely important for preventing or managing intergroup conflict.
The following is a pattern of trust building that we find – in different degrees – in all the case studies: the mayor and the leadership of the council make an effort to get to know the representatives of all or the most relevant migrant and minority associations on personal terms and to build a continuing relationship. The mayor and other city leaders invite the representatives to official events, visit the associations, and accept invitations for celebrations, jubilees and religious holidays of the different ethnic and religious associations.

The approach can be illustrated by the case study on Vienna: “The general perception and attitude of the city towards radicalism among immigrant and minority groups focuses on upholding sustainable relations with all immigrant organisations and fostering …continuous dialogue. As explained by the head of the Magistrate Division on Integration and Diversity…a main strategy of the city is to invest in a good relationship and continuous dialogue with all immigrant communities and to build networks between the administration, immigrant associations and other civil society organisations on district levels”.

**Box 46: Vienna: sustained intercultural dialogue**

The city of Vienna understands that intercultural dialogue needs to be applied in all policy areas and that this is helpful in preventing radicalisation. The city’s main strategy in this regard is to invest in a strong relationship and continuous dialogue with all immigrant communities by building networks between the administration, immigrant associations and other civil society organisations at the district level. The city believes that sustained dialogue is the main method to reach its general political goals, which include providing for equal treatment, equality of chance and participation in all areas of society. In addition to participating in dialogue the city funds a variety of projects involving both religious and immigrant organisations, and at these organisations the Department for Integration and Diversity’s staff regularly speak on integration issues. Through these activities, the city supports the acceptance of diversity (and not the demands for assimilation) and the social advancement of immigrants, and thus in turn prevents radicalisation.

Intergroup relations theory strongly supports a trust building strategy (ASDC 1992 and 2002):

- Conflicts can be prevented or reduced, when members of groups have the opportunity to get to know one another as individuals. There is less of a tendency then to perceive another group and its members as monolithic and homogeneous. This is a way of breaking up stereotypes, which can be rather easily reached at the local level.

- Group relations improve when groups identify each other’s assets (culture, language, history) and use and exchange them as part of the intergroup process.

- “Sufficient time must be provided for a group to overcome their initial feelings of anger and prejudice toward one another and develop trust. Relationships must be ongoing in order to effect long term change” (ASDC 1999: 4).
If conflict and tensions develop between majority and minority, trustful relations between leaders can be a basis for commonly trying to find a way out of the crisis.

**Training future leaders** of Islamic communities is another approach. Some cities have started projects with which to reach promising young adults from different mosques. Young men, of the second generation and rather well educated, have shown interest in radical messages. An attempt is made to offer them alternatives and to make them resistant against radicalisation. The Stuttgart project ‘Qualification of young Muslim leaders’ and similar projects that have already been described can serve as examples of this approach.

In the section on policies against radicalisation in the majority population we have already described a [system of reporting discrimination](#). The focus is there on the perpetrator. The discrimination reporting system should deter possible perpetrators from the majority group and enable sanctioning those that have discriminated. Discrimination reporting systems, however, can also play a role in preventing radicalisation in the minority population. In the complicated process of religious radicalisation of young Muslims feelings of discrimination seem to play an important role. To give victims of discrimination an opportunity for reporting discrimination cases to authorities and enabling these to do justice to the victims can strengthen the belief in the justness and legitimacy of the social and political order of the immigration country. In this sense reporting systems for discrimination are a preventive measure against radicalisation processes in the minority population as well. This reasoning is also part of the comprehensive Amsterdam approach against radicalisation that will be described below.

We have described the [role of the police](#) for managing intergroup relations in chapter 3.5. Projects like ‘Cooperation between the Police and Mosque Associations’ in Stuttgart or creating an ‘Ethnic Liaison Unit’ in Dublin have been discussed there as intercultural policies. In the context of this chapter it is important to emphasise that such policies and projects by the police should also be seen in the context of preventing radicalisation processes.

**The Amsterdam approach: a holistic, multi-level preventive anti-radicalisation strategy**

The Amsterdam approach, developed after the murder of Theo Van Gogh, is not just a single measure to prevent and fight Muslim radicalisation, but a comprehensive approach, which is directed towards both minority and majority groups. It is significantly based on research by research at the IMES Institute at the University of Amsterdam.

Following the case study, dealing with the hardcore radicalised *jihadi* groups is primarily the responsibility of the police. The city is concerned about those in the process of radicalisation. The city recognises that prevention must deal with three different levels and has described this in the Common Reporting Scheme:
“General prevention: tackle the breeding ground of grievances that may lead young Muslims to be convinced by a jihadi worldview, including the grievance of Islamophobia and discrimination which seems to be growing among the majority population…

Specific prevention: recognise that young Muslims are at risk of encountering the jihadi ideology. The city seeks to strengthen the resilience in the Muslim communities.

Recognise that some individuals are on this path of radicalisation and are beyond basic prevention, but are not dangerous enough for the police to be interested. The city tries to assist youth professionals in dealing with radicalising youth through positive interventions (mentoring, coaching, standard assistance, and ideological challenge). In some cases the police is informed, but only take charge when there are indications of relevant preparatory action”.

**Box 47: Amsterdam: A comprehensive anti-radicalisation strategy**

After the murder of Theo van Gogh the city of Amsterdam has developed a comprehensive strategy against radicalisation in both the majority and minority population, with an emphasis on Islamism. It is aimed at the process of radicalisation. Dealing with hard core radicals like Jihadi groups is left to the police.

The programme has a general prevention strategy, which consists of fighting the legitimate grievances of young Muslims, like their frustrations about discrimination. In specific programs the city tries to strengthen the resilience of Muslim communities against jihadi ideology. On an individual level the city supports intervention programs like mentoring, coaching social assistance and ideological challenge that aim at radicalising youth.

As an aspect of general prevention the city has built a system of fighting discrimination of Muslims (Anti Discrimination Office Amsterdam).

Specific prevention programmes are still much in development, as this is a very difficult area. “Another aspect to diminish the breeding ground for radicalisation is to support parents with children who are in search of their religious and cultural identity. It has been noticed that support for parents is needed, though the parents do not easily come with questions to Dutch institutions, because they think they don’t know anything about Islam…. Training of teachers is also an important element of the approach. Teachers should be able to recognise which boys and girls are getting lost in their search for a positive identity”, as stated in the case study.

Another important idea is to make existing non-radical Muslim organisations stronger and to support young Muslims. Muslim associations play an important role in diminishing the breeding ground for radicalisation and to increasing resilience and empowerment of youngsters. They can make their members aware of the different views on Islam, provide them with information on what is orthodox and what is moderate and organise discussion on this. Among others, a network of high potential young Muslims has been created that receives training and takes part in ideological and religious discussions which are supposed to
make people aware of the different views on Islam, on what orthodoxy is and to learn to be critical towards sources of information.

An ‘Information Household Radicalisation’ has been installed as a **programme working towards anti-radicalisation**. Persons who think that individuals or groups are in the process of radicalising can report this. The Information Household analyses the case, gives advice and tries to find the right individuals to interfere in the situation. Professionals from schools, youth work, police and city districts can phone the Information Household for a report or advice.

If a case of radicalisation has been confirmed the procedure is to ask for the cooperation of people who surround the group or individual. The cooperation of imam, school teachers, youth workers, parents, family members and anybody who could assist is essential. Parents are informed of what the views of their son or daughter could imply. To understand a particular case, possible social problems of the person are addressed, relating to home, income or physical and mental health. If possible he or she is provoked into discussions with a religious expert, whose views are not too far from his or her view. There have been eight to ten cases of this intervention per year.

The Amsterdam case study has described only few of the sixteen projects in the *Amsterdam tegen Radicalisering* program. The approach can be considered completely new and innovative, but also still fully under development. A comprehensive evaluation thus is not possible at the present time.

Cesari (2009: 1, after Eurofound 2009: 17) has criticised many anti-radicalisation measures towards Muslims as securitisation: “the measures intended to prevent radicalisation actually engender discontent and prompt a transformation of religious conservatism to fundamentalism. This is the process of securitization”. The Amsterdam approach intents to carefully avoid this danger.

### 6. Conclusions and Recommendations

*To be written after the Amsterdam Conference and the discussion with Advisory Committee of Eurofound.*
Bibliography


Annex: CLIP European Research Group

The following institutes and researchers from the CLIP European research group contributed to this report.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institute</th>
<th>University</th>
<th>Researchers</th>
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<tr>
<td>Centre for Migration Policy Research (CMPR)</td>
<td>University of Swansea (United Kingdom)</td>
<td>Heaven Crawley, Tina Crimes</td>
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<tr>
<td>european forum for migration studies (efms)</td>
<td>University of Bamberg (Germany)</td>
<td>Wolfgang Bosswick, Friedrich Heckmann, Doris Lüken-Klaßen, Franziska Pohl</td>
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<td>Forum of International and European Research on Immigration (FIERI)</td>
<td>University of Turin (Italy)</td>
<td>Tiziana Caponio, Irene Ponzo, Roberta Ricucci, Giovanna Zincone</td>
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<td>Institute of International Studies</td>
<td>University of Wroclaw (Poland)</td>
<td>Patrycja Matusz, Protasiewicz</td>
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<td>Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES)</td>
<td>University of Amsterdam (the Netherlands)</td>
<td>Anja van Heelsum, Rinus Penninx</td>
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<td>Institute for Urban and Regional Research (ISR)</td>
<td>Austrian Academy of Sciences, University of Vienna (Austria)</td>
<td>Heinz Fassmann, Peter Görgl, Josef Kohlbacher, Bernhard Perchinig, Mihály Szabó</td>
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